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Abstract

The purpose of this project is to examine the growth of the American military service
regimes along with how the American State used those regimes to construct American identity.
To accomplish this, this project looks at the length of American war as a dependent variable
from the types of war fought and the military service regimes. Over the course of this study, we
examine four distinct eras: the militia regime, the coercive regime, the Peacetime Draft, and the
All-Volunteer Force. Each of these correspond to various types of identity development, which
include individual state, regional/national, international, and retrospective identity, respectively.
This project takes a mixed-methods approach to examining these variables, using history, general
observations, and quantitative data to provide a thorough analysis of how military service helps
to shape American identity over time. The results of the analysis show that, over time, the
development of American identity in its numerous forms corresponded to the type of military
service regime, where individual states created militias and state-identity, conscription regimes
created regional and national identities, the Peacetime Draft created an international identity, the
lack of conscription created a retrospective identity. By the end, this project shows that the use
of the All-Volunteer Force is both lengthening American war, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and leaving open a space where American identity is no longer being constructed by the State.
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Chapter One
Service and Identity: An Introduction
“Whoever said the pen is mightier than the sword obviously never
encountered automatic weapons.”
--General Douglas MacArthur

In 2014, Chief Warrant Officer Ralph Rigby retired from the U.S. Army. Rigby had a
long military career, working his way up through the enlisted ranks and then transitioning to
move up through the Warrant Officer ranks. He served as a “power generator equipment
repairman, platoon sergeant, engineer equipment maintenance supervisor, maintenance
technician and ground support maintenance technician,” among other jobs he had over the course
of his career. His last duty station was in Korea where he served as a “senior ordnance logistics
officer in the 2nd Infantry Division.” Rigby’s retirement ceremony took place on his 62nd
birthday, the usual age in the military when retirement is imposed on a servicemember rather
than requested by a servicemember. His ceremony was not out of the ordinary, replete with the
usual fanfare of cake, gifts, stories, and the celebration of a long career. This event would have
not otherwise been a remarkable moment for the military, except for one small fact: Rigby was
the last Vietnam-era draftee to leave military service. In 1972, at the tail end of the Vietnam

1

War, Rigby was drafted into the Army. He was not expecting to make a life career out of the
military, but after the end of his required time, he reenlisted and remained in the service.1
The significance of Rigby’s retirement was much more than just about one person who
had made a career out of something he was forced to do. Rigby was the last of a generation of
servicemembers compelled to serve in the military. The long length of his career was his own
choosing, but the initial induction was not. Rigby was drafted at a time when the expectation of
military service from the public existed and was accepted both in legal and social terms. If
someone were to be chosen for military service, they were expected to serve. Yet, just one year
after Rigby received his draft notice, the U.S. military transitioned to the All-Volunteer Force, or
AVF, meaning that all new servicemembers from 1973 onward were to be volunteers, not
draftees or anyone forced against their own will to serve. Rigby simply made the most out of his
draft experience, turning it into a career, and his retirement marked the end of the effect that the
Vietnam-era draft had on any one specific individual. He was not the first draftee in, but he was
the last one out.
Rigby was just one example of the tens of millions of men and women in U.S. history
who have served the country, whether as volunteers or as draftees, and who have borne the
burden of the nation’s wars. They have also seen the military change, the public’s perception of
the military change, and the evolution of American warfare upfront, from Bunker Hill to the
streets of Fallujah. If anything, one glance through American history shows that there is one
constant, American war. For the 240-plus years of American existence as a nation, only 17 of

Regina Sherlock, “Last Continuously Serving Draftee Retires after 42 Years of Service,” U.S.
Army, October 29, 2014, https://www.army.mil/article/137112/last_continuously_serving_draftee_retires
_after_42_years_of_service.
1
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those years have seen the United States fully at peace.2 American war dominates and colors
discussions of politics, both in the past and now, and in spite of any assertions to the contrary,
war is central to the American being and how Americans view their place in the world. One look
at any component of American patriotic tradition, like the July 4th celebrations or the StarSpangled Banner, are simply images of American war recreated in the mind of the Americans.
Yet, it is highly unlikely that Americans understand how closely linked their identity is to
war, specifically the war and conflicts that the United States has fought. Most Americans today
live their existence without any concerns about open warfare in the streets, at least not to the
extent seen in other less-developed countries. The American public would not likely paint
themselves as a violent people, and individually, they would be correct. Yet, the American State
conducts war overseas on a massive scale and on a permanent basis, making the public at least
complicit in supporting war operations, even if they are not personally involved or know anyone
involved.
This question of personal connection is a particularly poignant part of the American
experience. For most of American history, the public was directly involved in American
warfare. They have had to serve in militias, as draftees, and as volunteers when the American
State required and needed. Yet, in the past five decades, that relationship to American war has
changed. The creation of the AVF has halted all expectations of compulsory service from the
American public, a tradition which had lasted for almost two centuries prior. The establishment
of the AVF ended an American institution which personally connected the public to the wars

Christian Oord, “Believe It or Not: Since Its Birth the USA Has Only Had 17 Years of Peace,”
War History Online (blog), March 19, 2019, https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/usa-only17-years-of-peace.html.
2
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fought by the State, and with it the political connection as well. It is this connection that we will
explore in this project.
The goal of this project is to explore the interconnection of the American State, the
public, and its military, particularly through the prisms of mandated military service and the
shaping of American identity. Both the military and American identity have a strong connection
and affect one another, and it is fair to say that neither simply came into being. Each is a
construction of both legal and social expectations, created and molded over time by the
American State and the public. By examining all of these elements, we can further understand
some of the differences of our current political epoque when compared to prior eras.
To explain the thrust of this project more succinctly, there are two major questions that
this project seeks to explore and attempt to answer. The first of these is the question about why
American wars are longer now than they have been in the past. The growing trend in recent
decades seems to show that American war is more protracted, lasting into the decades rather than
achieving quick, decisive victory and ending the conflict. Possible explanations for protracted
conflict may include the political goals of particular wars or privatized monied interests
associated with the military-industrial complex. However, there is likely something beyond
political or economic interests, and it involves American identity. This leads us to the second
major questions which concerns how the evolution of military regimes, from the state-based
militias to the All-Volunteer Force, shaped American identity. This focuses on the induction of
individual American citizens into the military as a possible explanation for this lengthening of
American war. By examining the military service regime structure over time and how it
developed, this could offer insight into how American identity grew over time and what
connection that has to the wars of today.

4

Before moving forward, since we have already used the term, we must address the usage
of the term “state” in this project. Since the focus of this project is on the United States as the
only case, the term state can have many different meanings in the American context, to include
different levels of government. To help differentiate, the term State with the first letter
capitalized will be used as a traditional political science term to imply the independent, sovereign
entity of the United States. This will be used practically interchangeably with the Federal
Government and its international domain of responsibilities. When discussing states as in the 50
territorial subdivisions of the United States, the term state will be lower case and often paired
with other qualifiers to clarify meaning.

A Justification for This Study
When we consider where the military fits into the grand scheme of a society, often the
connection to the State is the strongest. The State provides the guidance for how the military is
to be structured, provides legal backing for the military, and uses its power to procure resources
for the military. At the same time, the public plays a role as well, supporting the government,
and much of the time, providing personnel for the military. This is a trilateral relationship that
can be viewed similar to the Clausewitz Trinity, proposed by Prussian officer Carl von
Clausewitz in his early 19th Century work On War. Clausewitz used this triangular relationship
to explore the purposes and dynamics of war in Napoleonic era society, but his proposal remains
well-studied to this day in military studies.3

Christopher Bassford, “Tip-Toe Through the Trinity,” Clausewitz Studies, September 15, 2020,
https://clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/trinity8.htm.
3
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Figure 1-1. The Clausewitz Trinity

Looking first at Clausewitz’s Trinity can give us perspectives on war that we may not
have otherwise considered. Often, the military is the one organization considered when looking
to war since it usually is the element that is in combat and has to bear the brunt of the war.
However, it is the State that creates the military, and it is the people that give the military
justification for existing. Each of the other elements in the triangle are just as important to the
success or failure of war as the military. More often than not in military studies, this triangular
relationship is used to target certain elements of an enemy’s disposition as a means of crushing
military support and rendering enemy military operations ineffective.
However, this project is going to examine a particular relationship exhibited here, and we
will do so from the American perspective, not so much in the sense of targeting an enemy but
rather of examining what is occurring with American society and political culture. That
relationship is going to be the one between the military and the people. On face value, we can
probably figure out what this relationship is. The military protects the people, and from the
people, the military gains servicemembers. Yet, in the American case, this relationship is much
more complex. The American public treats the military heroically, putting their service on a
6

pedestal of respect. Elements of patriotism and respect for symbols of the country play into this.
How veterans are treated by the State and what response the public has to this also falls into this
relationship. In short, it is much more than simply a mutually-beneficial relationship between
the two.
Also, when looking to history, the relationship between the military and the public
changes. Early in American history, the public usually participated in state militias, which were
less effective after the Revolutionary War. As the American State developed, so too did its
military capabilities and its ability to force citizens into military service. During major conflicts,
the Federal Government has been able to draft individuals, just as they did Chief Warrant Officer
Rigby referenced earlier. The current era has no mandatory public service elements, so the
relationship between the public and military is two-fold: one is of those who volunteer, thus
furnishing the military with manpower, and the other is that of a passive public who supports the
military. What is implied here though is that there is much less of a personal connection between
the public and the military now than there has been in eras past because of the changing nature of
this relationship.
Military service and national identity are by-products of the relationship between the
military and the people. By looking to those two elements, we may be able to gain a better
understanding of the kinds of interactions that are occurring within this relationship in the current
era and in eras past. We may also be able to see what has molded and shaped American warfare
as it is today. Intersecting both military service and American national identity can lead us to a
greater understanding the American psyche today and what relationship war plays within it.
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The Implications and Outline of This Study
The need for a study like this is especially pertinent at a time like this. American war has
become a persistent component of the actions of the American State on a daily basis. At any
given time, the United States is engaged in conflicts around the world, most of them small-scale
with only minor American footprints on the ground or nearby. Yet there are also major conflicts,
like Afghanistan and Iraq, which have consumed resources and left many dead in their wake.
These conflicts have more or less lasted for two decades, longer than most other wars. If we use
wars of the past as any indication, these conflicts should have been over by now. Full U.S.
involvement in Vietnam lasted only nine years, and the social backlash against the war forced the
political class to reassess the American State’s role and objectives in Vietnam and the region.
Yet, that kind of backlash has not occurred against these current wars. The question is
why has this not occurred. Part of it could be the emotional trauma that occurred in the wake of
the end of Vietnam. The treatment of Vietnam servicemembers is an example of this, who upon
their return were disrespected, and the American public does not want to repeat that episode of
disrespect. However, this cannot be the only explanation. How is it possible for the American
State to conduct war on a permanent basis with all the resources it needs without the public
objecting? By exploring the evolution of military service and identity, we may be able to clue
into what is occurring now that is different from wars past.
To examine this, we will need to establish a literature collection which have attempted to
look at these elements from some perspective. Chapter Two will focus on this academic
literature examining these areas, particularly from the perspective of civil-military relations, the
State’s growth associated with military development, and nationalism and anti-statist studies.
This will provide the basis for further analysis of these elements. Chapters Three through Six
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will explore the relationships between war, military service, and the formation of national
identity by tracing the evolution of American military manpower regimes. By looking at the
construction of both over time, we may be able to ascertain what is occurring today by seeing the
evolution play out.
If we recall, one of the guiding questions of this project is the question of why American
war last so long today. Recent academic works have pointed to the financial interests that are in
play in American war, that the State no longer burdens the public with war both in terms of
service or in monetary cost through taxation.4 Therefore, the public is much less aware of the
war, as they would have been in wars past. Additionally, there has also been a massive growth
in the social benefits that the State accords to servicemembers over the past few decades, and
these sorts of programs are largely popular.5 The field of American Political Development has
long looked to the military as a means of growing State power both domestically and
internationally, all while narratives on American identity remain rather strongly anti-statist in
nature.6 This project builds upon these works by examining the relationship between the
American public and the U.S. military through the prisms of war, military service, and American
identity. It will show that war is a central component to American political culture and identity,
whether the public wishes to admit it or not.
4

Sarah Kreps, Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018), 8-11.
5

Jennifer Mittlestadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2015).
For examples, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison
State?,” International Security 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992): 109–42, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539189; Paul
Frymer, Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017); Samuel P. Huntington, “American Ideals versus American
Institutions,” Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 1 (1982): 1–37, https://doi.org/10.2307/2149312;
Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6
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By the end of this study, we will show some of the varied aspects of the growth of the
U.S. military since its inception, how the changing nature of inducting citizens into the military
affected the development of American identity over time, and how the length of war may
correlate to the changes in both American identity and the U.S. military, particularly the
development of the AVF. Additionally, we will show how military power gradually shifted from
the individual state level to the Federal level, which also helped to grow the Federal
Government’s ability to shape and mold American identity through the military service regime.
In short, the results of this analysis will seek to answer the questions posited earlier by
correlating the protracted length of American war today with the lack of a mandatory military
service regime in recent decades.

10

Chapter Two
A Theory of Military Service and Identity

"America without her Soldiers would be like God without His Angels."
--Claudia Pemberton

The connection between military service and identity is socially-constructed one,
reinforced over time both by the evolution of State institutions and social norms. At its most
basic level, serving in the military is considered a selfless act in defense of people who the
servicemember will likely never meet or know, which typifies a kind of honor amongst those
who are part of the defended nation or group. Garnering that honor with service equates to a
strong connection the nation’s identity, but how this relationship between service and identity
manifests varies based on the time period, events, and social norms among a multitude of other
factors. In the United States, this honorable view on military service is commonplace, with
almost universal acceptance and confidence in the military as a cornerstone institution of
national pride.7 Generally, there is a connection and a relationship between the U.S. military and
the American public, manifesting itself both individually, collectively, and through an array of
different means. Out of the American public arises those who serve, and once service is
complete, servicemembers return to the public.

Pew Research Center, “Americans’ Trust in Government, Each Other, Leaders,” July 22, 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/.
7
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Yet, the manifestation of this public-military relationship as well as how it has developed,
evolved, or been maintained leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Associated theoretical
concepts and themes, like the civil-military divide or the citizen-soldier, are hard to quantify in
any reliable scientific manner, unless one focuses in on a single-scope aspect within these
concepts. Even with this, given that the interactions between the public, the military, and the
political leaders of both groups can be affected by a plethora of different, constantly-changing
variables at play, these concepts are malleable depending on the interpretation of the individual
researcher, the method of analysis, or object of study. What is clear though is that a relationship
exists, and that civilian leaders, the public, and the military have a trilateral relationship with
interactions varying between each actor. One does not need to go far to see Americans and their
connection to the military. Public displays of military affection can be strong at times, especially
during periods of patriotic sentiments, such as national holidays or during crises.
The goal of this project is to posit that American identity is linked to the development of
particular military regimes over the course of time, and that our current regime, that of the AllVolunteer Force, has allowed Americans to take pride in the military while not having to answer
for the consequences of the wars of the 21st Century. An ensuing result of this is that American
war has gotten longer. With fewer personal connections to the military, Americans choose to
revere the military instead of holding it accountable, allowing the entire military industrial
complex to do as it pleases with few to no political consequences. Also, since American identity
is strongly linked to the military, fighting a war or at least feeling that the nation is at war is
required to maintaining some sense that the nation remains a force for good, hence why wars
have gotten longer. We will explore this in more detail later in the chapter, but for the time
being, our main variables of study are American identity as an independent variable and the
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military regime and war length as dependent variables. Since some of these variables cannot be
reliably measured on the whole in a fully scientific or data-driven method, we will look to theory
to provide a grounding basis to see all of these variables at work.
Most of this chapter will focus on the theories and governing literature connecting the
American public, the U.S. military, and identity. These will include literature about civilmilitary control, American State-led development, and nationalism. By examining the
theoretical debates within these particular areas of study, we will be able to see how academics
have generally viewed the growth in American military power through State and social
institutions and how that military power interacts both on those institutions and on the public’s
minds to shape and mold American identity. This will establish the theoretical framework for
our examination of the military regimes in the following chapters. We will also establish the
gaps within the academic literature that this project seeks to fill, mainly that the connection
between the American public and its military is understudied, that anti-statism does not explain
certain parts of American identity especially vis-à-vis Americans and their relationship to war,
and finally, that the post-2001 era has presented its own challenges to American war and
identity, shifting both beyond the paradigms of decades and centuries past. This project will
bridge a number of different fields of study, so we will be taking a holistic approach and
focusing directly on the military-identity connection and war length, taking from each field as
necessary to clearly understand the argument.

The Public and Its Military
The first and perhaps most appropriate place to start is to directly examine the
relationship between the military and the public. Academics have studied the relationship in a
field commonly known as civil-military relations or other variations on that term. The field
13

examines how those relations exist now and historically as well as what the philosophical and
optimal relationship should be. At its core, the field coalesces around the reciprocal relations of
the military and the public, that a military without a public to defend is simply a violent force for
its own benefit, and that a public without a military has left itself open to domination and
violence from other groups. If a public arises or is created, questions on defense arise as well,
giving need to a defensive posture and thus a military as an organizing force of that posture.
History is replete with examples of groups and nations arising and organizing their militaries in
forms that their individual publics would accept, but as with most theoretical and philosophical
debates, no one answer within civil-military relations provides a complete understanding of all
aspects of this relationship. In view of this, the debate around civil-military relations and its
evolving nature are at the very least uncertain since so many variables may be at play in
solidifying and influencing a public and its military. However, much of the academic literature
has coalesced around two particular areas of study: those of political civilian control over the
military and the citizen-soldier.

Civilian Control and Connection
The cornerstone debate on civil-military relations dates to the late 1950s and early 1960s
between political scientist Samuel Huntington and sociologist Morris Janowitz concerning the
professionalization of the U.S. military. At the time, the monumental growth in U.S. military
power post-World War II and the maintenance of the Peacetime Draft raised fears that civilmilitary relations, particularly civilian control of the military, could potentially deteriorate if the
military was professionalized using only volunteers, creating a higher threat of the military
intervening in domestic affairs. Both Huntington and Janowitz argued that professionalization
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would not affect civil-military relations, but for starkly different reasons. Huntington saw
professionalization as a way of achieving objective military control, where if civilian
interference in military affairs decreases, allowing the officer corps to take more control of the
military and remain politically neutral, then the military will be a more effective organization.8
Janowitz argued that so long as the civilian portion of government remained well-connected to
the military and exercised proper oversight, professionalization would not create major issues for
civilian control.9 Since the 1960s, debates over civil-military relations have largely focused on
what these two academics argued, parsing their words, and for good measure since a major
concern for most governments is how to prevent the military, an entity with such immense
destructive power, from either destroying its own society or from taking control of society.10
While the Huntington-Janowitz debate is appropriate to have, the focus on these two has largely
steered the debate over the past few decades, putting much of the attention on the relationship
between civilian leaders and society rather than on other aspects of the relationship, such as on
the connective tissue between the public and the military. Additionally, both of their works were
written at a time where the U.S. military was vastly different from our current military. They
were dealing with a military that had draftees and was much less technologically advanced than
the current military. It is likely that their framework, while still quite astute for our time, leaves
much to be desired.

8

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1985), 260-261, 465-466.
9

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: The
Free Press, 1960), 438-440.
Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 151-152.
10
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More recent studies have attempted refocus civil-military relations along the partisan
political divide. A 2001 study by Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn concentrated on clarifying
whether a political gap exists between military officers and their civilian counterparts, with
military officers identifying as more conservative than enlisted personnel or the public.
However, Feaver and Kohn also say that there is no real major issue with this divide so long as
efforts were made to keep that political gap from growing too wide.11 This is similar to what
Janowitz argued, indicating a thread of historical thinking on this issue. A later study by Jason
Dempsey in 2010 refocused the study of the partisan divide between military and civilian
populations to see which identifies more with the Democratic or Republican political parties.
The study focuses on data collected from a 2004 survey to analyze military personnel and their
political identification, concluding that, much like Feaver and Kohn argued, the officer corps
identified more as conservative or Republican than enlisted personnel or the public.12
The preference towards examining civil-military relations from the perspective of civilian
leadership or from partisan political identity is more common in civil-military relations because
the relationship is easier to study. Such investigations allow better variable scoping, thus making
data easier to quantify and therefore easier to support particular arguments. The other side of
this is that such analyses can scope questions and data too much. For instance, civilian control
and political affiliations are not the only issues at play in civil-military relations. Also, much of
the discussion is anchored within the particular time periods defined by their studies. The
Huntington-Janowitz debate is an example of this, fixed to the height of Cold War politics and
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driven through the backdrop of preserving liberal democracy in the face of totalitarianism, and
also in the pre-All Volunteer Force era of the American military. Feaver and Kohn’s study
analyzed data from the 1990s about the political divide between the military and civilians, but it
provides no insight to the effects of the post-September 11th military buildup and subsequent
wars. While Dempsey’s study confirmed Feaver and Kohn’s political divide, it does so with,
once again, rather-dated data fixed to a specific time and not giving us a greater understanding of
the processes in play. This is not to say that these studies are faulty. They do provide a glimpse
into a line of thinking at a particular time, but concurrently, they niche their work within a
certain scope, making it difficult to explain greater civil-military trends at play beyond that
scope.
With that though, there has been an attempt in the past decade to go beyond the
leadership and partisan divide focus to reconceptualize civil-military relations in terms of publicmilitary connections, although they have yet to create any major substantial changes to the field.
An often-cited 2012 study argued that a civil-military gap should not be conceptualized as a
monolithic entity of one singular divide, but rather as a concept with four different and
independently-shifting dimensions in continual flux: cultural, demographic, policy preference,
and institutional.13 While this is helpfully in changing the perception of what a civil-military
divide is, seeing it rather as a number of civil-military divides, it does little else to elaborate on
the state of civil-military relations. The study provides little historical data or otherwise to
support an interpretation beyond the intellectual prism that it offers. Along the lines of that 2012
study, this project’s author has complete work within the cultural civil-military divide,
examining the how the sub-genre of military comedies in film has disappeared in recent decades,
Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note,”
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indicative of a shifting military-public relationship.14 Once again, though, these dimensions of
the civil-military divide and their subsequent studies are apt to being scoped to the point where
they only explain a small part of civil-military relations.

The Citizen-Soldier
Another framework that is directly connected to our later examination of the military
draft is the concept of the citizen-soldier. At its core, the citizen-soldier is an idealized
individual who serves the nation for a specific time period or in the nation’s time of war and
returns to being a citizen at the service period or war’s end. This concept can, in most cases, link
the general public to war as citizens are expected to serve the State when asked. The citizensoldier is a philosophically republican ideal in nature as it combines service with a duty and
obligation to the State and the nation as a whole. A citizen-soldier can have a higher claim to a
national identity, given one’s willingness to put one’s life on the line for the preservation of said
nation. As with other discussions of civil-military relations, the citizen-soldier concept remains
nebulous, creating an array of interpretations in how to apply the concept both scientifically and
to real life. What is beneficial though about the citizen-soldier concept is that it attempts to
directly connect the public and the military and examine what that relationship entails.
The American citizen-soldier, when cited, often has a historical connotation associated
with it, mainly due to most 21st Century Americans having not served in the military in any
capacity, and most have fewer personal connections to the military as the number of veterans
declines.15 Also, to be an American citizen does not necessitate serving or fighting for the
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country, but rather is a status imparted by the State and requires a general acceptance of
American customs and norms. As such, the current form of the citizen-soldier holds a more
niche position in American society, mainly those who volunteer to serve either in the active-duty
military or in the Reserve or National Guard. These latter two are probably more appropriately
linked to the citizen-soldier since most service members in the Reserve and National Guard have
civilian jobs most of the time and their military service acts as a second job. They are
individuals who serve when needed and are regular citizens when not needed. This distinction is
likely lost on the public at large as they probably see little difference between these nuances.
There is a reason why the citizen-soldier concept is more historical; much of the literature
about American citizen-soldiers comes from studies of history and the past use of U.S. military
drafts, something that is just not as applicable currently. The peak application of the citizensoldier to American society was during the World War II-era when millions of Americans
served. Acclaimed historian Stephen Ambrose used the concept of the citizen-soldier in a book
of under that same name to highlight how regular everyday Americans came together in some of
the most decisive engagements during World War II.16 In another work, historian Shaul
Mittelpunkt argues that the United States relied on the idea of a citizen-soldier, especially during
and after World War II where it was seen as vital to the survival of a free nation, and that the
United States idealized other nations, particularly Israel and its military conscription regime, as
the epitome of a citizen-soldier State.17 These works clue us in to an era where the social and
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political expectations were for citizens to serve when called, and they fix the citizen-soldier
principle as applied in the American case to this specific historical time period.
The literature also points to the concept’s demise, at least in terms of its application to the
greater American public. The strength of the World War II’s effect on connecting Americans to
the military, particularly through the Peacetime Draft, had abated by the Vietnam War era. Beth
Bailey argued that at the height of Vietnam, as the draft became controversial, political leaders
pushed for military service less based on “fairness and shared sacrifice,” as the draft supposedly
was, and more based on monetary incentives for those who joined.18 By ending the Peacetime
Draft, the personal cost of war shifted from a burden on the public-at-large to strictly those who
volunteer. This was done to achieve a political end, saving political figures from public wrath
about the controversial war that Vietnam had become, but it effectively delimited the application
of the citizen-soldier concept to a select few. Service in wartime thus became more of a personal
choice with related monetary incentives to entice enlistment rather than forcing service on
individuals in the pursuit of a greater national purpose. In the years after Vietnam, political
figures changed the role of the public in American conflicts to a more passive one. As Andrew
Bacevich points out, a major political shift occurred during the Reagan administration’s military
build-up where “support for ‘the troops’—as opposed to actual service with them—[became] the
new standard of civic responsibility.”19 The military, even with fewer individuals at its
disposition, did not get smaller. It simply changed, and the role of the public became to support
that change, not necessarily to participate. This builds upon the argument that the citizen-soldier
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was declining or even disappeared after Vietnam. In the event of American conflict, shared
sacrifice was and still is no longer necessary, but what is necessary is a vocal support for military
personnel and the institution. As we will see when we examine this post-Vietnam period, this
likely leads to less public objection to war. Also, in turn, the military becomes segregated from
the public, leading to a cognitive dissonance between both parties, and the public becomes naïve
about the military and war. In short, the citizen-soldier as a concept is not as applicable today,
but its historical placement can still shed some light on the shifts in the relationship between the
military and the public at our current time.
In summation, civil-military relations remains a field in flux and ever-evolving. The War
on Terrorism and associated conflicts have presented their own set of challenges by changing
how American war is fought, and unlike in major wars past, the American public is more
protected and less connected from the consequences of current wars than at probably any other
point in American history. The key literature which has historically defined civil-military
relations has done little to expose the connection between the public and the military, instead
focusing on primarily civilian and military leadership and their connection. In the one area
where the public’s military connection is perhaps the strongest, within the citizen-soldier
concept, the general view is that the traditional form of a citizen-soldier is historical and thus not
a cornerstone of American civic tradition today. Instead, public support for the military is to be
felt and expressed vocally, not necessarily to be acted upon by one’s own service, unless one
decides to willingly enter into such an agreement. As such, the field of civil-military relations
provides only a glimpse in certain tranches of the greater military-public relationship, with many
areas left unstudied.
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State Development and Military Growth
We will now shift to focusing on a field rooted in APD, that of American State
development. This particular area focuses on how the various levels of U.S. government
developed over time along with their evolving norms and policies. In the current epoch, the
institution of the U.S. military remains one of the most powerful institutions within the Federal
Government, but this dominance was not envisioned as such by the Founders. The original
Federal Government was rather weak, but as the American State developed over time and took
more power for itself, this increased its ability to sustains a military. By looking to APD to see
how the State built itself and its military, we can see why the military became the powerful
institution that it has. Additionally, the APD literature on American State development takes
into account other societal and governmental aspects that civil-military relations literature leaves
asides. Some APD themes that are germane to our examination of the State and the military
include territorial expansion, the strengthening of Federal power and influence, and the
development of social welfare programs, all of which we will examine below.

Territorial Expansion and Limited Federal Government
The development of the American State is inextricably linked to the growth of the
country geographically across North America. The Federal Government of the 1790s was quite
small and weak, but as the country grew westward, so too did Federal powers grow to
accommodate that expansion. Historical analysis of the first century or so of independent
American governance paint a complex narrative of how the American State and geographic
expansion occurred conjointly. Paul Frymer contends that the American State and settlers had
aspirations that went beyond the present-day territorial bounds of the United States and that those
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aspirations had a strong white supremacist component to them. The United States aspired to
spread across the hemisphere, displacing native nations and groups and replacing them with
majority white populations. The problem though, Frymer argues, was the inherent weakness in
the American State. Since the Federal Government did not have the organic capacity to impose
its will through military-power projection in a sustained manner across the continent, let alone
the hemisphere, these aspirations were largely achieved in a slow, piecemeal manner of
legislative acts which incentivized westward movement to new territories.20 This indicates that
the early American State was relatively weak militarily, but it could at the very least pass
legislation which fostered expansion. The Constitution only limited Federal power in the
individual states, but in territories and on the frontier, the Federal Government maintained some
dominance through legal approbation.
Another related prism through which to view westward expansion and State development
is federalism, and one noted scholar to examine all three was William Riker. His concept of the
federal bargain produces a perspective examining state governments and their relationship with
the Federal Government as the nation moved towards the Pacific. The federal bargain, as the
name implies, was an agreed distribution of power developed over time between state and
Federal governments. In doing so, each side achieved a common understanding of what each is
responsible for, striking a power balance, but also allowing the Federal government to maintain
some level of overall control over the states. Riker suggests that without such a bargain in place,
the Federal Government would have otherwise had to station troops in each state to maintain
control, a capability which it did not fully possess for such an immense land area covering all
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states.21 In other words, the lack of Federal military power was, in part, linked to the creation of
new states. In addition to this, the lack of Federal military power required states to develop their
own power and their own defensive militias. What both Frymer and Riker point to is the feeble
state of military power nested in Federal Government during the opening decades of the
American experiment. With limited power and without robust military power to project, the
American State had to rely on other means to achieve control, such as legislative acts or power
sharing with the states. In short, American military power was a piece of westward expansion,
but it was not the only piece, nor was it likely the primary piece early on.
This leads us to why the American State was designed in such a way from its onset, likely
linked to concerns over internal security. By designing a weakened Federal Government with
little to no military power for itself, the Founders were countering perceived domestic threats
more than external. By limiting a national military to practically nothing and relying on state
militias as a defensive force, the Founders were attempting to achieve security on domestic and
foreign fronts. This system, termed the Philadelphian System by Daniel Deudney, defined the
period from Constitutional ratification to the Civil War, where a practically non-existent national
army and a massive militia system of citizen-soldiers sought to create a patchwork of security
across the nation from threats posed not only by Great Britain, other foreign powers, and natives,
but also from the domestic threats to stability as well. This system was based on avoiding
situations which could endanger the republic, such as the Federal military seizing power or
putting too much violent power in one particular institution, and thus achieving balance in
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security on foreign and domestic threats was key.22 This, in part, offers an explanation for why
militias were heavily dominant early in American history and why they are perhaps not so
dominant in other periods of American history. The early domestic threats were more present
given the young age of the country. As the nation matured, domestic threats persisted, but not to
the point necessitating a Revolutionary-era militia to maintain order. They could be maintained
through other means and institutions as the American State’s bureaucracy grew.
These interpretations indicate that the early American State was relatively limited in its
capabilities, its resources, and in its ability to control. The one factor that drove State
development was westward expansion, but that was more due to legislative power at the Federal
level than military power. The federal bargain allowed for an agreement on Federal control as
more states were admitted, but Federal military power was still reliant on state militias. Even
looking to the militias themselves, we can see a balancing act of creating a military force to deter
foreign aggressors while simultaneously addressing domestic threats. In short, the early era of
American history is not defined by a strong Federal Government, and one of the results of this is
that the U.S. military was not strong either.

The Growth of Federal Power and Programs
If early in American history, the State was weak, then there had to be some process
through which it was permitted to expand and grow. This leads to another central question
within APD, which is how the American State expanded its power in spite of constitutional and
systemic limitations. Over time, laws, amendments, precedents, and even traditions can be
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reinterpreted to suit the current needs of the public, and so examining these sorts of trends can
indicate ways in which the American State has grown its own power, including at the expense of
the individual states or the people. One trend to consider in APD literature is how American war
grew the demand for military power, which in turn grew State power both over war and other
domains.
The literature on war driving State development is not novel to the American case;
political scientists have linked war to State development for decades. Charles Tilly noted the
connection between European State development to the wars conducted in Europe through the
Middle Ages as primarily a coercive means of controlling violence within society.23 By growing
the power to conduct war, European States grew their own power to control domestic affairs as
well. Along the same lines, Bruce Porter examined the American State’s connection to war,
arguing that, initially, American government was weak, partly due to geographic isolation and
lack of national identity. However, war served as the natural driver for the development of the
State, to include the expansion of rights to different groups in the wake of war. Nationalism is a
component of this, forging a singular identity in the wake of conflict.24 Both Tilly and Porter
point to war as an organizing principle of State power. Since European States have longer
histories of conflict, this may indicate why they are perceived to have stronger, centralized States
when compared to the American State.
Other works in APD examine how war fostered social program development. In a
number of historical cases, the end of war propelled social programs to take care of veterans after
their service. A general theme in historical studies and political science was that in the late 19th
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and early 20th Centuries, the United States did not have a strong social welfare state like
European nations of the early 20th Century, but Theda Skocpol contested this. She points to the
post-Civil War period when the Federal Government constructed a massive pension system for
the war’s veterans as a means of meeting the social demand that many of these veterans placed
on the government. At one point, the payouts for these pensions reached forty percent of the
total Federal budget.25 This put the United States as one of the forefront nations in terms of
social welfare at the time, at least for veterans. Civil War pensions were certainly not the last
time that the Federal Government accorded large social programs to veterans. After World War
II, the GI Bill became a mainstay of social progression for military servicemembers, providing
funds for servicemembers to attend college after the completion of their service. Suzanne
Mettler argued that the implementation of the GI Bill had a profound effect on American
political and social culture, giving military personnel access to college and vocational programs
that they likely could not access prior to the war, creating a higher-education boom as veterans
sought to access these programs. According to Mettler, the program’s success assisted in created
a “more inclusive and egalitarian [political system] during the middle decades of the 20th
Century” when American citizens became more engaged politically.26 At the same time, the
Federal Government also accorded Veterans Administration-backed home mortgages to
returning veterans, which were government-backed mortgages to buy or build homes which,
much like the GI Bill leading to a boon in higher education, led to a housing boom across the
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country.27 These programs grew the Federal Government because they set a norm that, when the
United States goes to war, the nation as a whole should take care of its returning
servicemembers. Individual states or local groups should bear the cost of that care because if
war is a national obligation, so too is the care of those who serve. The social demands for
veterans’ care justified growing the Federal bureaucracy to meet those needs. At least in the
cases listed here, war becomes an impetus for the social change, which in turn leads to State
development.
We would be remiss to not mention race here as it plays a factor in the growth of Federal
programs related to war. Race itself stands as a major engrained theme within the varied shades
of APD, given the long American history of racism associated with slavery, segregation,
discrimination, and a multitude of other issues. Underprivileged groups have historically used
U.S. wars as a means of improving their status in society, both in terms of improving their
socioeconomic status and in using their service as a means of receiving equal treatment vis-à-vis
civic equality and inclusion. As Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith point out though, racial
progress is not necessarily benevolently bestowed by Americans, but rather it is the outgrowth of
major war and the political perception that rights should expand for a given group.28 As such, if
war grows the State, then war also grows the political demand to include underprivileged groups
into full civic life, necessitating State intervention to ensure this inclusion. Such was the case for
American blacks during and after World War II. With new social programs for veterans after the
war, one would assume that these programs to apply to all veterans, whether they are
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underprivileged or not. Ira Katznelson demonstrated that this was not the case, discussing the
inequalities in how blacks and whites were treated both in service and after the war. The U.S.
military early in the 20th Century maintained racist policies which segregated blacks from whites,
even though both groups were fighting the same wars. Blacks were often passed up for
promotions or given menial jobs, and yet, many blacks still enlisted, emboldened to serve their
country because in spite of the mistreatment, they still identified with the country.29 Despite this,
similar patterns of segregation were baked into the GI Bill after the war, disenfranchising black
veterans from program benefits in spite of their willingness to fight for the country.30 With
social pushback, these programs were eventually opened to blacks and other races, particularly
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which helped to bar similar forms of
discrimination and exclusion in these kinds of social programs. War can thus be a conduit for
affecting domestic perceptions and change, particularly for underprivileged groups.
Overall, APD provides us with a number of different perspectives on the military and the
state, with one of the most prevalent being that war has been a driving force for developing
American State institutions, particularly at the Federal level. This was not originally intended as
such in the early decades after the ratification of the Constitution. The relative weakness of the
Federal Government was based in part on the Founders’ vision of limited government, but also
due to geography and practicality. As the nation grew, limited Federal power meant that the
Federal Government had to develop ways of controlling territory that were both military
(militias) and non-military (legislative actions and the federal bargain), thus growing State power
incrementally. However, war became an enabler for growing the State both in terms of military
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power and also domestically, creating new social programs at the Federal level. There is also an
identity element in play here in terms of who is included and who is excluded. Race has been
one of those barring factors from full inclusion, but as we see, war and subsequent State
development can be an impetus for changing the status quo in terms of civic inclusion.

American Identity
This leads us to perhaps one of the more central aspects of this project, an examination of
American identity and what that entails. At its core, this is a discussion of the prevailing notions
of what it means to be an American, and this identity is open to interpretation and is not static.
Identity can have legal interpretations, as in an American someone who possesses U.S.
citizenship, or it can embody something more, embodying a spirit, loving the land, or respecting
American symbols. For our purposes, there are two major fields which deal with analysis of
American identity: the study of nationalism and APD. Nationalism is a subfield within
Comparative Politics that deals with manifestations of love of country or love of one’s own
State. It is not a field that is U.S. centric as it lends itself more to comparing versions of
nationalism across countries and regions, but there are sections of study, like banal nationalism,
which deal with the American experience. APD deals with American identity from a number of
perspectives, with some of the most notable being race and anti-statism. The previous section
already alluded to race with Katznelson, Klinkner, and Smith all pointing to how racial groups
were excluded from programs, and thus systematically excluded from full American identity.
Since race has already been discussed, this section will focus more on anti-statism, with the
acknowledgement that race and anti-statism have a common connection. To clarify what antistatism is, it is essentially the belief in one’s country without believing necessarily in one’s State.
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One could equate it to a generalized distrust of the government while still retaining an idealized
dedication to one’s country.
For this section, we will be examining American identity from both the nationalism and
APD perspective. We will first examine some cornerstone literature around how nationalism is
constructed and what of it applies to the American case. After that, we will examine how antistatism is viewed along with how that intersects with banal nationalism. This will set the stage
for further discussions of the construction of American identity in later chapters.

The Imagined Community and Elite Control
The often-cited work on nationalism is Benedict Anderson’s 1983 book Imagined
Communities. Just as the title suggests, Anderson argues that nationalism derives from an
imagined community of people see themselves as part of a greater group, even though they may
never meet all of the individual members of that community. These communities are selfreinforcing through narratives created in institutions, such as censuses, maps, and museums, all
of which are designed to exclude outsiders, position the imagined community in the world within
a particular geographic construct, and write the group’s historical narrative.31 Anderson’s
contribution provides the general framework for many nationalism studies, to include those
studying the American example. Daniel Immerwahr used Anderson’s imagined community
framework to show the development of American identity through many of the processes that
Anderson identified. As an example, Immerwahr points to the Insular Cases, a series of court
decisions which limited American citizenship for those in conquered American territories at the
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turn of the 20th Century.32 These decisions shaped the legal definition of American citizenship,
but more precisely, they excluded certain ethnic groups in overseas territories controlled by the
United States from becoming citizens, thus preventing them from becoming members of the
American imagined community. This is the essence of the imagining of a community, which is a
social decision as to who are included and who are excluded.
In terms of this question of community inclusion and exclusion, we can look to types of
nationalism to shed some light on how these decisions are made. Anthony Smith pointed out
two major types of nationalism, the first being ethnocentric nationalism and the second being
polycentric nationalism. Ethnocentric nationalism develops around a specific self-identifying
ethnic group, either with or without a State. Examples could include the Kurds in the Middle
East or the Tamils in Sri Lanka and India. The ethnic group serves the focal point for the nation,
and thus, the nationalism derives from the existence of the group.33 This would be a form of
nationalism based more on what Smith terms as “primordial ties” and tribalism, dating back to
before the development of nation-states.34 Not all nations are based on ethnic groups though,
which leads us to polycentric nationalism which focuses more on groups working together or
competing for power with a nationalist framework.35 In this case, ethnic groups still exist, but
they compete with other groups. The United States constitutes a mix of both of these types of
nationalism. Frymer and Immerwahr, to name a select few, both point to cases of white identity
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dominating over other ethnic groups, so clearly there is an indication that ethnocentric
nationalism is at play in the U.S. case.36 At the same time, some scholars might argue that
competition among groups is a core American principle, thus advocating for a polycentric form
of nationalism. Robert Dahl, for example, argued that ethnic groups achieve some semblance of
assimilation within American politics over time, allowing them to compete with other ethnic
groups for political power.37 In this case, it is not necessarily a negative since an ethnic group
can create a reliable bloc of support within a democracy. The U.S. case is simultaneously both
of these nationalisms at the same time, much along the lines of Rogers Smith’s multiple
traditions argument. The United States has a largely liberal tradition of freedom and competition
within political pursuits while also having an ascriptive and discriminatory tradition against nonwhite groups.38 Both of these versions shade American identity in different ways.
One final aspect in this section to consider is the role of elite control. Power dynamics
within a society can play a crucial role as elites can invoke nationalism to achieve political ends.
Nationalism can serve as an elitist, manipulatable, and cross-domain tool to create societal
change, for better or worse. Ernest Gellner argued that elites use nationalism to sculpt nations
during industrialization. He contends that nationalism was an outgrowth of transitioning from an
agrarian to an industrial society, where elites used it as an impetus for rural citizens to accept
greater national culture and feed urban industrialization with resources.39 During
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industrialization, as elite power and wealth moved towards the cities, nationalism became a
means of controlling agrarian populations outside of the cities, creating a symbiotic relationship
between the cities and the countryside. The former took resources from the latter and made
products to sell on the market. In this case, industrialization begets nationalism because elites
need to control people. This could explain some of why American identity was rather stunted in
the first century after the adoption of the Constitution. Westward expansion across the country
prevented elite control from taking root within settler populations and kept the economy mostly
agrarian. Richard Bensel argues that American industrialization was lacking through 1870, and
even when the United States started to industrialize, this growth was uneven geographically.40
American national identity at the time was not grounded in any common experience, so naturally
a common nationalism could not take root, nor could elites manipulate the masses in the same
way without it. This point is key because as we will see in the next few chapters, common
American national identity coincides with national industrialization and the growth of a common
national market, and with that, political and economic elites gained a new tool to achieve
political ends.

Anti-Statism and Banal Nationalism
While these nationalism themes can offer some shades of understanding on how
American identity originated or grew historically, there is also a need to understand how
American identity and nationalism exists today. The most pertinent frames through which to see
modern American identity is through anti-statism and banal nationalism. Both of these can
provide a unique perspective on how American identity is constructed, in part because they are
40
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based in separate fields of study. Anti-statism is largely an APD topic because of its uniqueness
to the American case while banal nationalism provides a perspective on control of the masses,
whether political, elite, or otherwise. Combining these perspectives can create a fuller picture of
the essence of American identity.
Perhaps one clear way of looking at anti-statism is simply through common parlance.
Americans in general do not use the nationalism to describe their love of country, instead
preferring the term patriotism. Academics tend to use these terms interchangeably, especially
within nationalism studies, but there seems to be a perceptible difference between these terms. A
dictionary explanation notes the difference as nationalism as the love and dedication to a
particular State versus patriotism as love and dedication to one’s country, and yet even this
explanation is open to interpretation.41 One could also make an argument about American
exceptionalism, that using patriotism instead of nationalism sets the United States apart from
other nations, and there would be some credit to that since in even in the academic world,
American studies are often separate from other world studies. No matter our interpretation, the
use of the term patriotism instead of nationalism in the common vernacular is likely indicative of
a distrust of the American State while retaining a love of country.
APD literature tends to confirm this distrust in the American State. Huntington addressed
this to some extent in his examination of ideals versus institutions. He claims that Americans are
essentially bound by their ideals, but the issue is that American institutions rarely if ever live up
to those ideals. This is in part because the American State is not a traditional State in the sense
of other European or more centralized States.42 This gap between American ideals and their
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manifestation in institutions is partially responsible for antagonism and discontentment towards
the American State. This anti-statism remained a constant, even in times of massive American
State growth due to conflict. Aaron Friedberg argues that competing pressures on the American
domestic front during the Cold War forced the demand for defensive institutions from the State
to be nested with private industry and practices. For example, instead of becoming similar to the
Soviet Union where all armaments and military equipment are produced by the State, the U.S.
Government contracted out a lot of its munitions and equipment construction to private
contractors.43 Even in war, the American tendency was not to trust the State completely for the
war, but to create a State-private industry nexus to temper growth in State power, and military
contracting remains lucrative for private industry. This anti-statist tendency still remains part of
American identity to this day and continues to color political debates.
On the flip side of this distrust of the State is an enthusiastic patriotism, best described
within the confines of banal nationalism. Banal nationalism is a term coined by Michael Billig
in his 1995 book of the same name, a case study on the U.S. form of nationalism. The essence of
banal nationalism is a less overt nationalism with patriotic representations considered natural and
unoffending. Billig uses the terms flag to describe objects, symbols, or other things that are
meant to recall a nationalist sentiment to individual citizens. These flags can be obvious
symbols, such as monuments or road names, or subconscious actions, such as specific terms or
phrases used. On any normal day, American citizens simply accept these flags as a regular part
of life. However, Billig argues, the purpose of these flags is to train citizens to accept certain
policies. Political leaders can use these flags to influence the citizenry to agree or disagree with
specific policies or courses of action.44
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The United States is a strongly patriotic nation, and patriotic flags in Billig’s sense dot
the American landscape. What is curious though is how these flags can be dangerous when used
for political ends like war, which is something that has become commonplace in the past few
decades.45 In cases where the American State may be pushing towards war, political leaders can
draw on the psychological conditioning of these flags to get individuals to rally the public around
the State and its objectives. In this sense, banal nationalism provides a way of circumventing
anti-statism by creating a means for the State to rally citizens to war, which the American State
has become rather successful at doing in recent conflicts. Since wars are fought externally, antistatist arguments on war tend to fall by the wayside, while those same arguments seem to remain
rather strong domestically. If anti-statism has a strong rooting in American identity, then that
root is more oriented towards the domestic front, leaving State growth in the military and other
foreign realms unobjectionable to the American public as a whole. This may be a practical
calculation on the part of American citizens and their identity. In Realist thought, States tend to
balance against external threats, so the compromise in letting the American State gain power
against those external threats may be acceptable since it allows anti-statist thought to remain
strong on the domestic front.46 No matter our interpretation, it seem both anti-statism and banal
nationalism can work together to form a kind of American identity where State growth at home
is derided while State power in war is cheered, all while being reinforced with integrated
symbols of American identity throughout daily life.
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In summation, American identity is multi-faceted, and we can look to studies in
nationalism and APD to flesh out our understanding of American identity, its history, and its
origins. American identity is an imagined community, like all other nationalities, born out of
ethnocentric and polycentric views simultaneously. It can serve as a point of pride in common
national symbols or it can be a tool of the elites and political classes, as banal nationalism
demonstrates. It has a strong anti-statist component, which is strong in political discourse, but at
the same time, the State has grown power in the international realm. Overall, American identity
is not static. It has changed and continues to change, and this project will attempt to demonstrate
some of those changes, especially related the military.

Literature Gaps, Proposed Solutions, and Methodology
Before going further, we should recall that the purpose of this project is to examine a
specific relationship that has evolved over time, that of particular military regimes and how they
shape American identity. In general, times of hardship can unite groups, and war is perhaps the
ultimate hardship. Out of wars, military are made, but identities are also forged. Military
structures can provide a conduit through which identity is maintained. Each of the above fields
address the U.S. military and American identity in a variety of ways. Yet, they lack in some
specific ways that we will seek to fill.
One aspect that is not answered in the above works is how American identity is
constructed, especially its association to State development. It is easy to point anti-statism as a
way of explaining this construction, but there is more to examine, particularly how this identity
has been constructed over time and what role the military has played in that. In the United States
today, individuals serving in the military are serving the State, but at the same time, they can
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hold anti-statist views and espouse those views. This may seem paradoxical, but it exists and is
quite common. One possible solution to this is to construct a new paradigm of identity that may
shed some light on the multi-faceted version of the American form today, where seemingly
contradictory views can exist simultaneously.
At the same time, there is a strong identification with the military that emanates from the
American civilian population. The American public respects and identifies with the U.S.
military today, so much such that it is the most respected American institution.47 Even with the
military being a point of pride, most American citizens today do not serve. How and why that
relationship exists as it does is based in historical developments along with State and social
reinforcements, but also in the wars and crises that the American public finds themselves in. The
military has become this institution of pride to look to for a sense of goodness and what is right
in the United States, and this seems far from what the Founders likely intended. In a way, the
military transcends the ideals versus institutions argument that Huntington pointed to, with the
military being both a real institution, but also representing the virtue of the nation. One way to
examine this relationship would be to look at its construction both historically and currently.
The citizen-soldier is one sort of connection between the public and the military, but as stated
before, that is often seen as historical and not as applicable today. This is where an examination
of military regimes comes into play. If we examine how the U.S. military was constituted
throughout U.S. history, with at different times militias, volunteers, and military drafts, we may
be able to see how and why this strong reverence for the military exists today.
One final aspect to consider is that of time. Any political institution will change over
time as societies face new crises and challenges, and both American identity and the U.S.
Pew Research Center, “Public Esteem for Military Still High,” July 11, 2013,
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military are not immune from this. Many of the studies listed above are major works framing
particular views within their given fields, but were written before 2001, a pivotal year of change
in American war. The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere are just absent
from these works, but this, at the very least, creates additional opportunities for analysis. The
post-2001 era also created perceived shifts in American identity, with boosts of patriotic
sentiment in the run-ups to these conflicts. This post-2001 era is a critical era for this project
because it serves as the endpoint of analysis. The U.S. military and American identity in the
current era are based in past constructions of both. Yet, we can still see elements of that lineage
passed down today, so by analyzing both the military and identity from the onset of the nation
until now, we may be able to grasp at new temporal-related insights from that analysis.
What this ultimately study proposes is twofold: first, that American military regimes have
shaped American identity, and second, those regimes have affected the length of American war.
To further analyze these claims, we will examine four distinct military regimes and their
corresponding forms of American identity, all of which will be examined individually in
subsequent chapters to demonstrate the evolution of each over time. The term military regime,
as we will be using it, is a classification of particular time periods and the predominant way in
which the public served in the military. These periods will be simplified for our understanding,
but it is important to note that no period discussed is isolated in time, nor are these periods
strictly uniform during the entirety of years prescribed to them. As we will see, some of these
periods are very uneven in terms of development, but we will explain those issues as we go
along. The overall goal to show how each military regime builds on one another, and thus also
builds American identity.
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Figure 2-1. Variables of Study and Their Interactions

Figure 2-1 explains the variables that are at play as well as how they interact with one
another. Our independent variable for this research is going to be the war or conflict in which
the United States was involved. Our dependent variables are going to be the formation of
American identity, in whatever form that takes, as well as the length of each conflict. The
intervening variable in this relationship will be the military service regime. War shapes the
military regime, mainly out of necessity for manpower and resources. That service regime as a
result has two major outcomes for our study. First, it forms or evolves American identity, and
second, it either shortens or lengthens the war. There are other variables which may be at play
within any of these connections, but as this project will argue, the military regime is the central
hub for understanding this relationship in American history. One final note, the form of
American identity can also have an effect on shaping the kinds of conflicts that the United States
is involved in, which what the upper arrow in the figure is demonstrating.
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A brief explanation of methodology is necessary before moving forward. The analysis of
this project will be primarily a mixed-methods approach based on using quantitative analysis for
numerical data sets that are available and using process-tracing to explain the development of
particular institutions over time. In terms of the quantitative analysis, examples of numbers
analyzed will include the number draftees, militia members, or volunteers in a given conflict, the
length of particular conflicts, and other data. As for process-tracing, much of this will be
focused on the development of two main institutions in question, the military and American
identity. Process-tracing for the U.S. military will focus on how that institution developed along
with the various service regimes listed in the next section. This will be cross-referenced with the
development of American identity in order to find correlations and seek explanations for what is
occurring in both institutions at a given moment.
Finally, this will not be a purely political science endeavor, but will heavily rely on the
field of history as well. Since much of the data comes from by-gone periods in American
history, the vast majority of the analysis will be rooted in the work of historians, particularly
those periods prior to the 21st Century. However, the analysis will mostly be based in political
science, using history as the backbone for the process-tracing needed to show the institutional
development at the core of the questions that this project seeks to clarify. As such, we should
view the methodology of this project as a means of illuminating a discussion between historians
and political scientists on the development and fluctuations of American identity and the U.S.
military as institutions over time.
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Hypotheses and Testing
As a means of testing this project’s premise and its variables, each of the following
hypotheses are proposed:

H1: Military regimes with diffused costs and compulsory service required from the public
reduces the length of American wars.
H2: Military regimes with conscription components shape American identity through
shared sacrifice.
H3: American identity over time has been a State-led development, both by individual
U.S. states and the Federal Government, associated with the development of specific
military regimes.
H4: The disestablishment of conscripted military service has created a more unstable
American identity, reinforced by high levels of patriotism.

Each hypothesis will be tested by military regime to see how each regime contributed to
the development of American warfare and identity. Each chapter will include a historical
examination of military service and the wars during that particular period, how those wars and
military service connect to or developed American identity, and end with an examination of the
hypotheses and how they apply to a particular military regime. Figure 2-2 offers a preview for
the structure of this project. The regimes examined will be defined as follows: 1) the militia
regime (1775-1860), the coercive regime (1861-1939), the Peacetime Draft regime (1940-1973),
and the All-Volunteer Force, or AVF, regime (1973-present). In terms of identity, each regime
has corresponding forms of American identity to be examined. The militia regime is closely
associated with an individual state-centric or local identity. The coercive regime is closely
aligned with the development of regional identity in terms of Northern and Southern states
during the Civil War, and then a national identity during World War I. The Peacetime Draft
regime then streamlines an international American identity based on perceived liberal values that
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the United States and regular Americans defended. The final period, the AVF, is marked with a
more ambiguous and uncertain form of American identity, which we will term as retrospective
identity, and we will explore what that entails later.

Figure 2-2. Synopsis of Project Format

Before we delve into each of these regimes, we need to which wars or conflicts this
project will focus on. American war can include small battles among disparate groups or major
worldwide conflicts. One Congressional Research Service study lists 47 pages worth of U.S.
military interventions abroad from 1798 until 2020, which is simply impractical for a project of
this sort.48 Since this is a study on American identity and military service, it serves no purpose to
examine small interventions abroad or skirmishes because those likely had little to no major
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effect on shaping American identity. For example, we can clearly say that the Revolutionary
War, the Civil War, and World War II each had a greater effect on American identity than the
Barbary Wars or the 1914 or 1994 interventions in Haiti, so most minor U.S. interventions are
not necessary for our analysis.49 With that, the wars that we will focus on are the ones
traditionally considered the major U.S. conflicts from the Revolution onward. Official
declarations of war are not a good parameter because Congress has not declared war, especially
since World War II, and the United States has still conducted war in the intervening decades.
We will instead use the Congressional Research Service’s definition of major American conflicts
will be used to denote the wars considered.50 These wars will be listed and discussed in the
appropriate following chapters.
By the end of this study, we should have a better understanding about how American
identity plays into the wars of today. Americans identify with the military, but most never serve,
and wars now last into the decades. By identifying how American identity and war interlink
through military service regimes, we may be able to understand also why American wars last
much longer than in eras past. This may also show us something about the American political
psyche and why war is necessary to maintain it in its current form.
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Chapter Three
The Militia Regime and the Youth of American Identity

“The militia is our ultimate safety. We can have no security without it.
The great object is that every man be armed.”
--Patrick Henry

War was particularly crucial to driving State development in terms of institutions, norms,
and territorial gain in the first eight decades of U.S. self-governance. The Revolution debuted
this era with a fight for the nation’s existence, and once the nation was established, U.S.
expansionist goals created conflict across the continent, particularly along the frontiers, as
Americans moved westward. In terms of military power, the nation had a rather small national
army focused on fighting both foreign and domestic enemies, with supporting militia units whose
primary purpose was local defense but also served as supplementary forces to the national army
as needed. In terms of identity, these militias served as a means of regrouping locals into
paramilitary units, which created a strong locally-connected identity amongst those in the
militias.
This chapter will explore the nature of the militia regime from 1775 until the onset of the
Civil War and its connection to the initial identity development. The militias of the
Revolutionary era stand as perhaps the first example of patriotic and civic duty to the country,
and they are a cornerstone of certain lines of patriotic thought today. This period will allow us to
analyze what the reality of the militia was, how militias were seen during this period, what
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elements of American identity grow out of this particular regime, and how those elements shape
American identity today.
Table 3-1. Major Conflicts During the Militia Regime51
Conflict

War Type

Outcome

Length
in Days

Total
Served

Militia
Served

Total U.S.
Deaths

Revolution
(1775-1783)

Existential/
Defensive

Win

3059

~217,000
-231,000

~145,000

4,435

War of 1812
(1812-1815)

Dispute/
Defensive

Draw

974

286,730
(official)

~251,730423,000

2,260

MexicanAmerican War
(1846-1848)

Expansionist/
Offensive

Win

649

78,718
(official)

~60,000
(volunteers)

13,283

These first eight decades of American existence were defined by three major conflicts,
which were the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War. Table
3-1 shows these conflicts as well as associated information and totals. Each conflict had a
combination of regular army and militia forces, but the degree to which they served varied based
on need and what was available. The type of war likely determined the demand for soldiers as
well as their source in terms of militia or volunteers. The Revolutionary War was an existential
and defensive conflict in which the United States fought to establish sovereign integrity. The
War of 1812 began as a dispute with Great Britain and was largely defensive in nature, while the
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Mexican-American War were expansionist and offensive. Each of these will be explored further
in their appropriate sections. One final note, the outcome and the length of each war in days is
listed as well. The longest of these wars was the Revolution at well over three times the length
of the other wars.
Before analyzing these wars further, it must be pointed out that the United States engaged
in numerous small conflicts throughout the entirety of this period, mainly against Native
Americans, as the ideas of Manifest Destiny took root and the nation expanded westward. These
conflicts are too numerous to analyze individually in a project of this length, and any attempt to
do so would not do justice to the crimes and transgressions that the American State carried out
systematically on Native American groups. Hence, these conflicts during the militia regime
period and afterwards should be seen a constant in American warfare, providing the Federal
Government with an early justification for raising and maintaining a national army while also
shaping white supremacist elements of American identity. While we will not be focusing on
these conflicts, their lack of centrality to this argument is not meant to be a purposeful omission
of their importance. Rather, the focus of this project is on the changes within the military regime
and American identity as they evolved, not necessarily the constants inherent within.

The Militia Versus the Standing Army
First and foremost, it would be beneficial to discuss what a militia is, what it has been
historically, and what are the distinctions between a standing army and a militia. The primary
reason for this is that as it stands in modern American society, there is no militia, at least not in
any traditional sense of the term. Americans are not required to provide any sort of militia
service, and any militias that do exist in the United States today are more often than not
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considered illegitimate organizations with no real power invested by either individual states or
the American State. Yet, any requisite examination of the American Constitution or any related
Founding-era documents shows a philosophical and political paradigm in which the militia serve
as a central focus of common defense against threats in general. To ignore the militia past of the
United States simply because sanctioned militias do not exist today would likely create issues in
historical interpretation of the country and its formation.
To see what the militia serves as, it is best to look at a standing army first. At its core, a
standing army is a professional force, highly-centralized and trained usually by the State to allow
it to be constantly on guard in case of attack. Standing armies are composed of individuals,
either volunteers or those coerced into service, whose sole purpose is the job of soldier. Since
their time is dedicated to that profession, they spend more time training and practicing their job,
thus they are a higher caliber soldier compared to militias. On the plus side, standing armies
provide a State with the capability to easily and quickly project power beyond their own borders
and against other groups or states. However, standing armies can also be extremely expensive
depending on their size. They require States to provide for their soldiers, spending money, time,
and resources on developing them and their capabilities. This can be extremely taxing because it
takes otherwise healthy and strong individuals out of the domestic workforce and places a drain
on the greater society.
The militia on the other hand is much less structured and more decentralized. Militiamen
are usually members of the greater population who serve their community for a common
defense. They are only soldiers when needed, and most of the time, they are workers in the
community, whether they be farmers, tradesmen, or other professions. This means that their
training is much less intense, and the State may or may not provide any sort of guidance,
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equipment, or resources, allowing the militias to form on their own and decide what they need to
do to prepare. Weapons and training are usually defined by whatever militiamen have on hand.
On the positive side, militias are much more cost-effective, often having little to no resource cost
on the State. However, they are usually limited in what they can do. The lack of training and
lack of State resources force many militias to operate on their own with little to no external
support. Additionally, this limits their range and ability to operate beyond State borders, forcing
them more often to be defensive-in-nature and geographically bound to one area or region.
The debate between militias and standing armies is in part linked to the debate of what
role the individual plays in a society’s preservation, and it is a question that all societies have to
tackle in some form. Rome for example had standing armies which allowed it to conquer and
maintain its empire for centuries. Yet, before its armies had conquered the Mediterranean,
Cincinnatus, an old farmer in the 5th Century BCE, was called to lead and defend Rome in a time
of imminent peril, only to resign his absolute power once the crisis was over, becoming an
example of an ordinary person serving his society when needed only to return to his life
afterwards.52 Sparta also had an army which its citizens were required to serve in, thus blending
the distinction between standing army and militia and inextricably linking Spartan citizenship to
military service.53 These ancient societies mixed standing armies and militias as needed based
on what is available, and as such, the debate between the two is certainly not something that is
exclusive to the American experience.
Since the Enlightenment, discussions in general about military forces concern their ability
to conduct violence not just against foreign enemies, but also on the domestic front. As States
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have consolidated their own power around sovereignty established at Westphalia in 1648, the
State’s monopoly on violence is both oriented outward and inward. Standing armies and militias
were topics of common discussion philosophical communities, with many prominent authors
discussing the purpose of militias. Thomas Hobbes used the term militia a number of times in
his 17th Century work Leviathan, invoking a sovereign’s absolute control over the militia, but in
his use, he was meaning the entirety of a country’s military force.54 Most English forces at the
time were geographically-bound militia. Written at the height of the English Civil War, Hobbes
was using the common terminology for what constituted the military, but this was about to
change.55 In 1645, Oliver Cromwell and the Parliamentarians established the New Model Army,
a standing army of professional, more disciplined soldiers who became rather successful on the
battlefield and eventually overthrew the king.56 This Army also deployed beyond England into
Ireland, Scotland, and even continental Europe.57 While it was eventually abolished in 1660
with the Restauration of the English monarchy, it raised serious questions about militias and
standing armies, especially with regards to internal security. England had previously relied on
militias, but with the effectiveness of a standing army on full display both domestically and on a
foreign front, one could not help but see that a standing army in some senses grew the State’s
own power in both domains.
Over a century later, the newfound United States was struggling in its battle against a
standing army from the same nation that had birthed Cromwell’s army, and those struggles
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painted the Founders’ views on standing armies and the oppression that they can produce. Antistatist beliefs were replete within the Founders’ perceptions and writings at the time of the
nation’s founding, and this included a strong preference for militia over a standing army. The
fear of a standing army threatening liberty was a major concern, particularly when the individual
states were considering the adoption of the Constitution and increasing Federal power. As one
example, Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist #29 that:
This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any
time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable
to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them
in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their
fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army,
and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.58

To Hamilton, standing armies stood in contrast to the militias. They were opposites in terms of
goals, abilities, and moral objectives. The militias were composed of citizens who willfully took
up arms to defend their liberties, while standing armies concentrated power, threatened
individual liberty, and could do so with impunity if given enough power. They each stood as
anathema to one another, and the Founders preferred the militia, seeking to use the militia as a
safeguard for liberty and the fledgling nation.
The Founders thus designed the Constitution in a way to prevent the centralization of
power within the Federal Government while also keeping the bulk of military power at the
individual state and local levels. Much like the discussion of Deudney’s Philadelphian System in
the last chapter, this was intended to balance against external threats from abroad while also
minimizing internal threats.59 Individual state militias met national defensive needs in times of
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crisis while keeping the Federal Government in check in times of peace. Within the
Constitution, the Federal Government was given enumerated powers to raise an army and navy,
but the Bill of Rights also guaranteed individual state power over military affairs in the Second
and the Tenth Amendments. The Tenth Amendment guaranteed powers not explicit in the
Constitution to the states or the people, thus granting states much leeway in their militias.
However, the Second Amendment directly included language reference the militia, with the text
of it reading that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”60 This is indicative of a belief
that citizens should take up arms and provide for a common defense, and the use of the term
militia is suggestive of individual responsibility towards that defense, as interpreted from the
English tradition.61
In short, the Founders preferred a militia system over the standing army for the
preponderance of American military power. Standing armies had their purpose and were
effective fighting forces, but given English history and the perceived tyrannical nature of the
British government, thanks in large part to its standing army, the need for a strong national
defense was tempered by fears of military and State power trampling on individual liberties.
Militias were a way of balancing between the need for defense and threatening liberty, and the
militia regime as it was set up provided a field for experimentation to see if these anti-statist
ideals vis-à-vis military power could hold true. As we will see, they did not, and they ended up
failing, only to provide the first stepping stone to creating an American standing army.
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The Militia Regime
In this section, we will explore what the militia regime entailed, how it was structured,
and its historical application. The demarcation for this regime is from 1775 until 1860. During
this period, while militias were a constant, they were not always the most consequential military
force for the duration of this regime. Their success during the Revolution brought them acclaim,
and the predominant philosophies governing standing armies at the time kept state militias alive,
but their influence waned over time. Their dominance in the political realm remained strong
because of that philosophical tradition and because of the sheer number of troops the militias
could provide, but in an evolving war environment, their limitations constrained the American
State more than they helped. Of note, in this section since we are dealing with the preRevolutionary era of the 13 original colonies, the terms state and colony may be used
interchangeably.
Perhaps the best place to start before delving into the history is to see how these militias
were formed prior to and just after independence, and in truth, formation depended on individual
state bureaucracy, infrastructure, and resources available. Massachusetts was the first to adopt a
mandatory militia service requirement in the 1630s as the colony was facing persistent conflict
with native tribes in the area. The colony also organized its militia into codified organizations
and units and required all males from age 16 to 60 to maintain their own weapons for service.62
By the time of the Revolution, Massachusetts had had a militia tradition close to 140 years old,
and that tradition passed down into volunteer-based and more highly-trained militias like the
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Minutemen, who have achieved since achieved an iconic status in American history.63 Other
colonies over time adopted militia systems for a common defense and structured those systems
based on their needs. All of them though had similarities to the system Massachusetts created,
which included service from the men in the community, maintaining their weapons, and
preparations for expected eventualities, like native conflict or against other European powers in
on the continent. They also served as a means of maintaining domestic order. In slave-holding
states, militias were used to prevent and suppress slave uprisings, as happened in South Carolina
in 1739.64 The militias were structured to meet the needs of the communities from where they
came without heavily taxing said communities. This was the idealized form of the militia.
Reality, however, was much different. States were free to create whatever structure or
requirements for their militias, so in essence, the term militia could simply mean a gathering of
armed individuals, state-sanctioned or otherwise. This was the case for the Green Mountain
Boys and the Oregon Rangers, which will be discussed later. The militia as an idealized crosssectional merging of American society was not true either. While one can find cases of members
of all different stripes within these militias, the majority of militiamen were younger men who
had not settled down yet to create homesteads or families.65 While war requires often young,
able-bodied persons to fight, this skews the composition of those fighting the war towards
younger and poorer individuals rather than an idealized cross-section of society. Also, this
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meant those benefitting from any war that the militia fought were older persons, settled people,
and elites who could avoid service.
Also, not all state militias were created equal, and some states were more advanced than
others. Connecticut allowed for militia leaders to recruit their own men, which allowed their
militias to be more particular about their recruitment, and thus, more of a professionalized
force.66 Virginia had extensive experience fighting with the British in the French and Indian
War, and during the Revolution, it was able to muster upwards of 40,000 troops for the cause.67
This number alone was larger than the population of Delaware and Georgia in 1770.68 States
with more developed militia structures also tended to have more experienced military leadership.
George Washington is a clear example of this, having served in the Virginia militia during the
French and Indian Wars, but there were others as well, to include Daniel Morgan, Francis
Marion, and even Benedict Arnold, to name a select few. This military leadership translated to
the political and social realm as well. The militia was thus not just a military organization, but
also an organization for advancement for one’s own benefit as well as one’s home state. In
short, not all militias were the same, and yet, they remained idealized, in spite of their realities.
For the rest of this section, we will explore the historical growth and supplanting of the
militia regime. Born out of a form of philosophical idealism around the preservation of liberty,
the realities of American development and threats both new and old forced a standing army to
take root at the Federal level. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the militia regime is how
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quickly it fell apart and was disregarded. Militia effectiveness fell into question not long after
the Revolution, and by the Mexican-American War, militias had all but been abandoned as a
reliable military fighting force. In spite of the philosophical and psychological attachment to
them early on, militias did not become a defining aspect of the American military organization as
much as they became the historical exception.

Militias in the Late 1700s
The Revolutionary War defined the militia in a number of ways. The war allowed
militias to demonstrate their value and help win the cause, and being on the victorious side
helped to garner more evidence of their effectiveness. Their composition made them an ideal
force to fight the British standing army. While they would in most cases have been no match for
the British, the militias did not need to decisively engage them. Instead, they only needed to
survive in order to keep the British entangled and tied down with trying to defeat them.
Additionally, the militia were a cheap force multiplier at a time when the American State barely
existed. Congress barely had any funds to sustain the Continental Army, let alone the vast array
of state militias, so using militias allowed for more American forces on the battlefield. Militias
made up the bulk of American military forces during the Revolution, filling a role dictated by the
time period, the resources available, and the philosophies at the time. With the Revolution’s end
in 1783, the immediate need for the militias disappeared and most returned home, with the
militias’ reputation as reliable defensive units firmly intact. The system in place had worked, at
least for the war. The Continental Army dissolved, and the American State under the Articles of
Confederation would revert back to relying on individual state militias for internal and external
security.
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The first major test for this occurred not long after and showed some cracks within the
system. In 1786, farmers in Massachusetts led by Daniel Shays effectively created their own
militia, revolted against the state, and almost brought down the Massachusetts government. The
Federal Government attempted to respond, but it had no standing army and no ability to tax to
raise a militia, thus curtailing its ability to put down rebellion. The Federal Government’s relied
on state militias, and states other than Massachusetts proved unwilling to assist. Massachusetts
eventually put down the revolt, but the incident exposed glaring issues within the American
system.69 The use of militias was not in question, nor did the incident diminish the status or roles
of militias. A state militia had, after all, put down the rebellion. Instead, the question was more
about the legal frameworks and financial tools at the Federal Government’s disposal which could
allow it to use the militias at all. Shays’ Rebellion was one of the precipitating events to the
Constitutional Convention, which created a more of a streamlined Constitutional structure in
which the Federal Government could raise and finance an army and both preserve and allow
Federal access to the state militia system.
Yet, there was a more problematic event to come. Soon after the Constitutional
Convention, the militias were put to the test against a perceived weak enemy, and the militias
failed spectacularly. In 1791, the Federal Government only had a standing army of 1200 men, so
militias remained the primary military organization fighting along the frontiers. Federal troops
were integrated with the militia to lead, but the militias made up the bulk of the military
organization.70 In the latter half of 1791, an expedition of approximately 1,400 U.S. troops, at
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least 800 of which were volunteer militia, entered the Northwest Territory to fight native tribes in
the area under the orders of the Federal Government. The expedition was plagued with supply
issues and bad weather, and in early November, the native tribes attacked the entirety of its
forces while in encampment, which became known as the Battle of the Wabash. The militia
caved and promptly deserted the battlefield while the regulars attempted to hold off the assault.
At battle’s end, the entirety of the force was effectively annihilated, with over 900 killed and 300
wounded, effectively killing “[a]lmost half of the entire U.S. Army.” The loss is often cited as
one of the worst defeats in U.S. military history, displaying impracticality, inefficiency, and
shortcomings of relying on poorly-regulated state militias as the bulk of the military force.71 One
obvious problem that came out of this incident was the failure of the militia’s defense, which one
could consider its strong suit. Revolutionary-era warfare was primarily defensive, intended to
weaken British forces who were on the offensive. Militias were not an offensive force, but they
did not need to be. They just needed to buy time for the Continental Army. The Wabash
incident was a case where the militia folded immediately, showing they could not always be
relied on in a combat situation. The defeat signaled that the militia system had problems, but
rather than abandon it, political leaders chose to reform the system.
Two things occurred in the wake of the Wabash incident which began shifting American
military power. First, Congress created the Legion of the United States, which was a standing
army of over 5,000 soldiers at the Federal Level to fight natives along the frontiers.72 The
Legion was the predecessor to the current U.S. Army, and it gave the Federal Government a
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military force that it could use, albeit limited to fighting along the frontiers. Secondly, Congress
sought more effectively integrate and fix the militia system by passing the Militia Acts of 1792,
the first of which streamlined the president’s power to call on the militia in times of crisis,
equated the militias with Federal troops requiring them to be “subject to the same rules and
articles of war.”73 The Second Militia Act, passed some days later, created a standardization of
the militias across the country, including the types of weapons used, the formation of standard
units, and a number of other things intended to increase readiness for the militias and provide a
baseline for training so all militias could be relied upon in a time of need.74 The Second Militia
Act also laid out a requirement that “every free able-bodied white male citizen [between the] age
of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years” was required to enroll in their respective
state’s militia as well as arm themselves appropriately according to the militia standard.75
Punishments were established for those failing to comply with the acts, including fines and
imprisonment, thus creating coercive mechanism to ensure compliance.76
These acts were an attempt to fix a system that was already buckling. In fact, most of
what they proposed above was simply a rehashing of the expectations that many state militias
already had. They put Federal backing into codifying expectation of military service from the
public through militias into law, and citizens were expected to upkeep themselves and their
weapons as well as be prepared to serve when needed. It did not matter that this system had
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already shown ineffectiveness. Rather than abandoning the militia system for those
shortcomings, Congress and others sought to reform the system, granting the president and the
Federal Government more power to shape the militia system throughout the individual states. It
did not seek to abandon the anti-statist philosophy just yet, but the growth in a Federal standing
army had already begun.
Overall, the militia regime prior to 1800 was aspirational, while also being a reality based
on what ought to be. Its successes during the Revolution coaxed the Founders and other leaders
to make an attempt to institutionalize the entire militia system. Much in the line with historical
tales of Cincinnatus or the Spartans, the Founders believed that the public’s defense should draw
on the strength of the public, mainly the common man. The militias endeavored to accomplish
that ideal, creating citizens who could fight if need be. Given the fear of what a standing army
could do, naturally, the militia also sought to create a common defense without the threat of
centralized power. It was an army based on federalism, with diffused power throughout the
states. The reality, though, was far from the idealized version of what could be, and thanks to the
Wabash, it became clear that the militia could not always be relied on in combat. Federal
attempts to standardize the system in 1792 did little to save the system because they only
standardized what individual states had already implemented. Militias were idealistic, and their
heyday and popularity peaked in the period before 1800. As time went on and the Founders
passed away, so too would the idea of the militia as a viable military force, but not before the
system was tested at least a few more times.
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From Militia to Volunteers
After the turn of the 19th century, the militia-centric system remained in place, but since
there was little to challenge it at the time, there was no impetus to change it beyond the Militia
Acts. This would slowly start to change over time as two things occurred: first, the Founders’
generation started dying off and second, the nation expanded further westward. The latter
allowed the nation’s war posture to shift almost permanently from the defensive to the offensive,
transforming the nature of American war and thus recalibrating thinking around if state militias
were a proper fighting force for the new kinds of American war. From 1800 to 1860, there were
two major conflicts against external state powers, the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American
War. These wars were gradual steps in shifting military power away from the states and onto the
Federal Government. By the time that the United States had defeated Mexico in 1848, the statebased militia system had effectively fallen by the wayside, and in its position was a full-fledged,
politically-accepted standing army, completely antithetical to the Founders’ intentions, but by
then enshrined in law, customs, and norms.
The War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War mark both the continuation and the
end, respectively, of the Founders’ militia-centric system. The nature of these wars pushed the
Federal Government to take a more active role in the military. The War of 1812 was largely
defensive, fought on or near American soil in an attempt to resolve trade disputes between Great
Britain and the United States. Militia were suited for this kind of war, but military tactics had
changed since the Revolutionary War, and the militias soon found themselves outmatched. As
for the Mexican-American War three decades later, this was an expansionist war, where the
United States was pushing westward. This war was fought beyond national borders and required
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more offensive tactics and firepower, something the militias were not adept in. We will now
look at both of these wars more in-depth to see why the militia regime began to fail.

The War of 1812 and Bladensburg
The War of 1812 was the first major State-on-State conflict with U.S. involvement since
the Revolution that required militia mobilization. The war began due to increased tensions over
trade disputes. Great Britain was trying to prevent American trade with Napoleonic France,
which gave rise to U.S. ships being targeted by the Royal Navy, resulting in Congress
subsequently declaring war on Great Britain.77 During the war, the bulk of the American
military force was made up of state militias with well over 400,000 counted troops, with a small
regular army force numbering in the tens of thousands. British forces over the course of the war
numbered at around 60,000 mostly regular soldiers.78 Given that Great Britain had spent the past
decade fighting Napoleon in Europe, exhausting its resources against a strong State competitor,
American superiority in numbers looked more advantageous, but by war’s end, it was clear that
numbers did not always translate into victory, and that sometimes, a small well-trained force was
more beneficial than a massive force.
The war was the first real testing ground for the 1792 Militia Acts, and it demonstrated
how empty the acts were. In the 20 years between the acts and the war, the Federal prescriptions
for the composition of militias and punishments for non-compliance were just not enforced in
any meaningful way, and the acts’ implementation at all levels was haphazard and incoherent at
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best with little Federal or state bureaucratic structure to enforce compliance or to rectify
problems the militias faced in terms of training or funding. Post-1792, states had been left up to
their own devices in implementing the acts, so states acted as they saw fit, which was not much
different than in the decades before the 1792 acts. The Federal Government largely focused on
developing its small standing army and let the state militias develop on their own. Once the war
began in 1812, old habits came back and the militia were used similar to how they were during
the Revolution; most stayed close to home to defend their own states or land and supplemented
regular forces in battle as needed. Thus, the 400,000-plus strong force was dispersed across the
entire country, which meant that the militia never really proved decisive in any American
battlefield victory.79
Where militias did excel was in demonstrating their ineffectiveness. We can look to one
battle in particular, the Battle of Bladensburg, to see this ineffectiveness on display. Much like
the Battle of the Wabash in 1791, Bladensburg revealed the flaws of relying on militia in combat,
only this time the consequences were much more symbolic, resulting in the British capture of
Washington D.C. and the burning of the White House. In August 1814, an American force made
up of upwards of 8,000 of militia men with a small component of regular army forces met a
British contingent in route to Washington D.C. at Bladensburg, Maryland. The American force
outnumbered the British force of 1,500 regulars by at least five-to-one, but the American militia
were no match for the British, who were battle-hardened from years of war in Europe against
Napoleon. The battle occurred near the Anacostia River west of Bladensburg with the American
force set up in blocking position against a British move towards Washington. American forces
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guarded the single bridge crossing the river and had artillery aimed at the British and
overwatching the bridge. To overcome this, the British force simply forded the river and began
launching assault after assault on American lines, consistently outmaneuvering and outflanking
the largely untrained militia forces. Additionally, the British use of Congreve rockets, a new
type of indirect fire weapon developed by the British, created massive disorder in the American
lines. By battle’s end, the British had forced the entirety of the American force to retreat in
chaos, and they were able to march into Washington unabated, subsequently burning the White
House and other buildings, in perhaps the most dramatic episode of the war.80
Bladensburg exposed the multiple failures of the militia system. First, training and
equipment were key in the American force’s defeat. The militia’s lack of training meant they
had less experience than the British regulars, but also that they were slower to react to the
dynamics of a fast-moving battlefield against a quickly-outflanking enemy, relying on the only
maneuver the militia were accustomed to, the retreat. The retreat is the maneuver that the militia
excels at, and this is by design. Even during the Revolutionary War, militias slowed British
movement and bought the Continental Army time. They were not meant to be in full direct
contact with a regular army unless they were supplementing and supporting a regular army. One
can add to this the British use of Congreve rockets, a new technology that the American militias
had not seen on the battlefield before, which further aggravated their lack of training and ability
to withstand the British advance. Another failure to consider is the lack of motivation to fight,
given the symbolic value of protecting the nation’s capital. This should have provided
motivation to fight the British, and since this was a defensive battle with superior numbers of the
American side, the militia should have had the upper hand. This was not the case though, and
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80
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such an astounding defeat marred the reputation of militia forces at even defensive operations.
Finally, it should also be noted that the U.S. commander during the battle, General William
Winder, had only joined the army two years before the battle, and prior to joining, he was a
lawyer.81 This is particularly poignant because, much like the idea that a citizen can become a
soldier at a moment’s notice which is a cornerstone idea with the militia system, giving such
major commands to inexperienced individuals denotes a similar line of thinking that military
leadership can do something similar, that citizens can become military leaders simply by being
given command. Bladensburg showed that that was not the case, and the battle was a clear
repudiation of relying on the militia during wartime, particularly against experience State
military forces. The inexperience of the militia had been laid bare for all to see.
Old habits die hard, and in aftermath of Bladensburg and the War of 1812, little changed.
The militia system was not abandoned, but went back into a dormant state when the British
threat was gone. There could be a couple of reasons that the system was not abandoned, first
being the numerical argument. What the militias did was “provide an immense reservoir of the
most basic military resource, manpower,” at least in theory.82 The massive number of troops the
militia system could provide, as shown in the War of 1812, was good at providing some
deterrence and, in theory, it provided for military forces at a moment’s notice. A second reason,
however, which may be more appropriate is the overarching shadow of the Founders and their
rather strong anti-statist philosophical beliefs. This was the first major interstate war after the
Revolution, and many Founders were still alive. James Madison was president, and former
presidents Thomas Jefferson and John Adams remained influential, along with other Founders,
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so to completely discard the militia system simply would have gone against any of the prevailing
philosophies against standing armies or that citizens should help to provide for a common
defense. The militia-centric line of thinking was just too strong, and legal norms and customs
had not changed enough in the intervening decades since the Revolution to diminish the system.
The pragmatism of militias, and in some sense their tradition, remained. With no imminent
threat after the war, the militia system endured, but not in a fully active state.
The War of 1812 was the first true testing ground of the Militia Acts after the Battle of
the Wabash, and while it did swell the number of servicemembers to a high level, this did little to
help in decisively engaging the British during the war and exposed new issues in militia
effectiveness. Over the next three decades after the war, with no major U.S. conflicts, the militia
system was not called up on any notable scale, and the atrophy within the system continued. In
the meantime, as expansion westward shifted the focus of military operations towards offensive
operations against Native Americans and soon Mexico, the nature of American war required a
shift in military tactics and thinking, but more prominently, as the looming shadow of the
Founders began to fade over those decades, diverging political shifts away from the militia
system could begin.

The Mexican-American War and the New Class of Volunteers
The Mexican-American War from 1846 to 1848 was the first major interstate conflict that
the United States fought against a non-European power outside of the territorial boundaries of
the country. This war was particularly prescient because it was the first conflict that sidestepped
the militia system almost entirely and provided the political impetus for shifting the U.S. military
structure away from the states and investing it in the Federal Government. Unlike the
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Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War was an offensive,
expansionist conflict. It was effectively the philosophy of Manifest Destiny in war form, and the
first major U.S. territorial expansion since the Louisiana Purchase. In terms of the militia
system, it demonstrated that the American State could take military power for itself with relative
impunity if it had a politically-accepted justification.
The facts of the war presented two major factors which helped influence the political
decision to not use the militia: territory and control. Since the battles of the war occurred in
Mexico, beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, a Federalized expeditionary army
was more suitable than a militia. Additionally, direct Federal control of the army was more
suitable than having to negotiate with states for troops. The nature of this particular war
necessitated a military force capable of being deployed far from home for an extended period,
which was antithetical to the militia system and its general focus on defense of the country.
Militias also had other limitations that made them undesirable for such a war. Militias at the
time were mostly limited to three months of active service, clearly not long enough to send to
Mexico and fight without having to return almost immediately once they arrived. Militia officers
were often chosen by the states which limited the Federal Government’s ability to influence the
militias, and said officers were only required to follow Federal orders if they were related to
insurrections or defense.83 Such politics embedded within the militias could possibly jeopardize
any unified national effort or gains on the battlefield. One should also not forget history and the
militia’s ineffectiveness at the Wabash and Bladensburg. If militias had already demonstrated
themselves to be ineffective defensively against Native populations and smaller professional
forces, any militia-based offensive campaign against a foreign state in its own territory could
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become chaotic instantaneously. In short, the political climate of the mid-1840s, especially,
given the desire for more territory, were ripe for ignoring the militias altogether.
However, to accomplish this required a political solution. President James K. Polk and
Congress were aware of how ineffective the militias were, and neither wanted to use militias to
fight Mexico. Yet, one legal problem remained; the Militia Acts of 1792 were still in place. In
order to avoid using the militia as an expeditionary force, Polk and Congress managed a
workaround which addressed the militia, but avoided using the militia as the primary force in
Mexico. Congress did not expand the regular army, which remained limited at the time, nor did
it negotiate for state militias to serve. Instead, Congress used a new category of soldier, the
volunteer, to supplement the regular army in a number of different capacities, authorizing the
recruitment of 50,000 volunteers. Congress also upped militia service from three to six months,
while also allowing volunteers from the militias, but requiring them to serve for twelve months.84
This category of volunteer is legalistic novelty of the time. There were regular army soldiers and
then militias. Volunteers were neither of these, but they could be treated like regular soldiers in
almost every capacity. This was a very unique way of circumventing the law, but for Polk,
Congress, and the state militias for that matter, it was a practical solution. It gave direct control
to Polk as commander-in-chief to execute the war as he saw fit because he could command
regulars and volunteers without consulting the states on the use of their militias. States also were
not burdened with having to provide their own military forces for a conquest war beyond their
borders, so accepting this legalistic solution was to their own benefit as well.
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None of this is to say that this was a proper decision, however. The constitutionality of
such a move was questionable, but little prevented the Federal Government doing it anyway.
States, even if they wanted to, could not really object because while their militias were being
mobilized at home, they were not doing the brunt of the fighting. Polk also had the blessing of
Congress which was likely not going to challenge such an action, especially given the political
desire for expanding the country across the continent. Constitutional questions aside, one must
also remember that the Founders had long since passed away by the time the war had begun.
The fear and idea of a standing army remained palpable, so much so that Polk addressed it a
mere six months before the war against Mexico began, arguing much like his predecessors that
standing armies threaten liberty.85 This was not in question, but without the towering figures of
the Founders around to clarify any distinctions or where to draw the lines on the standing army
issue, let alone any other Constitutional question, Polk and Congress were left to their own
devices and interpretations as well as how they would go about circumventing the laws already
in place. This is particularly poignant because it shows a generational shift in the interpretation
on standing armies and militias. Whether the Founders may have agreed with the execution of
the Mexican-American War or their opinion on volunteers as a compromise in the militia system
is moot; they were not around to give their opinion, and a new generation of leaders took State
power for themselves and used the system to create a stronger Federal and centralized army. It
set a precedent, and much like all precedents, they can be used later.
None of this is to say that militias were maligned or abandoned after this conflict. On the
contrary, volunteer units were equally criticized for being ill-equipped and lacking discipline as
the militia had been in wars and battles prior.86 Additionally, more American troops were killed
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in the war than Mexican troops, denoting that the American force composed primarily of
volunteers was not any more lethal or effective in terms of tactics.87 Yet, the war gave the
United States two things which reinforced how a larger military force at the Federal level could
be effectively used in a way that militias could not: victory and more territory. The war against
Mexico was largely a success, in spite of heavier American losses. In practically every major
engagement of the conflict, American expeditionary forces were victorious against Mexican
forces. That victory reinforced the perception around the use of regulars and volunteers as an
effective offensive force. Moreover, the war put almost all of the American Southwest under
U.S. control, growing Federal power and influence even more given that the territory fell
exclusively under Federal jurisdiction. With the desire for territorial expansion under Manifest
Destiny, the ends of the war justified the means. It was easier to accept the use of an expanded
military force at the Federal level without militia support, whatever the cost fiscally or
politically, as a means of achieving a larger territorial footprint. The war fed into the
expansionist spirit of the country at the time, and since most militias never had to serve in
Mexico, the consequences of the war were not felt by the greater population, a lesson learned in
1848, but with repercussions well-beyond.

A Summation of the Militia Regime
The militia regime era was, at best, a period of failed intentions and ideals. The
archetype of a militiaman as a defender of his homestead, willing to stand up and defend his
country against enemies foreign and domestic, is an engaging model for a nation’s birth. It
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embodies the ideal of civic-minded citizens who are willing to lay down their lives for their
country and its principles. During the Revolutionary War, this model worked. Militias were
able to engage the most powerful army on Earth at the time defensively which assisted the
fledgling Continental Army. Since the war was a success, this helped confirm the preconceived
notions that the Founders had about militias being a well-suited unit for defense, while
simultaneously allowing them to decry standing armies. They thus built a system where militias
were integral to national defense. The realities and inconsistencies of the militia system, though,
soon caught up. The Battles of the Wabash and of Bladensburg, two of the most stunning
defeats in American military history, demonstrated that militias simply could not be relied upon
in all cases, especially for defensive purposes or against professional and non-professional
military units. Despite reforms like the Militia Acts of 1792, the militia system simply did not
improve, though as an idea, it remained influential and strong in political discourse. Once the
Founders had passed away, it became easier to ignore the system. The Mexican-American War
saw the first legislative bypass of the militia system, using volunteers instead to bulk up the
Federal army. By this point, the militia system had become an antiquated shadow of what it
once was, and political leaders like President Polk paid lip-service to the ideal while ignoring it
in practice. American success in the Mexican-American War set the precedent that not only was
bypassing the militia legally allowed, but also that led to greater battlefield success.
With hindsight, it is clear that the militia system began to atrophy as soon as it was
implemented. Its importance, however, does not lie within its effectiveness as a military
organization, but more with the ideal it created and how that ideal formed American identity.
The ideal that the militias created, that of individual citizens arming themselves and standing up
to defend their country, remains a strong political desire in some American circles, even if just in
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theory. Some modern organizations embrace the idea of a militia as an ideal for our current
period, including the Three Percenters or other state militia or right-wing paramilitary groups, all
of which model themselves upon the idea of the common man taking up arms to protect the
greater country.88 It is also of note that these organizations tend to have strong anti-statist
philosophies attached to them, which is in line with how militias were envisioned as, a stop-loss
against tyrannical governance. The historic conception of the militia still shapes part of
American identity even to this day. Next, we will examine the militia’s connection to American
identity so as to understand why such a flawed failure of a system remains strong in American
thought today.

Militias and Identity
Despite modern militias being linked more to right-wing paramilitary organizations than
it is to any State-sanctioned military organization, there is an important element of study, that of
identity nested within militias. This identity is linked to a greater understanding of the American
political and historical development. Identity is largely a social construction of how one views
oneself within the greater society, often shaped and molded by external input and factors. Early
forms of common American identity, especially during the militia regime period, were
fragmented at best. A uniform American national identity at the country’s formation was
relatively weak with surges of unity in times of crisis. The Revolution and the period around
Constitutional ratification serve as examples of these times. However, these moments of unity
existed mainly at the elite level with political leaders serving as the decisive agents for how the
Federal and state governments would act. These sorts of actions were mostly outside of the

88

“The Three Percenters,” accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.thethreepercenters.org.

73

common person’s control, and thus their ability to have any say was limited. While national
identity was weak, the militia served as a means of unifying both elites and the common man
into a cohesive unit, and it was through this cohesion that we see at least one way in which
American identity began to develop at its most basic, the individual state level.

Individual State-Centric Identity
During the early parts of militia regime, the primary sculptors of American identity were
the individual states, not the Federal Government. Individual citizens were more closely tied to
their state government and localities than they were to the Federal Government, and the
Founders recognized this. Madison argued that state governments simply had many more
advantages over the Federal Government in terms of influencing individual citizens and their
actions.89 While this was an argument made in support of the Constitution, it also conceded that
in terms of military power, states were more dominant and able to organize their populations
more efficiently. Plus, having a Federal-level military force capable of threatening liberty and
state autonomy was simply anathema to how the Founders envisioned the proper functioning of
the nation. If states had more influence on their citizens, then they could also shape identities
more easily and impose that identity through laws or required militia service. States could thus
develop identity in ways that the Federal Government could not at the time, at least for a few
decades after the nation’s birth.
One practice which reinforced state-based identity within militias was the identification
of units. States varied on their unit identification nomenclature, but most had variations on a
numbered-based system, where units are identified by a numbered regiment similar to what we
89
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see in the modern military, and a name-based system to identify particular units, usually using
the name of a particular commander. Examples of both of these sorts of systems include the
Connecticut 5th Regiment in 1775 or Vermont’s Nelson’s Company in 1781.90 By forming these
militias and connecting their command exclusively to the state government as the highest level of
responsibility to which each of these militiamen were responsible, this coalesced a perceived
version of national-like identity not around the United States as a whole, but rather around the
states themselves. As we will see in future chapters, the forms of military unit identification
changed with the growth of new steps in national identity, but of our purposes here, the states
remained central to identity in this early period.
The early American states that were formed out of the 13 original colonies also had
distinct cultures from one another, resulting differences in state militias. Some were founded as
religious refuges for particular groups, while others were founded as commercial ventures or for
farming primary commodities.91 Each of these colonies, becoming states after the passage of the
Constitution, had their own distinct culture, and that culture was reinforced further by militia
service. Militiamen mostly served with people that they knew in communities with whom they
were familiar. This was geographic-based military service rather than some sort of melting pot
of people from around the nation. One can look at these individual state identities and associated
cultures as microcosms of State nationalism, and some academic literature on nationalism would
likely support this conception of sub-national identity development within American states in the
late 1700s and early 1800s, especially given the strong elements of sovereignty given to
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individual states, even within the Constitution.92 Such sovereignty along with a history of their
own distinct culture allowed for each individual state to create their own identities and
nationalisms, reinforcing both as they saw fit.

Militias Forming States
Up until this point, the discussion has focused on how states were the primary driver in
developing identity and militias to reinforce that identity. There are, however, examples during
this early American period of militias existing outside of officially-sanctioned state control
which reinforced particular identities, and which in some cases led to the creation of states
themselves. One particularly well-known example is the Green Mountain Boys, a militia which
was a key military unit during the early part of the Revolutionary War when it seized Fort
Ticonderoga from the British. The group was originally founded in 1770 to protect
encroachment by the New Hampshire and New York colonial governments on land which
eventually became Vermont.93 The leader of the Green Mountain Boys, Ethan Allen, once
described Vermonters as regular people and New Yorkers as more corrupt, seeking to take land
that was not theirs, clearly an effort to delineate a distinct Vermonter identity separate from that
of New York.94 The Green Mountain Boys’ efforts allowed for the founding of the Vermont
Republic, an independent State for 14 years, until joining the United States as the 14th state in
1791. This was the inverse of the state-creating-militia argument, but it is still a compelling
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argument for the connection. A militia fostered a particular national identity in defiance of
another individual state, which, over time, that nation was eventually subsumed into the United
States as a distinct state identity. This is particularly telling because it shows us the strength that
a militia can have at forming an identity, especially in this early part of American national
development.
This sort of militia influence in creating state identities was not unique to the
Revolutionary period either. In 1823 while Texas was still under Mexican rule, Stephen Austin,
leader of Mexican Texas colony at the time, created a militia group answerable only to him, a
unit that would eventually become the Texas Rangers.95 Austin’s act became one of the first
steps in creating a distinctly Texan military force and identity, separate from that of the Mexican
State and society. Over the next decade, Austin fostered these forces, growing them into a
functioning army composed of regulars, volunteers, and militias, eventually leading them during
the Texas Revolution. Texas became an independent republic in 1836, only to be followed in
1845 by Texas’ integration into the United States.96 While Austin’s militia was not the only
reason that Texans were able to foster an individual identity, such militias did reinforce a distinct
identity at a time when Texas had not yet become a state, very much similar to the Green
Mountain Boys and Vermont some five decades prior.
While Texas and Vermont are examples of militias forming identity while preceding the
state, as time went on, militias became less effective at fostering identity. One example of a
militia preceding a state that did little to build any identity was the creation of the Oregon
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Rangers in 1844, some 15 years before the state of Oregon was admitted to the Union. The
Oregon Rangers disbanded not long after their establishment with no discernable achievements,
but were reconstituted in 1846 for a short period. Their only engagement at a place called Battle
Creek ended in embarrassment after the unit attacked peaceful Indians foraging in the area.
After much ridicule from local settlers, the Rangers disbanded, this time for good.97 The Oregon
Rangers’ example demonstrates the declining effectiveness of the militia-identity connection
over time. This could be in part because the Oregonian identity in the 1840s was not as strong as
those of Vermont in the 1770s or Texas in the 1820s or there could be some other extraneous
factors at play, but when compared with the other trends of the time, like the sidestepping of the
militias during the Mexican-American War, it is in line with a perceived declining prominence in
the militia.
Whether one looks at the state forming the militia or vice versa, what we can discern is
that American national identity on a larger scale was weak at best in the early years of the United
States and individual state levers for forming and shaping identity were much stronger. Militias
were part of a defensive system, ordained by the Founders, that reinforced state identity. Over
time though, the ability for this system to reinforce a state-level identity diminished, almost
coinciding with the decline in the view that the militias were even an effective fighting force. As
militias declined, so too did their ability to act as a force shaping identity.
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A Short Note on Regional Identity
While this section has focused on the individual state identity and its relationship to the
militia era, it is important to note that especially towards the end of this regime, regional identity
in the United States had become much stronger in the political sphere and likely overtook state
identities as predominant. When considering regional identities, our focus during the early parts
of American history usually breaks down along the North-South divide or the free state versus
slave state divide. In the next chapter, we will discuss these regional identities more because the
zenith of their applicability occurs during and just after the Civil War, so they are more pertinent
to that particular regime. However, we must keep in mind that identity is a rather fluid concept
in which many identities may be manifest at once in a particular individual or group. Simply
because we are associating the militia regime with a state-based identity does not necessarily
mean that this was the only identity for the duration of the entire period. On the contrary, the
weakening of the militia system towards the end of this regime could be indicative the growth of
a higher version of identity, particularly that of regional identity. It will suffice to know at this
point that regional identity had already taken root during the militia regime, but its highest
manifestation, the Civil War, corresponds more with the growth of State coercion that it does
with a militia-based regime. Hence why it is sections more in the next chapter than this one.

An Analysis of the Hypotheses for the Militia Regime
Since we have discussed the militia regime and its related trends surrounding identity, we
can now analyze our hypotheses to see if they are supported and valid for this particular regime.
The militia regime is the one closely linked to the Founders’ conception of military service
nesting itself within American society as well as how that idealized conception failed fairly
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quickly. As a reminder, these hypotheses focus on the length of war and identity as primary
dependent variable of analysis. Of the four hypotheses, the militia regime can give us insight to
the first three.
The first hypothesis argues that military regimes with diffused costs and compulsory
service required from the public reduces the length of American wars, and for the most part, this
hypothesis remains sound within the militia regime. Of the three major conflicts of the era, two
lasted less than three years, while the Revolutionary War lasted eight years, with only about six
years of actual fighting. Since the Revolutionary War was the moment of the nation’s birth, it
can be considered an outlier for this period since it was an existential war for the nation’s right to
exist independent of Great Britain. The longer length can be linked to the circumstances and the
justification for the war. Yet, in another sense, it is not an outlier for this particular regime as it
defined the period with its heavy, but successful reliance on the militia. The War of 1812 also
had a major militia component, while the Mexican-American War had less so, substituting
volunteers which did little better than what the militia likely would have done. Either way, the
overarching paradigm of militia service, which connected individuals to American war, was
strong during this period and likely served to abbreviate the length of these wars to only that time
which was necessary to execute the conflicts.
The second hypothesis on conscription shaping American identity through shared
sacrifice has some support during this particular regime, but it is limited. The militia stands as a
rudimentary conscription component for this particular period, but in a much weaker and less
compelling form than in wars after this period. The Militia Acts of 1792 attempted to codify a
conscription-like regime through the militia, but the Federal and state governments did little to
apply the acts coherently across all state militias. As for the conflicts, the War of 1812 and the
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Mexican-American War did little to contribute to the personification of shared sacrifice within
American identity, but the Revolutionary War likely did. The reliance and success of the militia
cemented it as an institution during this particular period, and at least theoretically, this required
that individuals sacrifice their time, energy, and even lives for the benefit of the nation, if asked.
In this sense, this at least creates a basic common connection of American identity with all
serving the militia.
The third hypothesis, concerning American identity being a State-led development, both
by individual U.S. states and the Federal Government, associated with the development of
specific military regimes, has a lot of support in this particular period, particularly at the state
level. Given the weaknesses in the Federal Government during this early period of American
history, the states became the primary institution for the development of both their own militias
and of their particular portions of American identity. States both created militias and, in some
cases, were created by the actions and existence of certain militias. The Federal Government
was an actor, but did little at first in shaping an overarching national identity. Individual states
could thus shape identity and culture based on their own values or economic interests. One
should consider here that the states were originally separate colonies, and these colonies had
their own identities and histories, both which defined the people of the colonies. These histories
did not disappear with the Revolution, but instead created a patchwork of identities across the
country. Militias, in spite of their problems on the battlefield, reinforced identity and
connections with the state governments, more so than with the Federal Government or greater
American identity.
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Concluding Remarks on the Militia Regime
Overall, the militia regime from the 1770s through 1860 was defined by a simple idea,
that regular, ordinary citizens should contribute to their defense through militia service. This
largely fell in line with anti-statist thinking at the time, and it kept a sizeable force of military
power out of the Federal Government’s hands and closer to the people. Militias were successful
during the Revolution, but their effectiveness did not last beyond the war. The militia system
remained in effect for the duration of this regime, primarily for lack of a better system, but
battles like the Wabash and Bladensburg demonstrated how the militia could not always be
effective, even if militia held a superior numerical advantage. By the time of the MexicanAmerican War, the militia system had become a sidelined military force, and in its place was at
least the legal framework for a Federal standing army that could grow at a moment’s notice.
Despite militia failures and their declining use over time, the militia created a unifying
effect around common issues and identities during this period. States created militias and
militias created states, reinforcing identity in both directions from both institutions. These
individual states held more political power because of their military strength, which paled in
comparison to what the Federal Government had at its disposition at any point during this
regime. Within the notion of the militia, there rests a strong anti-statist ideology, and this in part
may be why the ideals of the militia lived beyond the period. Modern usage of the term militia
usually references the original militias of the Revolutionary period, but this is also a means of
denoting a notional model the original, good American. There is a reverence for the militias of
the Revolution and, along with that, any person who serves the country. It is that reverence and
idealized version of what the militia was which remains part of American identity to this day.
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In conclusion, the militia regime was first step in creating American military service and
in establishing a rudimentary, but fragmented common identity. The militia’s idealized form of
citizens serving for a common defense was not realistic or practical beyond the Revolution, but it
allowed for the American State to innovate its way out of its own constrictions. The end of the
militia regime debuted with an era of mass warfare on a scale that the Founders likely never
envisioned. As such, the militia system became even more of a relic from an unrealistic
philosophy, steamrolled over by the needs of a bigger war machine fueled by the Federal
Government, which inevitably consolidated American identity around newer archetypes.
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Chapter Four
Coercion, the Military Draft, and Growing National Identity

“God created war so that Americans would learn geography.”
--Mark Twain

War creates new demands on States and societies, requiring them to respond to the crises
at hand. If wars threaten the existence of the society, this can provide massive incentives to
allow for State growth, and such was the case for the American Civil War. The four-year long
conflict serves as the seminal event that amassed more power at the Federal level both during
and after, and this is largely supported by the APD literature. Richard Bensel argued that “the
modern state's inheritance from the antebellum period was nil,” indicating that the American
State that grew out of the Civil War an original creation, not wholly linked to the decades prior.
He also argued that existence of two States, the Union and the Confederacy, created two varied
cases of State mobilization and creation for study.98 Stephen Skowronek argued that the early
American State was dominated by “courts and parties,” which after Reconstruction was “was
stretched to the limits of its governing capacities” and required a reimaging of the administrative
State at the turn of the century.99 Unlike Bensel’s argument, Skowronek connects the post-war
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era after the end of Reconstruction to the pre-war period, but argues that societal changes
eventually forced it to change, especially at the beginning of the 20th Century. Both of these
arguments are well-founded, but they focus less on the military components of State-building, to
include the military drafts, and more on other administrative components. Skowronek addresses
the army, but only as a case in a greater part of his State-centric argument.100 These arguments
also do little to shed light on how American identity grew or was reinforced by these State
actions during the period.
This chapter seeks to blend the State-centric growth arguments coming out of APD along
with military development and the evolution of American identity by proposing a new prism
through which we can view this period, that of the coercive regime. We will define it as the
coercive regime because during this period, the American State created more forcible system,
both political and legal, for compelling military service from individual citizens. The MexicanAmerican War saw the declining use of militias and the increased use of volunteers, setting the
stage for furthering the growth of Federal military power. However, prior to 1861, the only thing
missing from further growing Federal military power was a catalyst to push beyond the militiacentric intellectual paradigm. The Civil War became that catalyst. The four-year conflict
introduced Americans to mass warfare on a scale that the nation had never seen. More
Americans were killed in this conflict than any other American conflict, and much of the reason
for this was the massive number of soldiers used on both sides against one another.
The defining element that sets the coercive regime apart from the militia regime is the use
of conscription for Federal military service, colloquially termed the military draft. Military
drafts create a legal framework through which the American State can induce individuals into
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military service, even against their will. This is distinctive from the militia system in a number
of ways. First, the power to compel service no longer comes from the states, but rather from the
Federal Government. The Federal Government no longer has to ask states directly for militias to
serve, but can reach out directly to the people. This, in turn, pluses up Federal military power in
terms of sheer numbers for however long is politically sustainable. By avoiding the states
completely, military power and influence flowed to the Federal level, and the states could be
bypassed completely. This is indicative of another line of thinking within APD, that of “durable
shift[s] in governing authority,” championed by Skowronek and Karen Orren.101 Military power,
vested mainly at the individual state level and rooted in anti-statist rhetoric at the Founding, had
by the Civil War, begun a permanent shift upwards towards the Federal Government. There
were still militias in the postbellum era, but their function had changed from national and state
defense to more civil and racial purposes.102 This made them more a theory than a reality in
terms of military organization. States still retained militias, but as we will see with the Dick Act
of 1903, the Federal Government consolidated more control over militias, transforming them into
the National Guard that we have today and creating bureaucratic frameworks for their use at the
Federal level. The onus of military power shifted from states to the State during this regime.
Also, we should break down the term coercion into two specific kinds, State and social.
With State coercion, we are describing a pressure that uses the monopoly on violence belonging
to the State to accomplish a task without necessarily having a public buy-in. Basically, this
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means the State forcing the society to do something that the society does not generally want to
do. With social coercion, we still have elements of State coercion, but there is also a general
social consensus on accepting a particular State action, thus applying social pressure on
individuals to comply with a State action. Both of these kinds of coercion play a role in this
regime. During the Civil War, both the Union and Confederacy drafted individuals into serving,
albeit without public buy-in. Both sides failed to some extent, but not without planting the seed
that the State could coerce citizens into military service. By World War I, the public almost
entirely bought into going to war, which in turn created a social coercion for military service.
This combined with State coercion to serve fully enveloped the compulsion to serve.
Our examination of the coercive regime will consist of three major conflicts, as displayed
in Table 4-1 with their corresponding data points listed. The longest and deadliest conflict of
this period was the Civil War, and both Union and Confederate service numbers are included to
fully encapsulate the use of coercion during the conflict. Additionally, it is also the only war
listed classified as an existential conflict during this regime since it was fought to preserve the
nation as the entity. The next major conflict was the Spanish-American War, a relatively short
expansionist conflict which put a number of overseas territories under U.S. control. The final
conflict of this regime was World War I, which from the U.S. perspective, was a dispute fought
in Europe overseas against the Central Powers for the benefit of American allies. This one was
the largest in terms of number of individuals mobilized, but U.S. involvement was brief, so
American losses were truncated. Each of these conflicts will be examined to show the piecemeal
changes that coercion had on both military service and American identity. Of note, volunteers
play a role as well in these conflicts, but State power plays less of a role with volunteers than it
does with draftees. A true analysis of State power comes not out of its ability to coax or
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encourage, but rather out of its ability to force and compel individuals to do what they may not
otherwise do. This is why our focus will be more on the drafts and how they shaped identity
because both military service and identity are being imposed by the State.
Table 4-1. Major Conflicts During the Coercive Regime103
Length
in Days

Total
Served

Draftees
Served

Total
U.S.
Deaths

Conflict

War Type

Outcome

Civil War
(Union)
(1861-1865)

Existential/
Offensive

Win

1488

2,213,363

~164,000

364,511

Civil War
(Confederacy)

Existential/
Defensive

Loss

1488

~750,0001,227,890

~300,000

~258,000

SpanishAmerican
War (1898)

Expansionist/
Offensive

Win

115

306,760

0

1,662

World War I
(1917-1918)

Dispute/
Offensive

Win

585

4,734,991

2,810,296

116,516

In terms of war length, the wars of this coercive period were abbreviated when compared
to the other regimes we have or will examine, with each being a victory for the U.S. military.
One possible explanation for this is because war consumes resources, and being in a permanent
state of war requires constant resource supply in terms of materiel and manpower. The
American State, let alone most other States at the time, could not sustain permanent war footing
on a massive scale. Another possible reason may be that the goals of these conflicts were fairly
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clear and once accomplished, the military demobilized. There was no need for a large and
permanent military structure to remain in place persistently. This was one of the benefits of the
draft in that it allowed the military to mobilize and demobilize personnel quickly. Yet, there may
be another explanation that is more pertinent here, which is the overarching shadow of antistatist, anti-standing army philosophical tradition in American political culture. Demobilization
lessens the threat of amassing too much violent power in the State.
In the first section, we will examine the coercive regime and how it developed, analyzing
what we discussed above. In the second section, we will examine how these forms of coercion
further constructed American identity, specifically how State coercion helped to reinforce
regional identity and how social coercion encouraged the coalescence of American national
identity. The coercive regime coincides with a major American period of identity growth,
superseding individual state identities, which were linked to state militias, and at its final state,
creating a national identity and national army in its wake. It is an evolutionary process, built on
individual state, regional, and finally national identity, but it is also forged in a common
experience of war.

The Coercive Regime
Much like the militia regime, it is important to see the coercive regime not as a constant
during the period of study, but rather as a period with spurts of growth dependent on the
situation. Our primary focus is on the elementary versions of the American military draft, of
which, there were three during this particular period, two during the Civil War and one during
World War I. These drafts were not perfect; in fact, they were quite controversial due to some of
the associated litigious elements within their structures. However, much like the militias, they
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serve as a step towards growing State power and military power. They allowed for the American
State to grow its war machine in times of crisis, beyond what it could previously do, and
certainly beyond what the militia regime allowed. We will also consider some of the events in
the intervening period between the Civil War and World War I because they can serve to
demonstrate this evolution towards more military power at the State-level. Of note, while the
focus here is on the military drafts, volunteerism remained strong during these conflicts as well,
and this will also be considered in terms of how it molded military service and identity over this
particularly period.

The Civil War and State Coercion in Simultaneity
The Civil War serves as perhaps the first major rupture point and shock to the militia
system, fundamentally changing how the American State inducted military members into
service. Even though the 1792 Militia Acts formally established an expectation of service and
consequences for not serving in the militias, all elements which are part of a military draft, the
lackluster enforcement of the Militia Acts by both the Federal and state governments did not
establish a fully compulsory military draft in any effective sense prior to the 1860s. Because of
the unique circumstances of the Civil War, including that eleven states seceded, and along with
them their own state militias, the militia system itself was almost completely sidelined for a
voluntarist-centric military force, supplemented with drafts as the war dragged on. The war
produced two drafts, one Union and one Confederate. Since each side was its own State, each
implemented its own draft which varied from the other’s, meaning different strategies and
incentives were used to compel service and resources. Both sides also had different objectives
for the war, which shaped the form and timing of their militaries and draft regimes. The South
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was fighting for its right to exist as a separate slavery-oriented State from the North and did not
need to dominate the North in order to accomplish that task. However, the North did need to
dominate the South to keep its goal of preserving the Union. The South had an easier task
because it just had to survive in order to win, but its fight was more existential than the North’s
because a loss would mean the end of the South as a separate State. The results of these different
motivations are two almost simultaneous attempts at forcing individuals into a particular State’s
will, based on different justifications, bureaucratic formations, and exclusions, which in both
cases resulted in largely ineffective and failed draft regimes.
The Confederate draft was on the whole a desperate attempt to compel service to ensure
the Confederacy’s survival while maintaining elite support for the cause. In April 1862, the
Confederate Congress passed the first official military draft in American history, requiring “all
white men […] between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five” to serve for a term of three years.104
Not long after in October 1862, the “Twenty Negro” or “Twenty Slave” Law was passed
exempting plantation owners with twenty or more slaves from military service.105 In 1863 and
1864, the Confederate Congress applied more changes to these conscription laws, reducing the
requirement in the Twenty Slave Law to fifteen slaves, and then requiring those exempted under
the law to pay $500 or send 100 pounds of bacon to the Confederate government.106 With each

104

"The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Commencing with the First
Session of the First Congress; 1862," Documenting the American South, 1999,
https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/statutes/statutes.html, Chap. XXXI.--An Act to Further Provide for the
Public Defence., accessed September 27, 2018.
“The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Second Session of
the First Congress; 1862,” Documenting the American South, 1999,
https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/csstat62/csstat62.html, Chap. XLV.--An Act to Exempt Certain Persons
from Military Duty, and to Repeal an Act Entitled ‘An Act to Exempt Certain Persons from Enrollment
for Service in the Army (sic) of the Confederate States,’ approved 21st April, 1862, accessed September
27, 2018.
105

91

of these draft law changes, it became clearer over time that the Confederacy was desperate for
soldiers and resources and that the actual purpose of the draft was to extract both from the
populace, which likely undermined the greater war effort itself. One estimate of Southerners
drafted gages the number at around 300,000, although that number remains debatable and does
not count volunteers.107 However, given the Southern non-slave population stood at around 6
million and if we accept the 300,000 as the estimate of draftees, then this pegs the drafted
population of the South at just about five percent of the total population, which is quite large.108
This draft was successful in compelling service, but the social impositions and implications made
it simply unsustainable.
The North did little better with its draft, but for the first two years of the war, it did not
need it because many individuals volunteered. By the beginning of 1863, “some 1.3 million men
[…] had joined the Union forces” voluntarily, a number that was triple what the South was able
to recruit in the same period.109 However, in that same year, hundreds of Northern soldiers
started deserting daily due to low morale from losses suffered by Northern armies.110 In March
1863, Congress passed the Enrollment Acts, requiring “[t]hat all able-bodied male citizens of the
United States, and persons of foreign birth […] between the ages of twenty and forty-five” to
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serve in the Union Army.111 However, just like with the Confederate draft, there were
exceptions. If chosen for the draft, individuals could provide substitutes to go in their place or
they could pay $300 to be exempted. In addition, failure to either provide a substitute, pay the
fee, or show up for the board was considered desertion and subject to court martial.112 These
rules aimed the draft at the lower and poorer classes who were less likely to pay the sum, let
alone find a substitute. In July 1863, tensions over the draft culminated in New York City when
groups of immigrant whites who were now under the threat of being drafted took their anger out
on the black population in the city, leading to four days of intense rioting.113 Despite social
backlash, the Northern draft continued, and by war’s end, over 776,000 were drawn from the 2.2million-man draft pool, and over two-thirds of those drawn were exempted, discharged, or did
not show up. Once payments and substitutes were added, just over 164,000 men were drafted
into the Union Army, which represented approximately 13 percent of the overall Union Army,
and quite a smaller percentage of the overall population compared to the 22 million who lived in
Northern states.114
These Civil War drafts had mixed results as they produced only supplementary military
forces for their respective causes and they had negative adverse effects on their respective
populations. The Confederate draft catered towards protecting elites who benefited the most
from preserving slavery from having to serve and, as time went on, its purpose changed to
providing a means of extorting resources just as much as it was recruiting soldiers. The Union
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had no better luck, only drafting a small percentage of those pooled, while also sowing social
discord and extorting money from the public. In the end, the war was largely fought with
volunteers on both sides, and the drafts were secondary recruitment tools.
The success or failure of these drafts is less important than how they changed the
interaction between the American State and the general public. The drafts created a sizeable
change in the American social contract, with the demands created by a crisis changing what is
expected out of citizens. The questions and debates arising from the early militia regime about
whether the American State could or should create massive armies and raise large numbers of
troops were eclipsed by the demands of this particular war. No longer was it a question whether
the American State could forcibly conscript people; it could and it did. The issues inherent in
both Confederate and Union drafts became lessons learned to inform political figures some fifty
years later when the next draft was to be implemented. Also, during and after this war,
individual states and their military power was surpassed overwhelmingly by that of the Federal
Government. The onus of defending the nation, rather than remaining a state and Federal
partnership as it was during the militia regime, became primarily a Federal responsibility because
of the massive amount of resources that the Federal Government could bring to the war effort.
Manpower was one of those resources, and with the power to conscript now a precedent, the
American State had little need for individual states contributions. It could fully furnish its
manpower directly from the people. After the war and especially after the end of
Reconstruction, Federal demobilization caused much of the military control to revert back to a
state militia-based system after the war, but these drafts set the precedent and set the stage for
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future drafts and growing Federal military power. That “durable shift in governing authority”
vis-à-vis consolidating military power at the Federal level began here.115

The Spanish-American War, Expansionism, and the Dick Act of 1903
The turn of the 20th Century saw another major American conflict, albeit on a much
smaller scale than the Civil War in terms of military personnel mobilized, and a major shift on
the Federal level towards the complete usurping of state militia and military power. The
Spanish-American War was an expansionist war for imperial purposes. While it is considered a
major conflict, it did little to change the American military itself, with the Federal Government
using mainly volunteers and no draft. However, its importance is not in its use of volunteers
with no draft, but rather how it created the environment for further permanent military change
legislatively. In the wake of the Spanish-American War and the subsequent PhilippineAmerican War, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1903, also called the Dick Act after its
sponsor Ohio Representative Charles Dick, which was the first step towards codifying the
military structure we see today, with the individual state National Guards replacing state militias,
creating a framework for federalization of these Guard units, and making them directly
answerable to the president in times of crises. This 5-year period between 1898 and 1903 is
pivot point because it fundamentally changed the relationship between the Federal Government
and how states control their organic military forces.
The Spanish-American War demonstrates the changing nature of American war,
especially compared to the wars prior. The 1898 conflict is one of the briefest major conflicts in
U.S. history, lasting less than four months. Initiated because of a perceived Spanish attack on the
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USS Maine, the conflict was expansionist in nature with the United States acquiring a number of
Spanish overseas territories, such as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and stipulating Cuban
independence from Spain. The justification for the war was imperialist, intended to grow U.S.
international influence abroad and, much like many European powers at the time, grant the
United States an empire for itself. 116 This was not an existential war because there was no real
threat to U.S. sovereignty or integrity, but instead it was a conflict of choice. The war had an
effect of consolidating political opinion around more Federal control of the military, especially
given that that the conflict was fought abroad and that state militias were not the type of military
unit this war needed.
Yet, even in 1898, the political class had to at the very least allude to the militias. The
Congressional resolution declaring war gave the president the power “to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States.”117 Ironically, despite the language in the war declaration, militias
did not represent any sizeable force, except for a small number of state National Guard and naval
militias. Even then, almost all overseas deployed forces were volunteer units. States provided
ground units by raising volunteer regiments, but these were not militias per se. These volunteer
regiments served alongside other volunteer regiments recruited by the Federal Government.118
The term militia in the declaration serves as more of a traditional term rather than a reality by
this point. In addition, there was no draft in this war, so no one was compelled to serve against
one’s own will. This was an expansionist war, but it was fought by those willing to do the
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fighting. The social discord that was prevalent during the Civil War drafts was practically nonexistent for this war. No one went to war forcibly, which made this the first fully volunteer
major war in American history.
Moreover, American ground forces were not the most critical element of the war; instead,
it was naval power which dominated the battlespace. Much of the military theory popularized at
the turn of the 20th Century focused on projecting State power through control of the seas.
Alfred Thayer Mahan was one of the principal proponents of American naval power at the time,
and this war provided a unique showcase of American naval power.119 With such long distances
to travel by sea, the U.S. Navy became the crucial military service in not only fighting, but also
transporting ground forces into the different theaters of operation. The entirety of the U.S.
military was fighting in two different hemispheres, so having a sizeable naval force which could
operate and logistically support campaigns over such distances far from home gave the American
State not only an advantage over Spain militarily, but also over the individual states at home.
Navies do not lend themselves to the same sort of individual state control as militias do.
Individual states could easily organize and form state militias since they require individuals and
their weapons, but they could not effectively operate their own navies because that is more
resource-intensive and requires ship-building capabilities, for which this was not a requirement
or need for landlocked states. Individual states, particularly along the coasts, did form state naval
militias beginning in the 1880s, but these were and are not commonplace, even today.120
Furthermore, the use of naval power as force projection across the globe naturally lends itself to

119

See Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1957); This book was pivotal to shaping views on Sea Power at the turn of the 20th
Century.
Naval History and Heritage Command, “Naval Militia,” accessed January 3, 2021; Currently,
only six states still have active Naval Militias.
120

97

international affairs, which is in the purview of the Federal Government, not individual states.
Naval power was practically exclusive to growing Federal military power. The SpanishAmerican War’s display of naval power as a key military asset provided further a justification
for growing naval power, a domain entirely exclusive to the American State, and thus Federal
military power as well.
Finally, one should not also discount victory as a justification for further Federal military
control. The U.S. military quickly vanquished Spain without using militias, military drafts, or
deploying people abroad against their will. It showcased its naval power to stunning success,
and it fought a war in two major theaters, seizing new territories and achieving victory against a
historical European power within a matter of months. Such victory demonstrated, rather justly,
that the Federal Government’s use of military power was efficient in its tactical use, further
blunting arguments for remaining within a state-centric militia system. With that said, it is of
note here that after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, the U.S. military fought an
insurgency war against in the Philippines until 1902, but similar to the Spanish-American War,
this conflict was fought with volunteers.121 Additionally, with no individual state involvement,
the Federal Government could claim sole credit for the victory.
Not long after the end of the Spanish-American and Philippines conflicts, the Federal
Government set about reorganizing the entire structure of the American military, to include state
militias. The Militia Act of 1903, also called the Dick Act after its sponsor, Ohio Senator
Charles Dick, was a major turning point in solidifying Federal control over all American military
power by creating a nationalized military structure which incorporated state militia forces. The
act modified the term state militia to “National Guard,” a term still used to this day for stateTrevor K. Plante, “Researching Service in the U.S. Army During the Philippine Insurrection,”
National Archives, Summer 2000.
121
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based military forces that are answerable to the Federal Government if called, and set about
standardizing the treatment of Guardsmen equally to Regular Army soldiers, such as in terms of
pay, assignment, or pension.122 If we recall, standardization was a primary goal of the Militia
Acts of 1792, as state militias varied in their composition and overall effectiveness. We can look
to the lack of Federal bureaucracy in the 1790s to compel states to standardize as a reason for the
Militia Acts’ ultimate failure, as well as the strong anti-statist philosophies at the time which
impeded national standardization. The Dick Act, however, did not have either of these
bureaucratic or philosophical problems as the United States faced a world in the 1900s vastly
different from the one of the 1790s. The frontiers of the United States had reached the extent of
their expansion, so the domestic threats that state militias were intended to counteract were not as
tangible as in times past. Plus, the Federal bureaucracy was more robust than in the 1790s, and
thus the Federal Government could more easily compel states, whether legally or through
monetary incentives, to standardize their militias into National Guard units. Some 13 years after
the Dick Act, Congress went even further with the National Defense Act of 1916, further
standardizing not just National Guard units, but the U.S. military at all levels, to include
promotions, types of units, and more instructions on how the Guard was to integrate with the
Regular Army.123
Both the 1903 and 1916 Acts were major steps in consolidating Federal power over
practically all aspects of the American military, whether at the national or state-level. While
there were no drafts during this period, the success of the Spanish-American War along with
another generational shift had created the atmosphere to complete the movement towards
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American State control of the military. The concept of militia had been replaced with a National
Guard for each state, standardization across the military had become more complete, and above
all, the Federal Government could now control state military forces directly and incorporate
those forces into the greater national military. The “durable shift in governing authority” that
began with the Civil War was complete by the moment just prior to World War I.124 The
American State retained its own military power, and it was about to use its power not only to go
to war, but also to force its own citizens to go as well. As we will see in the next section, one
more element was needed to make State coercion complete, and World War I provided it.

World War I and Social Coercion
Before World War I, if an American wanted to avoid military service, there were many
ways to do so. Militia service was rather porous, which allowed people to slip through if they
physically left a particular state or geographic region. When drafts were implemented during the
Civil War, if a person paid enough or offered resources to their respective State, he could avoid
serving. Additionally, in spite of prescribed legal punishments, the State had little recourse if
draftees simply avoided service by not showing up. Drafts also caused massive upheavals when
there was inequality in those forced to serve, as previously discussed with the 1863 New York
City Draft Riots. In short, public buy-in to any form of mandatory military service before World
War I was lackluster at best, and the Federal Government relied more on volunteers than they did
forcing people into service. By relying on volunteers, public buy-in was not fully necessary if
the State wanted to go to war. However, the coercive regime was about to become more allencompassing with the addition of social coercion. This along with the changes in Federal
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bureaucracy and absolute State control over the military, the ability of the State to draft and force
its citizens to go to war was about to grow exponentially.
The 1910s were a time of crises, both at home and abroad. The passage of the National
Defense Act of 1916 occurred when the United States was not even at war, but this did not mean
that the precipice of war was not in sight. Small skirmishes like the Mexican invasion of
Columbus, New Mexico, in early 1916 exposed a pressing need to expand the power projection
of the U.S. military beyond simply defending the borderlands to keep Americans safe, and with a
war raging in Europe, exhausting many of its participants, war itself did not seem far off.125
Despite this and the passage of the 1916 Act, American political leaders remained rather averse
to going to war, especially in Europe. Woodrow Wilson famously ran for reelection in 1916 on a
platform of keeping the United States out of the war. Additionally, the U.S. Army and Navy at
the time were relatively small and ineffectual, maintaining a small standing force of less than
200,000 total for both services.126 However, within a few months of taking office for his second
term, Wilson had to renege on his promise to keep the United States out of war due to increasing
danger to U.S. interests.127 The small American military needed troops once war had been
declared, so once again a draft became necessary. Only this time, unlike during the Civil War, it
was quite successful in filling the ranks.
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In May 1917, Congress passed a conscription resolution creating the Selective Service
and authorizing the president to raise some 500,000 troops to conduct the war effort.128 The
Federal Government required all adult males to register with local draft boards, and those boards
made decisions on who was or was not drafted. Additionally, these draft boards were
apportioned based on geography and population, and draftees were, at least in theory, chosen
equally, so no matter what one’s class was, service was required.129 Some 4,000 draft boards
were set up nationwide, answering directly to the president, and young men overwhelmingly
went to these boards to register.130 With the State apparatus in place to draft and use the military
more effectively, the draft could efficiently induct people into the military and use them more
resourcefully than occurred in the Civil War.
The American public, despite being largely isolationist a year prior, willingly accepted
the drive towards war and pushed for individuals to register and serve, creating a social
obligation to serve that at times bordered on neurotic. Individuals who avoided service were
termed “slackers,” and spontaneous gangs coerced these slackers into registering for the
Selective Service.131 The social compulsion was further solidified by groups who sought to use
the patriotic fervor and the support for war to achieve their own political goals. For example,
women’s suffragist groups used their support for the draft and the war effort as a means of
demonstrating their value to the country, and thus why they deserved the right to vote, even
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though they were not subject to the draft.132 The outgrowth of this social compulsion to serve
was that military service became practically all-encompassing. Individuals were required to, at
the very least, register for the draft, and if they chose not to, they became social outcasts. This
was dissimilar to wars past where one could escape service by not showing up, finding a
replacement, or paying a fee in money or resources. Service and sacrifice became the patriotic
thing to do and was expected from the public as well, and by war’s end, some 24 million
Americans had signed up for the Selective Service, with just over 4.7 million Americans serving,
of which just over 116,000 lost their lives. The majority of servicemembers in this war were
draftees, a first in American history.133 By the end of 1918, however, the war ended and so too
did the World War I-era draft, but not before social coercion had become a primary motivator for
compelling military service. The Civil War draft counteracted the public’s will, but the World
War I draft faced no such sustained backlash.
In summation, the coercive regime was a period of transition from a militia-based regime
to a Federally-controlled modern military. This transition supplanted the militia system
completely, effectively reorganizing the structure of the American military from the Federal
level down to the newly formed state National Guards. Through experience and
experimentation, the American State established a new paradigm vis-à-vis American military
service and the public’s relationship to said military. This paradigm is built on two primary
means of coercion, State and social, both of which manifested themselves over this time in both
drafted and volunteer military service. The Civil War allowed for experimentation in draft
systems to see what worked, and the Spanish-American War demonstrated that a volunteer force
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could operate effectively and encouraged the consolidation of military power at the Federal level.
By the end of World War I, the American State had learned how to forcibly conscript its own
citizens into the national military with overwhelming public support. By the end of the coercive
regime, the process for transferring American military power to a Federal responsibility had been
completed. Along with that, State power to conscript had been achieved as well, thanks in part
to public buy-in.

Coercion and Identity
As noted in Anderson’s Imagined Communities, the State plays a role in shaping the
nation as a self-identifying community. He uses the examples of the census, maps, and museums
as tools for the social construction of the make-up of the people, where they find themselves in
the greater world, and their own history.134 Therefore, if the State can shape and mold its people
to its will, it is fair to say that as State power grows, its influence over the public it has can
increase as well. How one measures this power is not as important as seeing the power itself and
how it spills into other domains. There is a clear trend in the American case where in spite of
those anti-statist tendencies, the State grew military power, which in turn allowed it to forcibly
impose newer forms of identity upon the nation. This is the essence of the coercive regime, a
forcible State-centric application not just of forced military service, but also of an identity upon a
nationalized group. It is during the coercive regime that we see a coalesced and stronger
formation of American national identity applied across all groups in the nation.
Yet, we should not see the leap from individual state identity to national identity as an
instantaneous process, but rather a gradual one, slowly building over time. As a result of this
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slow and gradual process, there was an intermediate stage briefly reference in the last chapter,
regional identity, which developed and remains in some forms to this day. In this section, we
will examine first regional, then national identity and how they connected to the coercion of
military service during specific wars. We will also look at how State and social coercion work
with one another to assist in creating these identity formations, with State coercion alone
overlapping with regional identity and social coercion overlapping with national identity. Once
both types of coercion were in play, then compulsory military service becomes practically
inescapable, lest one relinquish American citizenship and move elsewhere. Military service thus
became one part of American identity.

A Formation of Regional Identity
Any definition of American regional identity would revolve around geographic
regrouping of individual states around a common ideology or culture. These sorts of regional
identities are still commonplace, and Americans today still identify with particular regions of the
country based on where they are from and where they live. These geo-constrained and sociallyconstructed identities are part of the American experience and can fluctuate over time. The most
notable example of regional identity is how Southerners identify with one another more so than
they might with Americans from Northern or Western regions, and this self-identification can
manifest itself socially, economically, and politically. An example where regional identity shifts
or changes in time is with political realignments. With the Southern example, in the 1960s,
Southern states changed their party affiliations en masse from the Democratic to Republican
party after the passage of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet, even in that example, the shift was not just
geographically-based; it was political as well. The geographic constraints of the region created
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real-world demarcations, but the shift within the identity was a result of State actions. In short,
we should not see regional identity as simply the geographic location of particular states or its
inhabitants alone, but it should be viewed as a State-constructed identity as well, born out over
time and State actions. Such is the case of the main regional identities we will discuss here,
those of Northern and Southern identities, as these two serve as the major building blocks
towards achieving a full American national identity.
When discussing these two particular identities, it is natural to lean on the Civil War as
the event that puts them on full display. The war is the seminal event of Northern versus
Southern states, a dichotomous battle of political culture over slavery. We should be clear that
Northern and Southern identities, while ever apparent during the Civil War, predate the conflict
by decades. For our purposes, the use of the Civil War as a focal point is intended to fix these
identities in time, but at the same time, the Civil War acts only as the culminating event in the
formation of these identities. Much of the work in the establishment of regional identities
occurred in the antebellum era, and thus within the confines of what this project defines as the
militia regime. In spite of regional identity having its origins before the beginning of the
coercive regime, this does not mean its placement here is incorrect. Identity is nebulous and
ever-changing so putting exact dates on its origins is a difficult task. The use of the Civil War as
the zenith of this regional identity is appropriate because within the coercive regime, we saw the
American State and a quasi-State system in the South forcing identity through conscription and
other means onto their citizens. As a result, we will look at State construction of regional
identity through a before- and after-the-war lens to fully flesh out regional identity.
Prior to the war, the American State reinforced Northern and Southern identities through
legally-structured means. For instance, the identification of free states versus slave states
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reinforced a type of political, economic, and social identity at the state-level, and the Federal
Government used such state identities to establish and give legal grounding to these states as
well as justification for political actions. Since states had fostered their own identity, the growth
of the nation westward fomented debates on the admission of new states as either free or slave
states. The Missouri Compromise is a good example of this sort of legalistic regional identity
created by the early Federal Government. By admitting so-called free and slave states one-byone in order to maintain a balance of power at the Federal level, the Federal Government was
creating separate regional identities and parsing states in to separate categories. The Missouri
Compromise even created a geographic boundary where no states north of the line would be
slave states.135 The American State was the primary actor in superimposing these regional
identities onto the states because it was also responsible for the creation of new states. It created
a State-sanctioned framework through which states would self-identify with one another and
work together for their common interests. It is within that framework that not just political, but
also economic and social ties formed, and the war provided a clear example of where each state
came down on their regional identity.
At the same time though, the war exposed cleavages within states regarding their
particular regional identities and where they would align. Not all citizens of the states were
uniform in their state’s chosen cause. One example of this is to look at border states and their
loyalties during the war. Border states like Kentucky and Missouri, which did not secede during
the war, saw Confederate insurgencies within their states from their own citizens who supported
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the Southern cause.136 Even within states, the existence of two regional identities caused divided
loyalties. A more extreme example of these identities causing divisions is the breakaway of
West Virginia from Virginia, which created the new state in 1863. The northwestern parts of
Virginia which encompassed most of modern West Virginia were culturally different from the
rest of Virginia. The largely mountainous region of the state had less agricultural land and thus
was less bound to slavery. The war had exposed largely pro-Union sympathies in the area, and
the secession of Virginia was the moment that those areas decided to unify and proclaim
themselves as separate, succeeding at joining the Union in the midst of the conflict.137 The war
exacerbated these identities and forced people living in these borders areas to make decisions on
which side they were going to support, and in the West Virginia case, the State creation of these
identities indirectly led to the fracture of an entire state.
Up until this point, we have looked at these regional identities as part of a prism of
geographic location or historical support for slavery. Perhaps another way to look at these
identities is to go beyond the regional focus and see them as developing national identities in
distinctly separate ways. We can view this perspective through each side’s goals during the Civil
War. The South sought to separate itself from the North, creating its own separate State, while
the North sought to preserve the Union. The Southern version of identity in this case was a
regional identity imposed on it by the Federal Government in the decades prior to the war and
with aspirations to be a distinctive national identity, centered on preserving slavery as an
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economic system with other strokes of political and cultural similarities amongst the secessionist
states. The Northern version, however, was more closely linked to what we could consider to be
the American national identity of the time, that of keeping the states that had joined the Union,
whether in the 1790s or much later, from willfully leaving the Union. In the North’s case, its
form of identity was not so much a regional identity based on geographic location or aversion
towards slavery as it was preserving a status quo of all states remaining in the Union, whether by
will or by force. We can see this in Northern patriotic narratives at the time which focused on
the concept of loyalty, a term which is still debated by historians as to what it exactly was and
probably varied depending on which part of the North is being discussed.138 At its most basic
level, however, loyalty meant loyalty to the Union, and Southern secession contradicted this
loyalty. In order to maintain this form of identity, the North needed to dominate the South to
preserve the Union, which it did so through State power of imposing that national form of
identity. In this framework, the Civil War-era regional identities are more of a dichotomy
between a nationalist-imposed identity in the North and an aspirational quasi-national identity in
the South.
No matter the framework used to view regional identity in the Civil War’s context, the
State remains the primary actor in fomenting and applying this identity. Once again, the Civil
War had two State structures which were attempting to impose identity on their respective
populations, with our focus being on the military drafts. In the South, the use of conscription
forced individuals to fight for the South’s cause of preserving slavery as an institution. Much
like in the case of the militias, though, the realities do not always match the historical perceptions
afterwards. The Southern draft was one of poorer individuals, most of whom did not own slaves.
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The greatest benefit in preserving slavery as an economic system would not go to those who
fought, but rather those who did not fight. It was a draft intended to benefit Southern elites,
which did not provide the most compelling reason for individuals to serve. As such, the use of
Southern identity imposed by the Confederate State as it were, backed up with the Southern
monopoly on violence, became a tool to inspire and, in the case of the draft, compel service.
Without full social buy-in and without a strong historical rooting, however, the draft’s ability to
consolidate Southern identity was weak at best. Additionally, it is difficult to ascertain how
effective the Confederate State was at fomenting a Southern identity overall, but at the very least
we can see that the war left a psychological division in which Southern regional identity exists
even today. The Lost Cause myth and terms used for the war, like the War of Northern
Aggression, are examples of modern psychological manifestations of Southern identity.
On the other side, Northern use of identity was more effective and efficient, especially in
compelling military service, but only for a time. A large swath of volunteerism at the onset of
the war meant that, first, the draft was not needed early on and, second, that their form of identity
was already deeply rooted in Northern states. We can look at this identity as regional or
national, but volunteerism is indicative of at least a form of social buy-in to American identity or
the cause of retaining the Southern states in the Union. The North resorted to a draft at a time
where volunteers were drying up and the war effort needed more men and resources. In fact, the
use of the draft to extract money and resources from the population, which to be fair the South
did as well, likely did little to strengthen that identity. Despite this, the Northern form of identity
compelled more volunteers than it did draftees, and perhaps this is at least one indication that the
Northern identity was stronger than the Southern one. The Northern cause to preserve the Union
was already rooted in an identity dating back to the nation’s founding, whereas the novelty of the
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Southern identity was perhaps one part of its undoing. These drafts were certainly not the only
expression of regional identity, but they did demonstration the extent to which each State could
compel its will and form identity upon its respective publics.
As we can see, there is a lot of interpretation related to these identities, how they formed,
and what real-world effect they had. The key point to consider here is that they serve as a
stepping stone towards consolidated national identity, no matter what interpretation we accept.
Whether we treat Northern or Southern identities as full regional identities based on geopolitical
ideals or connections or as quasi-or fully national identities, these regional identities serve as a
connective tissue and foundation upon which American national identity was eventually
achieved. In the next section, we will move ahead some five decades to the consolidation of
American national identity during World War I.

The Solidification of National Identity
World War I saw the coalescence of American national identity around a common cause
and a foreign enemy. What set this particular conflict apart from the prior wars is how the public
openly embraced the war, creating peer pressure to register for the draft and serve in the U.S.
military. This trend was not unique to the United States; the political atmosphere surrounding
World War I, both at home and abroad, created a mixture of expectations for military service and
fused it with the growing nationalism that was growing across North America and Europe.
Conscription, national identity, and public buy-in for war are cornerstones to understanding all
nations involved in World War I. The American case, however, is unique in how vastly different
it was from the Founders’ intentions. The American State had, over the course of a century,
taken military power for itself from the states, built a Federal-level military, and forcibly drafted
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its own citizens, and had eliminated much of the anti-statist philosophical opposition to any of
these actions. By World War I, the American State had the legal ability and the capacity to go to
war. It also had the ability to shape and mold its citizens’ identity into whatever it needed to
succeed at war.
There are a few examples which demonstrate the strengthening position of the Federal
Government in reinforcing national identity through the military. The first of these is associated
with a perceived shifting of power from Congress to the Executive. Political scientists have
generally noted this trend of Congress ceding power the president or the president exercising a
broad range of powers over Congress, and this trend is prevalent, especially in times of crisis like
during wars when the president serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.139 Bruce
Porter argued that World War I had a “ratchet effect” in building State capacity in the United
States because the war effort expanded Federal bureaucracy, which thus granted more power to
the president.140 William Howell argued that presidents have the ability to take unilateral action
in the absence of Congressional action, whether at war or in policy, and this ability grants the
president a significant amount more power to set the political landscape.141 On top of this, one
should consider the power of the bully pulpit. Richard Neustadt argued that presidential power
lies in the president’s ability to persuade, both Congress and the public, and because of the one
voice with which the president speaks compared to Congress’ many factions and many voices, it

139

William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on
Presidential War Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 4.
140

Porter, War and the Rise of the State, 269-272.

141

William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 14-15.

112

is easier for the president to win over hearts and minds.142 Neustadt and Howell do not address
World War I directly, but they do point to some of the other abilities that the president has it his
disposal.
Because of the president’s unique position, any expansion of military power at the
Federal level grants more power directly to the president, whether in wartime or not. A larger
military meant a greater ability for the president to shape the military and to shape the culture
around service. For example, at the onset of World War I, Congress passed military draft
legislation which provided more comprehensive explicit Executive power over military-related
affairs, down to the minutiae.143 The president was given power to regulate alcohol sales and
restrict brothels and other kinds of vice-based establishments near military encampments and
installations.144 On face value, this may not seem to be noteworthy, but it is indicative of an
increasing cultural power of the presidency over shaping young servicemembers. If a common
experience through military service is being defined by Congressionally-enumerated powers
given to the president, then the Federal Government through the presidency is shaping and
molding a common identity through that experience. The large numbers of enrollees in World
War I, combined the social coercion of the time, gave the military draft in 1917 a particularly
cogent ability to shape and mold that national identity, unlike military campaigns of the past.
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Another way in which the Federal Government consolidated national identity was
through military unit identification. If we recall it referenced in the last chapter, military units
during the militia regime were identified by their state of origin or by a particular commander.145
By World War I, that sort of state- or leader-based unit nomenclature had all but disappeared, but
it was a process to get to that point. During the Civil War and the Spanish-American War,
military units were still identified based on their state or region of origin. The Civil War saw
large formations like the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia square off against the Union’s
Army of the Potomac. These large armies were national armies, defending their respective
States, but their origins still came from local, regional, and state-based units from where they
were rooted.146 The Spanish-American War had state-based volunteer units complement national
units. For instance, at the Battle of San Juan Hill, the 1st U.S. Volunteer Calvary, also known as
the Rough Riders, served alongside state-volunteer units like the 71st New York Infantry
Regiment.147 However, by 1917, World War I units deployed to the European theater had no
state names nor did they use volunteer designations either. Instead, units were designated
through alphanumeric job-oriented unit combinations that the U.S. military continues to use to
this day.148 Additionally, the entire force that was deployed to Europe was called the American
Expeditionary Force, another term that implies a national origin, not a state or regional one.
These unit names are indicative of the progressive development of an American identity at the
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heart of military service. Those who joined American units during World War I were not
representatives of their respective states of origin; they were instead Americans, mixing with
other Americans from all states, regions, and territories to create a national fighting force. This
was a symbol of the State developing both the military and identity simultaneously. The
usurping state-based unit names and the disuse of the term volunteer are both examples of the
creation of a sameness within American identity. Whether draftee or volunteer, all
servicemembers were Americans.
Ultimately, the construction of the American State built not only its military but also its
ability to create a national identity over time. Coercion was an outgrowth of the State’s growth.
Once the public had bought into the State’s construction of American identity and with the
bureaucracy well in place, its use to compel military service was rather easy. With State and
social coercion both complete by World War I, national identity or, perhaps more appropriately,
American national conscience was forged in the common war experience and reinforced by
common military service under national banners. By war’s end, the American State’s control
over the U.S. military was unquestioned, a far cry from the Founders’ intentions, and yet the
public acquiesced, in part because their identity rested upon that very military. The seeds were
planted for American military dominance worldwide.

An Analysis of the Hypotheses for the Coercive Regime
Turning towards our hypotheses, the coercive regime is the second period of analysis,
and it builds upon the militia regime with a keen focus on growing military power almost
exclusively at the Federal level. The American State took more power for itself at the expense of
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the states, but the process was not immediate. Of the four hypotheses, the coercive regime can,
like the militia regime, give us insight into the first three.
The first hypothesis argues that military regimes with diffused costs and compulsory
service required from the public reduces the length of American wars. When looking at the wars
of the coercive period, they are relatively brief when compared to other periods. The Civil War
was the longest American conflict at four years in length while the Spanish-American War was
the shortest at four months, if we do not consider the Philippines-American War as an extension
of that conflict beyond the official end date. The coercive period’s evidence does not hold water
for this hypothesis at first glance. World War I and the Civil War were the conflicts during this
period with compulsory service and diffused costs, but they were longer than the SpanishAmerican War, which was all-volunteer force. While this may contradict the hypothesis, it
might be important to consider other extenuating circumstances which affect the outcome of our
assessment of this hypothesis. First, volunteer forces tend to have more mobility than drafted or
militia forces, and this may be why the Spanish-American War was over so quickly. The rise in
American naval power against a weakened Spanish enemy may also have contributed to the
brevity of the war. It is also perhaps important to consider that none of these wars were terribly
long when compared to other American wars. The Civil War is not a short war by any means,
but remains shorter than Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and even the Revolutionary War. Because
of this, if we consider the length of these wars from a macro-view, in that we combine the length
of these wars together, then this particular regime has some of the shortest major wars in
American history, which does help to confirm this hypothesis.
Our second hypothesis deals with conscription components within military regimes
shaping American identity through shared sacrifice. The coercive regime demonstrates that
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identity can at least in part be shaped by shared sacrifice through conscription. The Civil War
had the first official American conscription regimes which correlated with regional or quasinational identities. These were relatively weak conscription regimes, but much later once the
United States became involved in World War I, American identity consolidated around shared
sacrifice and military service, making all three strongly correlated with one another.
Yet, the third hypothesis is perhaps the most appropriate and visible within the coercive
regime. This third hypothesis argues that American identity over time has been a State-led
development, both by individual U.S. states and the Federal Government, associated with the
development of specific military regimes. This regime served as the transition period from
individual state-based identity to national identity with the intervening step of regional identity,
manifesting itself around the Civil War. Creation of regional identity and American national
identity was clearly the result of State-level interventions, whether through legislation or
growing military power at the Federal level. Wars were a means of unifying the public under a
common cause, and while volunteerism tended to dominate the Civil War, by World War I,
public pressure for service meant the military draft came to symbolize a typified and common
version of American national identity. The American State had created the environment in
which national identity could be fostered, and the World War I draft manifested that identity in
military form.

Concluding Remarks on the Coercive Regime
If the militia regime was the infancy of the American military, the coercive regime was
its teenage years, filled with growing pains and figuring out who it wanted to be. This regime is
defined by the growing American State and experimentation with what that state could or could
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not do. It is the transition period from state militias to a federalized military, capable of
conducting war beyond the borders of the United States. While early militias denoted a concept
of universal military service, they were not effective military forces. To achieve some form of
effectiveness, the Federal Government subsumed military service for national causes. States
retained militias, but Federal military power grew through volunteerism and the military draft,
which allowed it to reach out and directly impact the lives of its citizens in wartime. By the end
of this regime, not only could the American State forcibly conscript its own citizens into military
service, but it had the backing of the population. The Federal Government had taken a primary
role in creating, sustaining, and using its war machine, something that ran counter to what the
Founders intended. However, with the growing complexity of war both domestically and
internationally, the evolution of American military power necessitated changes, and those
changes usurped power from the states and invested it at the Federal level. By the end of the
coercive regime, it was no longer a question whether the Federal Government could have a large
military or whether it could force its citizens to go to war. It could, and it had the legal
framework, associated precedents, and pressing crises to make it happen.
Along with growing State power over the military came radical changes to identity. As
more individual Americans served together for national or quasi-national causes, common
experiences bred common identity. A militiaman in the 1790s may never have met other
militiamen outside of his own locality or state. His identity may have been more vested locally
than nationally. However, by the 1910s, this was no longer the case. The American State had
created a national identity and had forced its citizens to adopt that identity through service or
through supporting the war cause. American identity was no longer a nebulous concept; it
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existed, Americans had at least a common idea of what it was, and it became a tool of the State
when needed.
Much like the coercive regime built onto the existing militia regime, the coercive regime
was also a step towards an even larger military, more conscription, and a brand-new form of
American identity, which hundreds of thousands of volunteers and draftees sacrificed themselves
for at the State’s direction.
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Chapter Five
The Peacetime Draft, International Identity, and the Apex of Service

“A peacetime draft is the most un-American thing I know.”
--George Wald

The militia and coercive regimes were both transformative periods for American military
service. Militias represented an ideal of service, nested at the state-level, while the coercive
regime saw growth in Federal military power and the ability to compel service from citizens.
However, during the coercive regime, conscription was limited in scope only to the times of
crises in which the country found itself at war. The next regime we will discuss, the Peacetime
Draft regime, was different in that the American State’s conscription bureaucracy initially
implemented a draft with no war and maintained it in times of peace between wars. For the
duration of the Peacetime Draft, the United States fought three different wars, but the existence
and use of the draft was not predicated on any state of war. From 1940 to 1973, almost
uninterrupted, the United States conscripted individual male citizens during wartime and
peacetime into its military, applying themes about military service and identity from prior
regimes to the greater part of American society. This had a major consequence of enlarging the
size of the American military to a permanently high state in an effort to counterbalance against
perceived threats abroad. This in turn fostered a new kind of American identity, an international
identity, which encompasses the values that the United States represents to the rest of the world.
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Many of these can be named off-hand because they are still within the popular American
narratives of today, like democracy or freedom. At the time though, these values were a pivotal
part of distinguishing sides in the Cold War, serving as a means of setting the United States apart
from the Soviet Union. The Peacetime Draft regime serves the high-water marks of military
service to the country and of constructing American identity. It established the permanent
military footprint at the heart of the Federal Government while also using that military to defend
the apogee of American values within the self-perceived form of international identity.
Table 5-1. Major Conflicts During the Peacetime Draft Regime149

Outcome

Length
in Days

Total
Served

Draftees
Served

Total
U.S.
Deaths

World War II Existential/
(1941-1945)
Offensive

Win

1365

16,112,566

10,110,104

405,399

Korea
(1950-1953)

Dispute/
Defensive

Draw

1128

5,720,000

1,529,539

36,574

Vietnam
(1964-1973)

Dispute/
Defensive

Loss

3097

8,744,000

1,857,304

58,220

Conflict

War Type

The Peacetime Draft regime was marked by three major conflicts, as noted in Table 5-1.
The first of these was World War II, which serves as the height of patriotic service, duty, and
embodying American identity. While not the deadliest conflict in American history in terms of
casualties, it had the highest number of Americans serving in the military during any one
conflict, including the highest number of draftees. The second of these conflicts is the Korean
conflict, which had a high number of those who served, but a lower percentage of draftees out of
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the total served when compared to World War II. The final of these conflicts, Vietnam, was the
longest and had an even lower percentage of draftees in terms of total served than either of the
first two conflicts, but it was the most controversial since the use of the draft created public
outcry against the conflict. Up until that point, the Vietnam conflict was the longest in American
history, and despite the military’s efforts, the war has been considered a loss because of the
North Vietnamese invasion of the South two years after the war’s official end.
When comparing all three conflicts, the only one which was existential and offensive war
was World War II. The totalitarian threat from Germany, Italy, and Japan was perhaps the most
substantial threat that the United States had faced since the Civil War. The other two conflicts
were international disputes involving the U.S. military on the side of an allied partner. In the
Korean War, the U.S. military fought alongside South Korea, while in Vietnam, it fought
alongside South Vietnam. These disputes were different from the existential conflict in World
War II because they were limited in scope to a particular region and had a mission of preserving
a particular status quo within that region. Additionally, these two conflicts were oriented
towards fighting communism and preserving American interests, both of which had become the
primary motivator for U.S. interventions abroad at the time.150 This new type of intervention,
not just based on defending against existential threats to American territory, but now based on an
ideological fight against an outside threat, fed into the development of a new kind of American
international identity, which projected onto the world what the United States stood for and was
willing to defend with its blood and treasure. Within this identity are common tropes about who
Americans are, to include being guardians of freedom, defenders of democracy, and a dedication
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to consumer capitalism, as well as encapsulating all of these within a paradigm of good versus
evil, with the United States being in the former.
For this chapter, we will examine the Peacetime Draft regime and how it restructured the
American military and notions around military service. This will focus on the 30-plus years
when the draft was a principle means of military recruitment during times of war as well as how
that system came to an end amidst public outcry and shifting political narratives. Additionally,
we will look at how this particular military regime helped to build the United States into an
international power, thus creating an international identity which the United States sought to
defend. It also built upon elements of the militia and coercive regimes, but when it ended, it
destroyed and morphed ideals around military service and American identity. As a consequence,
this regime is key to the development of American power today because serves as the
precipitating era for the current military regime in which the United States is in, the AllVolunteer Force, and so what took place during the Peacetime Draft regime will be instrumental
to understanding our current military and associated identity paradigms.

The Peacetime Draft Regime
The Peacetime Draft regime is defined as the period between 1940 and 1973, where the
United States continuously, except for one year in 1947-1948, maintained a conscription regime
in times of war and peace in order to bulk up its own military forces in times of need.151 This
regime built upon the militia and coercive regimes using the lessons learned from the failures of
those regimes and acting upon what made those regimes successful. The Peacetime Draft used
coercive State power, social buy-in, and ideals rooted in Americans being citizen-soldiers to
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create American-centric positive narratives around conflict and war. These elements and these
narratives were instrumental in fostering and supporting this new regime and birthed new
reasons for Americans to fight abroad. With a new international identity to defend, the U.S.
Government sought to use its military power to protect its interest and its allies abroad, marking
a permanent shift in the American military footprint towards the exterior of the country to be
able to maintain persistent international interventions abroad if need be, all while using the draft
of citizens into the military to maintain that image both at home and abroad. The coercive
regime made the American State’s control over the national military structure unquestionable.
The Peacetime Draft regime put that structure to work in a multitude of ways.
While this period was the pinnacle of American military service in terms of the number
of those who served and social acceptance of the draft, it was not without its issues, and we
should not look at it as a monolithic era of like-minded Americans doing their duty without
question. In fact, this particular regime should be viewed as culminating towards the beginning,
then slowly descending towards transition to the All-Volunteer Force at the end. The 30-plus
years of the Peacetime Draft helped build American international dominance, but it also created
one of the most controversial periods where the American public debated if forcing individual
citizens to fight in wars, especially international wars over abstract ideas that did little to defend
the home front, through mandatory military service was proper, if not moral. The collective will
created during World War II had been spent by the time Vietnam generation had reached draft
age, creating questions around whether a draft was necessary and eventually consigning it to the
dustbin of history.
In this section, we will examine three distinct periods of the Peacetime Draft regime, first
starting with World War II and how it shaped the Peacetime Draft through a perceived just
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cause. We will then look to Korea and some of the political and cultural investments made by
the greater American society in the 1950s to maintain the draft as an institution. Finally, we will
look at Vietnam and how it tore at the core of the draft with a perceived unjust cause, effectively
ending any State or social requirement to serve.

World War II, The Just Cause
After World War I, the draft drawdown reverted the American military back to having a
smaller footprint, maintaining a relatively small active-duty force numbering on only the
hundreds of thousands for both the Army and the Navy. The post-World War I military still had
more personnel, having at least 100,000 more members than in the decades prior to the war, but
overall, the number of military personnel remained limited.152 With no conflict, the American
State saw no need to continue its use of the draft, and so military members during this
intervening time between 1918 and 1940 were volunteers recruited for Federal service through
enlistment, Service Academies, or other means. In this particular time of peace, the U.S. military
maintained itself without a draft.
Yet, this changed in 1940 with growing tensions worldwide. In Europe, Germany had
invaded Poland the year prior, and in June, Germany conquered France, leaving the United
Kingdom practically alone in Europe against the Nazi threat. On the other side of the world,
Japan had expanded its empire into mainland Asia, increasing its military and naval power. The
United States, however, remained out of these conflicts, with the exception of providing
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assistance to the United Kingdom and engaging in political quarrels with Japan.153 Similar to the
period prior to World War I, isolationism had been a predominant foreign policy, and the
political will for war was not there. However, with these creeping threats abroad, Congress and
President Roosevelt began to prepare for the eventuality of war.
In September 1940, with no war declaration or state of war existing between the United
States and another country, Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,
establishing the first and only Peacetime Draft in American history. The act outlined that all
males between the ages of 20 and 45 in the United States were required to register for the draft.
Additionally, the act laid out provisions for implementation by creating local registration boards,
where individuals were required to present themselves in person in order to be registered.154 The
Peacetime Draft used practically the same bureaucratic structure as the World War I draft, just
without the impending crisis or push for war. Its implementation was a signal by American
political leadership that war was possible and preparations needed to be made.
Even if Congress and the President perceived threats abroad, this did not mean that the
American public accepted those threats as legitimate enough to warrant compelling military
serve. On the whole, the public did not embrace the Peacetime Draft upon its implementation.
Many at first saw the forced military service at peacetime as a threat to an individual’s right to
anti-violence beliefs, particularly for conscientious objectors or pacifists. Groups formed against
the draft and tried to influence Congress to oppose and nullify the conscription regime.155
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Additionally, within a year of the law’s passage and still with no war to fight, some draftees in
the Army began to actively resist against serving by spreading word to family members and the
press about their treatment in the Army. Congress was forced to make compromises by changing
certain aspects of the draft, to include changing the length of service. Along with this, the public
largely believed that draftees should not be sent abroad for military operations, in some sense
negating their usefulness.156 For the first fourteen months of the Peacetime Draft, its legitimacy
remained unconvincing and unproven. Between September 1940 and December 1941, there was
no social compulsion to serve because the perceived threat to the nation was not apparent, and
with that, it became difficult for those drafted and their families to see a point to their service. In
spite of this, the Peacetime Draft remained in place because the resistance to it had not grown
beyond the control of the American State.157
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 effectively eliminated any
reservation that Americans had about the wars or resistance towards mandatory military service
within the Peacetime Draft structure. The attack provided the United States with a rationale to
enter the war, allowing Americans to paint themselves as the victims of an unprovoked attack,
and as such, they would respond with force. This created a just cause narrative around the
American fight because it was defensive against an enemy who had attacked it. This just cause
is a central aspect to the U.S. military and its draft because it provides an impetus to act with
haste. Within days, Congress expanded the fight to include both Germany and Italy as well. By
painting the U.S. response as a just and noble cause, the United States could portray its war
actions in a positive light, towards a greater goal of a more secure world. The Peacetime Draft
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and the rest of the war effort became rather effective once the United States had this just cause.
With cause in hand, the draft allowed the United States to mobilize for total war on two vastly
different geographic fronts. In total, from 1941 to 1945, the United States drafted around 10
million men into the armed forces.158 There were also a sizeable number of volunteers, but the
vast majority of servicemembers were draftees. The draft filled the ranks, but the whole of
American society shifted towards the war effort. American industry oriented itself towards
wartime production, so not only were draftees and volunteers serving, but the general public
working in factories or rationing supplies also provided a sense of unity and service towards the
greater goal. The whole of the United States was united in the war effort and service was a
commonality amongst all, no matter what position they were in, whether inside or outside of the
military.
American success in the war reinforced the belief in the Peacetime Draft’s effectiveness.
By war’s end, the United States, save Hawaii, was largely untouched by the war’s direct effects,
and its massive industrial power allowed the country to emerge from World War II as the
primary industrial and banking power, in a prime position to rebuild the world. The American
civilian population was largely untouched and avoided most other threats plaguing other
countries at the time, like hunger or deprivation of resources. Additionally, a good-versus-evil
paradigm associated with this particular conflict reinforced the just cause paradigm. Especially
once the war was over, with the horrors seen in the Holocaust and the atrocities carried out by
the Japanese in hindsight, American political and cultural portrayals of the U.S. role displayed
the United States as on the side of good against a world filled with evil. Since conscription
played a major role in the United States achieving victory on the side of good, the war’s strong
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association with massive military mobilization helped to demonstrate the novelty and usefulness
of a military draft and a growing security structure against threats to the American homeland.
World War II set the standard for national mobilization for a patriotic war, and it belayed
any question over the usefulness of a military draft, at least for a time. At war’s end, the U.S.
military quickly demobilized and millions of veterans returned home. Yet, what they returned
home to was a vastly different United States, one that was elevated to a position of leadership on
the global stage and one in which military power became a primary requirement for the new
superpower to maintain its commitments. The fight against fascism had dissipated and, in its
place, the United States found a new foe in the Soviet Union. The American State began to build
anew a permanent national defense apparatus, passing the National Security Act of 1947, which
fundamentally reshaped the military and intelligence communities, including creating a separate
and independent Air Force.159 At the same time, the Peacetime Draft was ended in 1947, only to
be resurrected by President Truman in 1948 due to the increasing fears over Soviet aggression in
Europe and elsewhere.160 The Cold War became the justification to continue the Peacetime
Draft, providing personnel for the country to maintain its international supremacy.161 It was
essentially a new just cause, brought forth as a means of maintaining the American military and
its position in the world. While at a much-reduced level, the Peacetime Draft became a mainstay
of American life and social expectations. More importantly though, the American State had
effectively consolidated control over all facets of the American military and national defense.
With World War II, the American State had demonstrated the extent to which it could leverage
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its military capabilities, and its new-found global status put it in a position to permanently
leverage that ability on the world stage.

Korea, State Investment in Veterans, and Cultural Acceptance
This post-World War II Peacetime Draft period was not without challenges. If anything,
the mix of State power compelling service along with social expectations, given the events
leading up until that point, created in American society both an understood need for military
service and a tension concerning the appropriateness making service mandatory. Suffice to say,
the post-war Peacetime Draft was not necessarily a period of unity around the draft as a
beneficial element to society, but rather a generational expectation given the new international
position the United States found itself in. The imposition of this U.S. conscription regime at
peacetime was more of a question about what had worked rather than answering any questions as
to if it were appropriate for the given international conditions facing the nation. It was a tool of
the American State, not the only tool, but one nonetheless that had been effective in the past.
The late 1940s and 1950s tested the use of this tool, but at the same time, it was also a drastic
period of solidification of Federal military power, which included a State expansion of veteran
benefits and a growing push to gain cultural acceptance of the draft and military service.
The first real test of the draft after World War II was the Korean War when the United
States supported South Korean and United Nations forces against an invading North Korean
force. From 1950 to 1953, a total of 5.7 million Americans served during the conflict, of which
the Selective Service drafted approximate 1.6 million.162 In comparison to the number of
volunteers, the draftees were outnumbered more than two-to-one, meaning they only made up a
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smaller component of those who fought. With the Korean conflict being on a much smaller scale
and localized to one specific peninsula, the need for World War II-levels of military personnel
was simply not necessary, nor was it feasible. The draft overall was relatively successful with
very few protests against it, and most who were drafted responded to the call to serve.163 At the
same time though, the American public was not very supportive of the war, especially given the
stalemate situation from late 1950 onward and the firing of General Douglas MacArthur in
1951.164 Because of President Truman’s handling of the war, his approval rating towards the end
of his term had dropped to 22 percent.165 The public generally supported the draft, while not
necessarily supporting the war effort or how it was fought. Perhaps one major reason for this is
the lack of generational shift between World War II and the Korean War. With the end of World
War II and the start of Korea less than five years apart, the memories and experiences of war
were still fresh in the minds of most Americans. With that, the expectation of military service
was also fresh, so the draft was less controversial. In addition, the Korean War was only three
years long, with most of the fighting during the first year, so the conflict was relatively
abbreviated, giving little time for a sizeable or formidable protest to form. No matter our
interpretation, the public’s willingness to accept the draft while pushing back against the war is
remarkable here because it shows that support for the institution of the draft can be distinguished
from the war that the draft is supporting, something that was not the case in Vietnam as we will
see. The Korean War serves as the first example of the draft being used to increase military
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personnel as needed for regional and non-existential conflicts for the United States, and it was
rather successful.
On a separate note, during this same period, the American State vastly increased its
investment in veterans. Prior wars had seen pension systems enacted for veterans, but postWorld War II, State investment in veterans was taken to a new level. With millions of
servicemembers returning home from a global conflict, the American State collectively created
programs beyond pensions for its former military personnel as way of valuing their national
service. The Federal Government established the G.I. Bill, a program designed to allow
servicemembers to go to college through government-paid benefits, to repay the effort that
servicemembers had put forward during the war. Original estimates were that the G.I. Bill would
be used by about 10 to 20 percent of the returning veterans, but in reality, approximately 50
percent ended up using the program.166 The G.I. Bill was the first modern program after World
War II to cater exclusively towards veterans, a way of rewarding service from a grateful nation,
and it was not the last veterans-centric program.
The creation of such a program is indicative of a shift in societal expectations towards
veterans. As veterans return home, social expectations required the State to take care of the
veteran to return the favor. In the wars before 1941, pensions in the form of money received at a
certain age or time were the primary means of meeting this social expectation. The G.I. Bill
went beyond that, instead catering to veterans’ educational needs, and doing so on a massive
scale. With some 16 million serving during World War II, a large number of them draftees, and
just about half of those who served used the G.I. Bill upon their return, this program was a
colossal infusion of money on the domestic front towards veterans. The conscription of
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American citizens drove up the number of people who were eligible for this program. In that
sense, the Peacetime Draft not only invested in American citizens for their warfighting
capabilities, but also for their own personal development at war’s end, which added to the
nation’s political and economic development as well. Military service, thus, became not just
about adventures abroad or fighting wars, but also a conduit for the State-assisted investing in
oneself. This is an important change because it modifies the relationship between the veteran
and the State. It is no longer simply about required service from the individual to achieve a
certain State goal in wartime, but the State also has a responsibility to take care of that
individual. This marked the beginning of a shift in what service entailed and how it was
rewarded. The relationship between State and soldier became more symbiotic rather than onedirectional, a trend which continues even to this day.
The Peacetime Draft also had a cultural aspect to it as well. With American men having
to register and serve if called and the shadow of World War II and Korea looming over
American society, military service was integrated into cultural elements which reinforced service
expectations. Perhaps one of the most prominent examples of the intersecting military service
with culture was when Elvis Presley was drafted into the U.S. Army in the late 1950s. Elvis was
already a musical star in his own right before being drafted, but the local draft board where he
lived drafted him in 1957, a service that he did not avoid because of his stardom and willfully did
his duty from 1958 to 1960.167 Elvis was not assigned to any difficult duties nor did he serve in
an actual combat zone, given that the United States was not actively engaged in a combat during
his time in service, but his presence was a boon for the military and the maintenance of the
Peacetime Draft. In 1960 after his military career had ended, Elvis starred in the film G. I. Blues,
Brian McAllister Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1.
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“a faux-autobiographical movie about his army career.”168 The movie was as a pop culture
reference for this time period about Elvis’s service as well as a Hollywood commercial for
military service and the draft. Elvis’s service was not necessary; at no point was he the pivotal
soldier in a battle or anything of that sort. Instead, his military service functioned more as a
symbol of the era rather than the actual need of his personal military service. It indicated that no
one, not even a superstar like Elvis, was above serving in the Peacetime Draft, if and when
called. Such a cultural reinforcement of the draft and military service is emblematic of the
centrality of this sort of social expectation at that particular time.
From the late 1940s through the early 1960s, this was a period of nesting the Peacetime
Draft and military service as a part of the American experience, but what is unique about this
period is that war was not the only element reinforcing the expectation of service. The draft
augmented the number of military personnel during the Korean War, but the confluence of other
events and actions during the time period allowed for the draft to endure. Massive State
investment in veterans through the G.I. Bill showed that war and the draft could also create
incentive for individual self-improvement. Cultural reinforcements, like drafting Elvis or the
film G.I. Blues helped foster the social expectations around military service. On top of this, the
generational shift away from the World War II generation had not fully occurred, so with the war
fresh in people’s minds, so too were military service expectations still prominent. For the time
being, the Peacetime Draft continued to be effective part of American society.
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Vietnam, The Unjust Cause
The Peacetime Draft regime began its decline in the 1960s, stoked by the controversies
surrounding the Vietnam War. Whereas World War II cemented the ideal of military service in
American minds through a perceived just cause, Vietnam broke that service expectation with a
commensurate unjust cause. This particular war marked the end of 33 years of compulsory
military service and created an increasing uncertainty about the U.S. position in the world. It
raised questions around if forcing individuals to fight in a supposed unjust war was appropriate,
and what resulted from Vietnam was a simple answer: no. Of note, the war itself was only one
of the contributing factors to the social discord at the time as the 1960s was a period of social
angst around Civil Rights and other domestic social issues. Vietnam was a contributing factor to
exacerbating these social and political perturbations of the time, but its close linkage to the draft
caused the draft to be a primary target for those protesting the war itself.
Despite the war’s controversial nature and wide-ranging ramifications, the Vietnam-era
draft was not very different from prior drafts. It was still built on the same Selective Service
structure and bureaucracy as prior war periods, but the number of draftees was more limited than
prior periods. Only 1.85 million were drafted for the duration of the conflict, a small figure
when compared to the over 10 million Americans were drafted during the World War II. The
numbers of Vietnam draftees peaked from 1966 to 1969 when total draftees averaged about
300,000 a year, which once again was a relatively minor number in proportion to the overall
number of servicemembers.169 Additionally, of the approximately 58,000 U.S. servicemembers
in Vietnam, only about 17,700 of those killed were drafted from the Selective Service, the rest of
those killed being volunteers.170 Of all Vietnam-era servicemembers, draftees only represented
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about 21 percent of total military personnel, a much smaller percentage than either World War II
or Korea.171
The issue surrounding the Vietnam War, though, was not facts or data about the number
of draftees, but rather how American society felt about the war and, by proxy, the draft.
Perceptions about the conflict were quite different from Korea or World War II. First, this was
not a war of existential consequence for the United States. If Vietnam was lost, the United States
was not going to disappear, thus lessening the consequences of losing. Additionally, it became
more unclear over time why the United States was even engaged in conflict in Vietnam. While
the initial justification was to prevent communism from spreading throughout Southeast Asia, as
time went on, the war became seen more as an occupation and success became less apparent,
especially after the Tet Offensive. American citizens began to question the war in Vietnam and
its usefulness given its unclear goals and execution.172
Perhaps the most detrimental perception of this conflict was the alleged inequality in the
draft. The Selective Service seemed to picked certain, less privileged individuals while allowing
others not to serve. The deferment process provided an opportunity to postpone military service
to a later time or even avoid military service altogether if one were able to get enough
deferments and reach a certain age. There were a number of different deferments available,
which included job deferments, ministry deferments, among others. Doctors could also
medically disqualify individuals for military service if there was something that could negate
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their ability to serve as well.173 Additionally, if an individual chose specific kinds of military
service, he could avoid Vietnam altogether. The National Guard, in spite of being an integrated
military service within the national military framework capable of being federalized, was often
exempted from having to go to Vietnam to serve. Given the Cold War mentalities of the time
and the concerns over a conflict with the Soviet Union, homeland defense remained essential,
and thus, the National Guard was the main component of the military to remain stateside. While
some guardsmen did end up in Vietnam, the vast majority were able to remain stateside without
having to go to Vietnam, thereby fulfilling their service obligations without having to defy any
draft orders.174
The most prominent deferment, however, was the college deferment, which allowed
males who were going to college to avoid military service temporarily in order to complete
education. In one study on the matter, estimates were the college attendance for the male cohorts
between 1965 and 1970 saw around a five-percentage point increase in college attendance for
males, a jump that tended to subside after the draft was over.175 Colleges also during this time
period remained a center of protest against both the draft and the war. These anti-war, anti-draft
protests culminated with the 1970 shooting at Kent State where National Guardsmen opened fire
on a protest crowd, killing four.176 College deferments pushed individuals who did not want to
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be drafted into college, where the environment was largely anti-war and anti-draft, thus
reinforcing even more their desire to not go to war.
Finally, others chose to avoid the draft by simply defying it. An estimated 100,000 fled
the United States to avoid having to serve in the draft. By fleeing the country, they were able to
escape the State-compulsion component, although socially, these individuals were ostracized.177
Additionally, those who did not flee the country but still refused to serve could expect to serve in
prison. In one guidebook for conscientious objectors published in 1970, it described what the
expectations were for prison life should the objector’s request to not serve be denied.178 Draftees
had to be prepared to face legal consequences if they chose not to serve and did not have a
proper justification.
Resistance to the Peacetime Draft grew in the years prior to the war’s end. In 1968,
Richard Nixon ran his presidential campaign in part on the promise to eliminate the draft and
transition to an All-Volunteer Force. This act was both to politically-motivated to help garner
support for election, but also it harnessed the political and social movements against the war.179
Nixon was elected, continuing the war for some time along with the draft, but after his reelection
in 1972, he made good on his promise. With Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, the war
officially ended, and the United States withdrew from South Vietnam. With no war and no need
for draftees, the Peacetime Draft officially came to an end on June 30, 1973 when the last man
was drafted into the U.S. military.180 On July 1, the All-Volunteer Force was born.
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The view of Vietnam and the draft both as unjust helped to end the war, but the peace
agreement did not last. Within two years of the Paris Accords, the North Vietnamese broke the
treaty and overran South Vietnam with no active U.S. resistance, handing the U.S. its first major
war defeat, at least according to the popular narrative. As stated before, perception is key when
discussing the Vietnam War, and the fall of South Vietnam after the war’s official end tainted the
entire conflict as a loss. The Peacetime Draft was the casualty of an unpopular war and the
political and social machinations of the time, but it did not help that, in retrospect, it was
associated with the first major loss for the U.S. military. The Vietnam era draft was not different
from prior drafts. As shown above, most military personnel were not draftees, but how the
public perceived the draft and its use was quite different than prior drafts. One could connect
this once again to a generational shift. Whereas Korea was only a few years after World War II
and many servicemembers served in both wars, Vietnam had a whole new generation of soldiers,
draftees, and family members who had not necessarily lived through World War II or at least did
not have the war as vividly in their memories as the older generations. Whatever the
explanation, Vietnam ended any sort of mandatory military service in the United States.
Vietnam was the end of a long State-building enterprise of compelling Americans to serve their
country when asked. From 1973 onward, requiring military service from citizens was no longer
in the political cards. The political class, the general public, and the American State generally
agreed that the military should not be compulsory, or at the very least, requiring compulsory
service was not politically feasible.
With the Peacetime Draft officially ending in 1973, so too ended the individual
expectation of military service, and thus, service became exclusively a choice by those who
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volunteered. The Peacetime Draft regime marks the high point and low point of military service
in the United States, but its end also changed the relationship between the public and the State.
No longer could the State effectively reach out to its citizens and compel service in times of war.
The personal connection that people could viscerally feel to the wars that the State was
conducting in their name was dismantled. If we consider the prior regimes as well, this is the
first real retrenchment in State power growth, at least in terms of the State and its citizens.
Militias and drafts compelled some form of service, but after 1973, this was no longer needed.
However, there is a divergence that occurs here. Less power to force military service did not
correlate to a decline in military power at the hands of the American State. State military power
grew with the draft, but it did not decline with the draft’s end. If social cohesion around a
common just cause created a permanent draft, social discord around an unjust cause destroyed it,
but not without leaving Federal power over the military in place to develop in a much different
way under an All-Volunteer Force.

The Apogee of Military Service and Identity
The Peacetime Draft of 1940 to 1973 serves as the high-water mark of military service in
the United States. The confluence of world events like World War II and the onset of the Cold
War forced the United States to respond much differently than prior international conflicts that it
had been in. The nation instead chose to integrate itself within the international structure, using
its military strength as a guarantor of a new international order. The U.S. position as a world
power created an international identity with interests across the globe that needed to be
protected. This was novel in the American experience up until this point. While there had been
prior international conflicts and skirmishes, the American State had never nested itself in in the
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international world politically, save for trade agreements. American policy changed as a result,
and the American State reshaped the internationally-oriented parts of its bureaucracy to meet the
new challenges. Americans now identified themselves within the international order, mostly as
the headline actor amongst a theater of supporting and antagonist characters. With this
international identity came a need for military personnel, not just in times of war, but in times of
peace in order to maintain a bulwark against the Soviet Union and other perceived American
enemies. The Peacetime Draft served as at least one way of intersecting American international
identity, military service to the country, and State power into one organization, building onto this
identity and spreading the cost of this international integration onto the American public.
In this particular section, we will examine how American international identity was
constructed as well as how that shaped the American experience during the Peacetime Draft
regime. Military service played a critical role in the establishment of this identity during World
War II and its maintenance in the post-war period. By looking at some particular elements
within American international identity, we will also be able to ascertain why this identity along
with the Peacetime Draft fell apart. On top of this, we will also examine the veteran as an
element of identity. With more veterans produced during this 30-plus year period than any other,
we will see there is something inherent that Americans retain from their relationship to their own
servicemembers that is critical to American identity. One final note to consider, as with our
examination of the Peacetime Draft regime, we should not look at the American form of
international identity as a monolith, but rather as an evolving paradigm that is consistently
shifting with new political actors and events shaping it, but with common trends and themes
throughout. International identity as we discuss it rests upon the identities that came before it,
and its construction is not limited to one period. However, the world events during this
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particular regime elevated international identity to a status not seen before in American political
development.

Pax Americana and the International Identity
The catalyst for catapulting American international identity to the forefront of Americans
minds was World War II. The war is the cornerstone event for shaping American policy after
1945. In 1918 at the conclusion of World War I, the United States retreated from the
international community and once again became mostly disinterested from what happened
elsewhere, save for those events that affected American interests. World War I had solidified
American national identity around a common cause, but American life continued as usual.
Nationalism was a way of bonding people together and motivating them, but the nation was not
necessarily central to one’s identity on any given day. Americans collectively had forgone any
responsibility for what happened abroad as it did not fundamentally affect them, at least as they
perceived it. The attack on Pearl Harbor changed this, and the United States no longer ignored
what was going on internationally. Upon the war’s completion, the United States was able to use
its military and economic might to rewire to the world in its own image, being that it was one
nation that was relatively untouched by the ravages of war. The war marks a turning point in
how Americans viewed themselves and their position in the world, and that view was vastly
different from more self-centric views after World War I. As with many things, success can
breed confirmation, and with American grit succeeding in ending in the war, American
international identity grew out of the success of the war through a number of different narratives.
The first narrative of this identity to consider the unique position that the United States,
that of an emerging superpower. The war brought the economic capacity of the nation to the
international stage, pumping billions of dollars into the war and rebuilding efforts. Most nations
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that were international powers prior to the war had been devastated and exhausted by war’s end.
Most of Europe and Asia had been ravaged by war. Yet, the American economy emerged
practically untouched and at a maximum capacity. In an effort to keep the American economy
going, industries transitioned from wartime building to an export-based economy, allowing trade
to develop worldwide mostly on American terms. This engrained capitalism at the heart of the
American identity, but that was not unique to this period. If anything, capitalism has been part of
American economics for practically all of the country’s existence, but what was notably distinct
after the war is that American-style capitalism became a philosophical and economic commodity
for export, and with much of the world in ruin, it became hard for other countries to resist. On
top of this, economic interests often work together with the military. The military is used to
preserve freedom of movement for goods and maintain stability for economies to grow. While
this sort of thinking may not have been at the forefront of servicemembers’ minds at the time,
that they were simply protecting economic interests, preserving American stability likely was
along with preserving American economic dominance in the face of competing philosophies that
threatened the American-dominant world order, such as communism.
Secondly, a narrative connected with preserving economic freedom and development, the
United States saw itself during and after the war as preserving democracy for the world, which
was. As an example, prior to U.S. entry into the war, President Roosevelt described the United
States the “arsenal of democracy” as the Lend-Lease program allowed for U.S. arms to ship
overseas to American allies.181 During the war, the U.S. role at defending democracy was much
more active, directly engaging and fighting non-democratic states that threatened the safety and
well-being of the United States and its allies. Fighting totalitarian states like Germany and Japan

181

Franklin Roosevelt, “‘Arsenal of Democracy’ Speech,” Mount Holyoke, accessed February 3,

2021.

143

made this sort of dichotomy much easier to establish for both the American State and the public,
especially as democracies fell across Europe and elsewhere. Putting the United States in the role
as preserving democracy, as the defender of peoples and their right to self-governance, made the
war effort and the sacrifices associated with it much more tolerable and acceptable. Not only
that, but after the war, this narrative persisted. In the face of the perceived Soviet threat, the
United States remained the arsenal of democracy and the protector state for democratic regimes
against communism. In short, this is a compelling narrative at the heart of American identity
because it fosters once again that just cause that the American public is dedicated to and is
willing to sacrifice for.
One final narrative to consider which overlaps with the other two narratives is what we
could term as the good-versus-evil paradigm. World War II was not just unique in the scale and
types of warfare exercised during the conflict, but also the atrocities that both the Germans and
the Japanese committed against local populations and groups. The Holocaust is a prime example
of this, with the German government attempting the wholesale extermination of the Jewish
people, among other minority groups. The Japanese were no better with many of their atrocities
conducted throughout China and elsewhere. With the United States being on the victorious side,
liberating prisoners from concentration and work camps all while exposing the greater atrocities
that occurred and holding those who committed said atrocities accountable, the natural position
for Americans was to accept that the U.S. effort was one not just of national defense, but also of
beneficence to humanity. Seeing these atrocities in hindsight and how shocking they were
reinforced narratives that the United States had defeated a greater evil. This good-versus-evil
paradigm fits into nationalist narratives as well since these narratives usually pit the nation as a
natural good versus those outside as inherently bad or evil. The American experience during the
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war is a clear example of this. The U.S. role in World War II confirmed narratives of U.S.
goodness, and the central component to what made the United States successful was U.S.
military power, including the draft.
As we can see, American international identity fused a number of different narratives
together, and the war served as the pressure cooker which fused these narratives together into a
common American identity. With war being the event that forges an identity like this, the
Peacetime Draft was an incubator for imposing these sorts of narratives upon a public. It forged
a common American experience, reinforcing these narratives and further ingraining this identity
into American citizens. We can still see the narratives and their associated elements in political
discourse to this day.
Yet, the Vietnam War was the moment where these narratives were challenged, and this
was linked very strongly to the draft. International conflict for nebulous ideals or concepts like
freedom, democracy, or the preservation of an economic system are generally acceptable to the
public when the threat to each of those is tangible, but much less so when the threat is elusive or
remote. When the public perceives the threat, the public can more willingly accept State action
to negate the threat, as was the case in World War II when the public accepted the military draft.
The Vietnam War, however, was not an example of this, and in fact, it ran contrary. The
prolongment of the war exposed many of the fissures within these obscure elements of American
international identity and caused the public in general to question whether forcing people to put
their lives on the line against their own will was proper in the pursuance of an ideal that, if the
war was lost, would not be affected with the grand scheme. The threat to democracy,
particularly American democracy, if Vietnam was lost was not obvious, nor was the threat to the
American economy or freedoms. This particular war exposed the American public to a war that
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was unnecessary for the preservation of those greater American ideals, and the draft forced the
American public to face the reality of that war head on. After Vietnam and the end of the draft,
this real-world connection to American conflict no longer existed in its dispersed form, but the
ideals lived on, leaving the State with something to fight for internationally, but less of a chance
of being checked by the public if any overreach.

The Veteran
Another element of study to consider within American international identity is the role
played by the veteran. When we use the term veteran, we are encompassing all of those who
have served or are serving in the military. The term veteran is rather fluid in who is considered
one and who is not, but for our purposes, it is anyone who has served. Arguably, the veteran is
the central figure in this form of identity because he or she has experience in the conflicts that the
American State embarks on. The veteran also plays a primary role in fostering American
identity and a sense of pride in what the nation is. During the Peacetime Draft regime, with
American politics oriented towards the exterior of the country and new interests abroad to
defend, the American veteran became the actor upholding this identity as well as the entity
deserving the most reverence and respect. When one considers the narratives above within
American international identity, they focus on a nexus of defending something considered
precious. Freedom, liberty, the ability to choose one’s economic future, and even the defense of
good all add to a greater developing patriotic account fostering an image of an American ideal,
and the manifestation of that ideal is the veteran. The veteran represents something moral and
upright. What sets this period apart from other periods is the relative strength of the personal
connection between the veteran and the American public, fostered by the State’s drafting of
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servicemembers. The Peacetime Regime created more American veterans in terms of sheer
numbers than at any point in American history. The byproduct of this was a renewed reverence
given to American veterans because so many more people had fought for the country and the
preservation of those ideals. While one cannot say that respecting veterans began at this moment
in time, it is fair to say that this reverence accelerated as more Americans became veterans from
wars abroad.
With a just cause like World War II, the veteran became that representation of goodness
and selfless service. It was easier in that case to rally around servicemembers during the conflict
because supporting them was instrumental in ensuring that the nation succeeded.
Servicemembers were a point of pride, so the natural progression after the war was to repay the
veteran by creating veterans’ programs, like the aforementioned G.I. Bill, as a compensatory
measure. The veteran became a patriotic symbol during this time, and respecting the veteran
became a civic duty and a responsibility of both the State and the public alike. There were other
consequences to this though as this likely took social coercion to a new higher level. If the
veteran is wholesome and good, then it makes sense for society to make more veterans. By
using the military as a means of providing wholesome growth for individuals, the outcome is that
American society becomes better overall. This provides justification for maintaining the
Peacetime Draft, but it increases the dangers associated with war. If the draft provides an
endless supply of personnel for war, then this may make society more militaristic. Either way,
making more veterans can have both a positive and deleterious effect.
The veteran as a symbol obviously connects to war, but it also connects to patriotic
sentiment within the public. If veterans are revered, it is because they idealize a particular theme
or narrative running through the American spirit, and those themes we could encompass within
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patriotism. This becomes almost a triangular relationship at this time. Patriotism is connected to
war and the veteran, and all three interact within one another to foster an American archetype.
This is by far not a perfect model, but it can clue us in on what was occurring with the growing
American international identity at the time. The veteran is the representative of this idea,
embodying a nebulous, but willingly-accepted patriotism, and he is willing to give his life in war
for the American cause. This model works during World War II as a means of sustaining public
support for the war effort. American society in all its aspects had to come together in order to
support the troops abroad. In this sense, patriotism was not just supporting the war, but also
supporting the fighter of the war.
This veteran-centric model had issues, which Vietnam brought to the forefront and the
Peacetime Draft helped accelerate. If the war was connected to the servicemember, then being a
servicemember made one supportive of the war. With Vietnam being a largely unpopular
conflict, then the image of the veteran was also tarnished as a result of its association. Forcing
individuals to serve in an otherwise unpopular and unjust conflict forced the nation to confront
the veteran ideal and if it should truly be forced upon the public, to which the answer was no.
This particular moment in time was one of high civil strife over the war, but in context, this
period did not completely destroy the veteran’s connection to patriotism and American identity.
The veteran connection created in the post-World War II era and reinforced by the Peacetime
Draft remained, albeit in a subdued state, but what this period did harm was the personal
connection that Americans had to war. Veterans did not have to be family members or friends,
and going forward, entire families could become entirely disconnected from American war.
This divergence is particularly important here. If World War II showed us that patriotism
was to support the war and the warfighter, and the popular urge during Vietnam was to do the
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opposite, to resist the war and the warfighter simultaneous, then we see that the patriotic
sentiment has an ability to diverge, that the public, if given the opportunity, can distinguish
support for the war and support for the soldier, similar to what we saw in the Korean conflict.
This ability to diverge these two kinds of support is an important distinction that will come into
play in the next chapter, but the construction of the veteran as a key role player in American
identity is rooted in this Peacetime Draft regime and the proliferation in the number of veterans
with American society. Just like with the ideals that are central to American international
identity, the supplanting of the draft does little to change this reverence and respect for veterans.
This aspect of American identity rooted in the veteran will become more apparent in the AllVolunteer Force regime.

An Analysis of the Hypotheses for the Peacetime Draft Regime
The Peacetime Draft regime serves as the third period of analysis for our hypotheses, and
it is the critical period of military service because it contains the apogee and the destruction of
mandatory military service in the United States. It fused and perfected many of the elements
from the militia and coercive regimes, only to see its demise in the face of social discord. Of the
four hypotheses, the Peacetime Draft regime can help us to explain at least parts of all four.
The first hypothesis, concerning military regimes with diffused costs and compulsory
service required from the public reducing the length of American wars, is confirmed by the
Peacetime Draft, with some caveats. Unlike prior regimes, this was the sole regime where
compulsory military service was characteristic of the entire period. Thus, the cost of military
service was diffused throughout the public for the most part. In looking at World War II and
Korea, the length of these wars remained abbreviated at less than four years for both.
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Mobilizations and the costs that these wars had on the greater American population through the
draft kept these wars short. Vietnam, however, was a longer war at just about nine years, over
double the length of the other two major conflicts of this period, and it effectively dismantled
any possibility of conscription in the future. This can be looked at as contradicting this
hypothesis, but it actually helps to confirm it. The extended length of the war exposed the lack
of clear and concise watermarks for victory. Without decisive engagement or a clear objective,
the U.S. presence in Vietnam served no other purpose than just to be present and preserve a
status quo. This forced draftees and their families to consider whether the war was worth the
effort, thus creating the social discord. By forcing individuals to serve in the military, the
American State was eventually going to have to reckon with the objectives of the war if the war
was not concluded in a timely manner, which that reckoning did occur. Thus, even though the
Vietnam War effectively abolished conscription and sewed social discord, the draft worked at
shortening the conflict because it forced the American public to face the war with their own
personal connections.
The second hypothesis is confirmed as well since the Peacetime Draft regime shaped
American identity through shared sacrifice, and it did so in a number of both positive and
negative ways. With the draft’s close association with World War II and the wartime economy,
the shared sacrifice fostered an ideal of American identity as something good and that the nation
was a defender of democracy and free-market capitalism in the years after the war. This moment
in the regime probably did more to shape American identity around a common nexus,
international or otherwise, than any previous regime. With that though, the draft was used
during Vietnam, a war that was intended at upholding this view on American international
identity as the defender of democracy and freedom, but the civil strife caused by the war and the
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draft created a reckoning for Americans and their position in the world. After Vietnam,
Americans would not be required to serve in the military to defend American identity or its
ideals. The State-based compulsion mechanism was gone, and that personal connection to war
was gone with it.
The Peacetime Draft regime does lend some credibility to the third hypothesis, which
argues that American identity over time has been a State-led development, both by individual
U.S. states and the Federal Government, associated with the development of specific military
regimes. The era of the Peacetime Draft was a moment where political demands necessitated a
new form of American identity to broadcast to the world, and this was a State-led project. The
Federal Government fostered this identity by using the general unity after World War II to create
political narratives around what the United States stood for as well as the defense of its interests.
The State leveraged its power over people to compel military service throughout this period, and
other leverage measures were implemented to keep the regime in place, to include higher
spending on veteran programs as well as using Elvis as a cultural ambassador for the Army.
Even with the disestablishment of the draft at the conclusion of Vietnam, the State still remained
the crucial actor in fostering American international identity.
Finally, the fourth hypothesis, concerning the disestablishment of conscripted military
service creating a more unstable American identity, reinforced by high levels of patriotism,
while not fully answered by this particular regime, does have some more clarity because the
ending of the Peacetime Draft shows some trepidation in this international form of American
identity. With the American public facing the U.S. conflict in Vietnam in terms of seeing the
actions taken on the ground on television, the perceived lack of purpose or goal, and the personal
cost through being forced to send loved ones abroad, the ideals of the United States being a
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defender of freedom or democracy came into question. The American public had to openly
debate how much they were willing to sacrifice in the pursuit of an imperial conflict in a faraway
country. One cannot fully say here that the disestablishment of the draft caused questions around
American identity because it was clear that those questions were occurring before the draft’s end,
one can say that the draft was a casualty of these questions around American identity because the
draft forced Americans to face the resulting wars with their own flesh and blood. In World War
II, this worked to establish American dominance and build a new international identity, but by
Vietnam, the American public was less inclined to self-sacrifice, especially when faced with an
unclear or ill-defined conflict.

Concluding Remarks on the Peacetime Draft Regime
The Peacetime Draft regime was unique in American history because the American State
used the lessons learned from prior military regimes and broadly implemented them across the
whole of the American public. The Peacetime Draft was the pinnacle of military service in the
United States with more people serving in them military during this time than at any time prior.
The maintenance of the U.S. position in the world necessitated a stronger military, and thus the
American State set up a permanent military structure funded by money and manned with
volunteers and draftees. Sustaining such a military structure was necessary to protect American
interests abroad, but it also fostered an American international identity based on general concepts
of freedom and democracy. Out of this regime rose a portrayal of the American servicemember
as the defender of what is good and wholesome, and with it, most American citizens had at least
a personal connection to servicemembers, either through family members who were veterans or
through serving in the military themselves.

152

Vietnam challenged this archetype with servicemembers no longer seen as wholesome
and instead as imperialist troops for an unjust war. The draft forced the American public to view
its own connection to this, and generally, the war was not a popular effort, not even close to the
extent that World War II had been. Vietnam ended an era of commonality around military
service, a period of general public connection to the military that protects it. Vietnam ruptured
that connection, leading to the creation of the All-Volunteer Force and changing how Americans
relate to their military.
Overall, we can look at the Peacetime Draft as the zenith of the State-led construction of
military service and American identity. The State managed to implement a permanent draft
structure and used it three times for three different conflicts. Keeping that structure in place for
as long as it did was a monumental feat unto itself. The State also built an American identity to
broadcast to the world and fostered that through the draft and within the public. There were no
higher forms of military service or identity to be achieved beyond this. With no more draft after
1973, military service entered a new stage of development, unconcerned by the political
considerations of the masses. What resulted was unchallengeable State military power and an
unmoored American identity, ripe for exploit.
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Chapter Six
The All-Volunteer Force and Retrospective Identity

“Freedom costs a buck o’ five.”
--Song from the film Team America, World Police

The end the military draft inaugurated a new era of military composition, that of the AllVolunteer Force, or AVF. The AVF marked a finality in terms of compulsory service in the
American military. No longer would American citizens be forced to serve in the military at any
level, Federal or state. Instead, the entirety of the military transitioned to a force only composed
of volunteers. This meant that all soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines, whether on active duty or
in the Reserve or National Guard, chose to serve on their own accord. With the launch of the
AVF, all compulsory military service laws from the Militia Acts up until that point were no
longer in effect. The only vestigial element of the draft era that remained, and still does to this
day, is a registration requirement for the Selective Service where all males 18 and older in the
United States are obliged to enroll in the event that there is a future draft.182 Yet even with this,
there has been little to no chance of any repercussions for failing to register. Even though there

Selective Service System, “Selective Service System,” accessed March 4, 2021,
https://www.sss.gov/.
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are still prison and compensatory penalties for not enrolling, no one has been prosecuted for
failing to register since 1986.183
In short, there is no real compulsory element for military service during the current AVF
regime. Neither the Federal Government nor do any states require service. This stands in stark
contrast to the prior regimes discussed because it is a retrenchment from the responsibilities of
individual Americans to serve in the defense of their own country. Even during the militia
regime, the expectation of service still existed, and it only grew stronger with the growth of the
American State and its power over military affairs. This is no more, and it has had a
transformative effect on American military power and identity, all of which we will explore in
this chapter.
First, we should consider the major conflicts of the AVF regime, listed in Table 6-1, of
which there were three. The first of these was the Persian Gulf War, which the first decisive
victory for the AVF in a major land war since the end Vietnam. Over two million served during
that war with a total number of deaths only numbering in the hundreds. The other two conflicts,
Afghanistan and Iraq, began after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001. These conflicts overlapped for about eight years and resulted in just under
7,000 American military deaths total. The number of those who served in each is difficult to
ascertain simply because many of the servicemembers who served in Afghanistan also served in
Iraq, and vice versa. These conflicts are linked in the time period and geopolitical landscape in
which they occurred, and so the total servicemembers for both conflicts has been combined. The
part that is of particular note in all three conflicts is that there were no draftees or militias. No
one was forced to serve who did not willingly volunteer to serve in the military.
Kristy N. Kamarck, “The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for
Congress” (Congressional Research Service, April 11, 2016), 17-18.
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Table 6-1. Major Conflicts During the AVF Regime184

Conflict

War Type

Outcome

Length
in Days

Total
Served

Draftees
Served

Total
U.S.
Deaths

Persian Gulf
(1991)

Dispute/
Offensive

Win

210

2,225,000

0

383

Afghanistan
(2001-?)

Dispute/
Defensive

Undecided

7000+

0

2,352

Iraq
(2003-2011)

Dispute/
Defensive

0

4,418

2,770,000+
Undecided

3195

There were other minor conflicts during this period as well, and they will not be ignored
or discounted because of their size relative to these major conflicts. Our analysis of the AVF
focuses on the three major conflicts, but the minor conflicts contribute to many of the same
arguments, that American war has proliferated and the American State’s war footing is
permanently engaged in the world. These conflicts include interventions in Grenada, Panama,
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, and Yemen, just to name a few. While they may
not be central to the analysis here, they do color the argument with more cases confirming the
largess of American military power in the world, particularly during the AVF regime.
The fact that these conflicts have been fought with volunteers is consequential for
modern American society because it changes the relationship and the dynamics with how
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Since Afghanistan and Iraq were simultaneous operations with many military personnel serving in both
war zones, the total served number has been combined for both conflicts. David A. Blum and Nese F.
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Americans interact with the wars that are fought in their name. In Chapter Two, we discussed a
trilateral relationship between civilian leaders, the public, and the military. These three entities
have had some direct relationship over the course of American history, but not in the same way
during the AVF regime. The dwindling connections between the military and the public are
becoming further diminished as fewer Americans serve and service becomes the purview of the
select few. The lack of that connection has likely created political and cultural dynamics that
perpetuate war, and that is what we will explore in this chapter.
In the first section, we will explore the AVF and how it has worked in the three major
conflicts and a number of minor ones. With no draftees, the U.S. military has had to transform
how it uses the military forces at its disposition and surge them at particular moments to meet
critical mission needs during these conflicts. We will explore how this has created privatized
elements of the military structure which answer demands created by the State while offering less
of a perceived military footprint to the public. In the second section, we will explore how
American identity has changed in the AVF era, particularly how identity has become
retrospective and focused on past glories. If we recall from the last chapter, American
international identity’s growth was interrupted by the social changes during the Vietnam era and
the end of the draft. However, for the first part of the AVF, this international identity remained
rather strong given American dominance through the end of the 20th Century. Yet the
entrenchment of a retrospective identity took hold after the attacks of September 11, when
perceptions on American superiority changed with bogged down wars and the rise of new world
powers. With the American public disconnected from American conflicts, they became more
supportive of the military through strong patriotic temperaments and militarism. With no draft to
mold citizens, the State does little to change this form of identity, except to use it for its own
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political ends and continue the war effort. Retrospective identity is thus an is an unmoored form
of identity which combine elements from prior identities and regimes. It harkens back to periods
where the United States was a perceived positive actor on the domestic and world stage,
exacerbating modern wars with no personal cost to most citizens.

The All-Volunteer Force
If we recall, Huntington and Janowitz were the two academics who fostered the debate
over the professionalization of the military force in the 1950s, and their concerns focused on
whether the civilian leadership would be able to retain control over the military in a post-draft
era. Both agreed that civilian control would remain for different reasons. Huntington argued
that a professionalized officer class would keep the military at bay, and Janowitz argued that as
long as civilians remained strongly connected to the military and its oversight,
professionalization should not be a concern or a threat.185 The advent of the AVF provided a
space for the debate of its merits to play out and a field of experimentation for a professionalized
force to shows its value, and Huntington and Janowitz would probably see a lot of similarities to
their predictions with what occurred.
Yet, there is an important element to consider with the advent of the AVF: there was no
alternative after 1973. Compulsory service was simply no longer politically feasible. There
were no state militia alternatives to rely on, and any military draft was just going to be avoided
due to the political cost. This raised the stakes with what could be lost if the United States were
to enter again into a major war scenario and raised questions as to how effective the AVF would
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be. The force being born out of the Vietnam era, its birth was so traumatic that it left many
unsure as to how and if it would succeed. Thus, the shadow of Vietnam loomed large over the
AVF for about the first two decades of its use.
However, the AVF would succeed, and the American State made it work. The Persian
Gulf War was the first validation of the AVF as well as the new format of American military
centered less on masses of available personnel and more on technology. At around the time of
the Persian Gulf War, the geopolitics of the world shifted dramatically with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War. For much of the 1990s, the U.S. military was involved in
small regional conflicts, all of which it was able to maintain with a relatively mobile force. This
changed in 2001 with the attacks of September 11 when the use of the military abroad went into
overdrive. The United States invaded Afghanistan soon after and remains there to this day. In
2003, it also invaded Iraq, and despite that war officially ending in 2011, the United States still
remains heavily engaged in Iraq because of the weakened internal structure of the Iraqi State.
Interventions against ISIS, in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere have painted this post-2001
era as heavily military-dominant in terms of American State power projected onto the world.
When we consider the AVF regime, we should look at it as two distinct periods, that of
pre-2001 and that of post-2001. The reason for this is that each of these periods presents unique
challenges to the AVF and the American State’s use of its military. The shadow of Vietnam
loomed large over the first two decades of the AVF, but once the Persian Gulf War validated the
use of the force in a major war, this boosted confidence in what the AVF could do. Such
confidence though was tempered in the post-2001 era when that same AVF, albeit in a smaller
size thanks to the Cold War drawdown, fought two major wars and countless other conflicts
around the globe during and after the Global War on Terrorism. State power clearly did not
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diminish with the AVF, but as we will see, the public’s connection to how that power was used
abroad did diminish.

Vietnam Syndrome and the Persian Gulf War
The Vietnam War, the politics surrounding it, and the social turbulence caused in its
wake was not curtailed once the war was over. If anything, the post-Vietnam era was still
shaped by the experiences of the war. Both the public and the military had suffered trauma of
different kinds as a result of the war and its end, the first perceived major war defeat in U.S.
military history. The psychological trauma suffered by veterans of war effectively created a
whole new category of medical diagnosis, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder which shaped how
military personnel who served in the war were portrayed both in public and in culture.186 The
image of the Vietnam veteran as broken took root and shaped the treatment of veterans for the
years to come. Along with that, social stigmas against war and American intervention abroad
shaped political discourse throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and events like the Carter
Administration’s failing to respond effectively to both the Iranian Hostage Crisis or the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan compounded the sinking belief in American military superiority.187 The
period was marked by Vietnam Syndrome, a term used to describe “the malaise that [had]
allegedly reduced the United States to a state of impotence in a menacing world.”188 Into that
void of confidence stepped the AVF to fight the nation’s wars.
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The first few years of the AVF were rough for both the nation and the military, to say the
least. Some twelve days after the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese forces, the first real
international test of the AVF was the Mayaguez Incident, which was disastrous for the U.S.
military. The Khmer Rouge had seized a U.S. ship named the SS Mayaguez near an island off of
the Cambodian coast. The Ford Administration, with other international threats elsewhere,
wanted to conduct a rescue operation for the Mayaguez crew as a show of force after the fall of
Saigon, but the National Security Council and the Department of Defense blundered the
planning. Both the Marine Corps and the Air Force planned simultaneous rescue operations with
no interagency coordination, which both operations failed with over a dozen U.S. casualties total.
The captured crew was released during the operation without incident, but were not on the island
that the U.S. military was assaulting.189
Additionally, some five years after the Mayaguez incident and in the midst of the Iranian
Hostage Crisis, the Carter Administration authorized another rescue mission for the hostages
held in Tehran, a mission that ultimately failed before any actions could be taken to secure the
hostages. In April 1980, the mission, dubbed Operation Eagle Claw, was an overly complex
mission requiring multiple helicopters, aircraft, and a large contingent of Special Forces. The
aircraft were to fly from south of Iran, meet up in the desert in central Iran, refuel, fly to Tehran,
rescue the hostages, and fly home. Upon their arrival at the refuel point, aircraft issues and dust
forced the mission to be aborted, but before all of the aircraft could leave, one helicopter ran into
another aircraft, causing an explosion that killed eight servicemembers. The mission was
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another black-eye for the U.S. military, and the American hostages remained in Iranian custody
for another eight months.190
Both the failures of the Mayaguez and Operation Eagle Claw were not due to the military
structure being the AVF; no one would argue that conscripted troops in either of these operations
would have made them successful. Yet, their failures were significant for the United States and
the younger years of the AVF. They were opportunities for the AVF to demonstrate its value
and capabilities, at least in very small and concentrated doses. Neither of these operations were
direly consequential for the United States, but an element of American pride was tarnished with
each. They continued a stretch of military failure beyond the end of the Vietnam War, further
causing uncertainty around American military power to linger and casting doubt on the position
of the United States in the world. Not long after Operation Eagle Claw, in July 1980, President
Carter reenacted the registration requirement for the Selective Service, which had been dormant
since 1973.191 With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and changing world events, the draft
once again was prepped for the eventuality of war. Vietnam Syndrome was rife.
Yet, the draft was not going to be used again, and the AVF was not abandoned. As with
past cases of military failure, the lessons learned shaped the military of the future. The Reagan
Administration gave the military the resources and room to adjust itself and build a new military
structure with the clear-eyed understanding that the draft was not going to be politically feasible.
The AVF had to defend the United States with the personnel and capabilities at its disposition.
One of the signature achievements during the Reagan Administration was the passage of the
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Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, which fundamentally reorganized the military and how it
operated worldwide.192 One of the key elements of the act was the establishment of a number of
combatant and functional commands which streamlined the command of all military forces for a
given region or function under one command structure, creating what became known the joint
environment. This allowed Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel to work together for common
objectives using each service’s strengths to accomplish military objectives together.193 However,
if we consider this further, this was a pooling of military resources to more effectively use them
on the battlefield. The failures of the Mayaguez and Operation Eagle Claw inspired the passage
of this act, but it was also an acknowledgement in some sense that the AVF had to fundamentally
change in order to be effective because the draft was not coming back. The entirety of the
Department of Defense had to restructure to meet the conflicts of the future, and the AVF had to
succeed because there was no other feasible option. Even with these changes, the AVF still
needed to be validated in some conflict.
That chance for validation came when the Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait in August 1990,
setting off an international crisis. Kuwait, a small sovereign nation and a pivotal oil port at the
western end of the Persian Gulf, was unable to repel the invasion given Iraq’s massive military,
whose presence also threatened the integrity of Saudi Arabia’s borders just south of Kuwait.
International response was swift, and the United States began to build up its military presence in
Saudi Arabia to deter Iraqi aggression and prepare to an eventual invasion. In January 1991,
Congress gave the Bush Administration a green light for military actions, but by a very small
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margin in the Senate, with only 52 Senators voting for the action. One cannot help but see the
strength of Vietnam Syndrome at this particular moment when the first massive military
campaign since Vietnam was about to be launched. Some predictions put the number “of
American casualties in the range of 10,000 during the first 24 hours,” given Iraq’s experienced
military and the threat of chemical warfare.194 The AVF was about to fight its first war, and no
one was sure it would succeed.
Yet, the military structure created under Goldwater-Nichols allowed the AVF to work
swiftly once operations had begun. Joint service planning had created a strategy that would
weaken and encircle the Iraqi Army in Kuwait. In mid-January 1991, an air campaign some 30plus days began targeting Iraqi defenses and units. Towards the end of February, the ground
campaign began with little to no resistance. In fact, many Iraqi units surrendered en masse and
retreated once the assault had begun. By the end of February, the war was over and Kuwait was
liberated.195 The AVF only suffered casualties into the hundreds, while estimates of Iraqi
casualties ranged from the tens of thousands to upwards of 100,000 killed.196
In hindsight, the AVF needed the Persian Gulf War to be accepted as a valid military
institution. The Gulf War was the first major American conflict fought without conscripts of any
kind since the Spanish-American War, using a military structure that had not yet been
legitimized, while Vietnam Syndrome stoked fears of an impending catastrophe in the run-up to
the war. It was limited in scope to a particular region and also in time, lasting no longer than it
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had to, but it displayed with resounding success the capabilities that the AVF could bring to the
fight in terms of planning and effective use of the resources at hand. Just a day after the conflict
was over, President Bush proclaimed that “we’ve kicked Vietnam [S]yndrome once and for all,”
a sentiment that defined the renewed confidence at the time in American military power.197 It
also helped that a confluence of world events at this particular time bolstered American prestige.
The war occurred within a year or so of the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification under a
West German government, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, ending some four decades of
Cold War tensions. At this particular moment, the American State had achieved a number of
major political victories, and its AVF stood as a renewed symbol of American dominance. The
U.S. military was redeemed.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on Terrorism
The 1990s were a period of relative confidence for the United States. With no Cold War,
no one was challenging U.S. dominance in the world, and military policy focused more on smallscale operations in localized areas, something the AVF was well-suited to do. Throughout the
1990s, the AVF conducted operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, just to name a
select few. The U.S. military also maintained a no-fly zone over Iraq to prevent the Iraqi
government from attacking its own civilians.198 The 1990s were certainly not a peaceful period
for the world, but the AVF was able to manage American military operations effectively because
no one conflict drained its resources or shifted its focus entirely. The limited scope of these
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conflicts allowed the United States to react with the forces at its disposition and do so with little
strain on the military or the American State overall.
Such a period though created a glut of confidence in the AVF and the American position
in the world. The AVF at the moment of the Gulf War was only a decade removed from the
calamity of Operation Eagle Claw, and the Gulf War itself was a major offensive, but also
limited in terms of objectives. It succeeded, but it was not a war like Vietnam. Once the main
objectives were achieved, the bulk of the U.S. military disengaged. Throughout the 1990s, the
public’s confidence in the military grew to higher levels, averaging year-over-year about 10
points higher than in the 1980s.199 These smaller engagements in the 1990s helped confirm that
the AVF was a force to reckon with the threats that the United States faced at that time, and it
was well-suited for that particular world. Such thinking though can lead to complacency and
overconfidence, which it did once that world was gone.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 completely shifted American foreign policy in a
drastically new direction. The attacks, in which 19 al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four planes,
two of which were flown into the World Trade Center buildings, one of which damaged the
Pentagon, and the last of which crashed in Pennsylvania, killed close to 3,000 Americans. Once
the initial shock of the attacks had set in, the new Bush Administration launched the Global War
on Terrorism, or GWOT, whose effects are still felt to this day. The irony with the GWOT is
that it became a nation-building exercise, something that President Bush had eschewed before
becoming president.200 The 1990s was replete with debates over whether nation-building should
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be what the AVF was tasked with doing. With no major international enemy to fight, the AVF’s
existence was more to be a force for good and to make the world a better place. The use of the
AVF offered stability in regions that needed stability to maintain peace or to grow. Bosnia is a
clear example from the 1990s, but the U.S. military has done this prior to the AVF era with
Germany, Japan, and Korea as well. The GWOT was about to fundamentally change the U.S.
military.
The first major action in the GWOT was the invasion of Afghanistan, dubbed Operation
Enduring Freedom, intended to be a direct engagement to capture and kill al-Qaeda planners and
perpetrators of the September 11 attacks after the Taliban refused to hand them over to the
United States. The invasion itself played to the strengths of the AVF. The U.S. Air Force
maintained air superiority, targeting enemy positions at will, while only around 3,000 ground
troops, mostly Special Forces, were in Afghanistan during the first few months. These troops
worked in tandem with Northern Alliance fighters, who had been fighting the Taliban for years.
By December 2001, the Taliban government had fallen and both al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters
had fled, leaving the United States and its allies in control.201 The AVF made the initial invasion
of Afghanistan seamless. The small American footprint, the use of American air superiority, and
use of homegrown fighters made the invasion and low-casualty, quick invasion force.
In 2002, the United States turned its attention towards an old foe, Iraq. Iraq in the
preceding years had snubbed UN resolutions and sanctions and also expelled weapons inspectors
intended to prevent it from developing chemical and biological weapons, which it had been
known to use against the Shia and Kurdish populations within its borders. The United States
began to make the case for justifying an invasion of Iraq with Iraq’s noncompliance with the UN
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weapons inspectors, arguing that such a slight indicated that Iraq intended to develop weapons of
mass destruction. After months of international political cajoling with only moderate success,
the United States along with a number of other allies launched the invasion of Iraq in March
2003, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom. By May 1, the entirety of Iraq had fallen.202
The invasion of Iraq though was vastly different from the invasion of Afghanistan. Both
operations sought to use the strengths of the AVF, but in very distinct ways. As the operation in
Afghanistan used a light American footprint supported by local fighters, Iraq did not because of
the different dynamics of the war. This was a traditional state-on-state conflict to some degree.
The operation looked more like the Persian Gulf War sequel, only this time with the fall of
Baghdad. The American contingent of the invasion force consisted of approximately 200,000
ground troops, armed with tanks and heavy equipment, all intending to push right through any
resistance the Iraqi military could muster.203 It was not a display of American ingenuity and
subversion in the way Afghanistan was. It was instead a full display of American military might
and what the AVF could do. The AVF conquered an entire country in a matter of weeks.
Afghanistan and Iraq though were not over in December 2001 and May 2003,
respectively. Those conflicts had only begun, and the AVF was going bear the brunt of the
nation-building program for the next two decades in both countries. From 2003 to 2011, the
United States occupied Iraq, having to create a democratic government from scratch and rebuild
the infrastructure damaged from over a decade of U.S. airstrikes. The U.S. military had to deal
with a Sunni insurgency in Anbar Province, growing Iranian influence within Shia groups in
southern Iraq, and the intervening violence between those two sides. Throughout most of the
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rest of the 2000s, the United States maintained at 140,000 troops in Iraq, with a high point during
the period known as the Surge in 2007 of 170,000.204 Even after the official end of the Iraq War
in 2011, the U.S. military had to return a few years later to counter the ISIS threat that had spread
across western Iraq and threatened the integrity of the country. At the same time that the Iraq
War was occurring, U.S. obligations in Afghanistan remained and were a a strain on the overall
strength of the AVF. For most of the Iraq War, American troops in Afghanistan remained at
around 20,000. When the Obama Administration took over the war effort, they drew down
forces in Iraq and surged them in Afghanistan, with troop levels reaching upwards of 100,000 in
2010 and 2011.205 At present, only a few thousand remain, but the conflict still continues.
Despite these drawdowns in the Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military remains in a
permanent state of conflict. Throughout the 2000s, the AVF supported operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo, while also fighting terrorism in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa. In 2011, the
United States and its allies intervened with an air war in Libya to prevent Muammar Qaddafi
from killing civilians inspired by the Arab Spring. In 2012, Syria descended into a crisis, then
civil war, which the U.S. remained out of, fearing getting bogged down in a new conflict.
However, the vacuum created the Syrian Civil War allowed ISIS to grow and dominant large
parts of Syria and Iraq in 2014, which forced a massive U.S. response with an air campaign and
building up of Iraqi military forces. In addition, the U.S. military has become involved in
conflicts like Yemen and Ukraine.206 Even if Afghanistan, the only remaining official major
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conflict still going on, were to end, the United States and the AVF would remain engaged in war
elsewhere.
Both Iraq and Afghanistan represent the biggest burden that the AVF has had to take on
in the post-Vietnam era, and that is not even counting the other conflicts listed above. Iraq and
Afghanistan, since they were fought simultaneously, are often blended together since many
servicemembers served in both theaters, and each war’s duration put a consistent strain on the
AVF over time. The total number of servicemembers serving in both is close to 2.8 million with
almost 7,000 killed, if referring only to the official dates of each conflict (i.e. Iraq from 2003 to
2011).207 In terms of the sheer number of casualties, these wars are nowhere near Vietnam or
Korea levels, but they have taken a much different toll on both the country and those who serve.
If anything, the demands created by the wars fought by the American State have not decreased in
the AVF, but have increased and shifted over time. What the institution of the AVF has done is
take the burden of those conflicts, not just Iraq and Afghanistan, but all of the smaller-scale
conflicts, and put that burden on a select few who volunteer. As we will see in the next section,
the results are, unlike regimes past, an American State that seeks to avoid burdening military
service on the greater public at all costs, while simultaneously finding ways of extending the
AVF in unique and often cumbersome ways.

Proliferating War and the Changing Nature of the AVF
In 2003 at the height of the Iraq War, Representative Charles Rangel introduced a bill in
the House of Representatives to reinstate the military draft. The bill, if passed by Congress and
signed into law by the president, would have required all Americans between 18 and 26 years of
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age to serve in the military for a minimum of two years. The act would have also required
females to register for the Selective Service, thus subjecting them to the draft as well.208 A
longtime advocate for the draft, Rangel wrote an opinion piece at the end of 2002 providing
justifications for bringing back the draft, citing the pre-Iraq War overextension of the AVF
already engaged across the globe and the push for military solutions by the Bush administration
to problems abroad.209 Such a bill would allow the post-2001 patriotic sentiment to be harnessed
and used for the two wars that the United States was now involved in.
Rangel’s bill finally made to a vote in October 2004, where it was voted down in the
House with 402 votes against and two votes for the measure. Even Rangel himself voted against
his own measure.210 The vote effectively killed any discussion of a military draft for the two
most consequential and burdensome wars of the AVF regime. This vote was significant because
it showed the political non-viability of the military draft, even in the midst of two major wars.
That same year, Congress approved over $90 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funds, a category of money beyond the base DOD defense budget, which is used exclusively to
fight wars overseas.211 Congress was willing to spend money to fund the wars, but not to force
the public to serve in those wars. Since 2001, Congress has spent over $2 trillion in OCO funds,
with over 90 percent of those funds going towards the military.212
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Rangel’s draft bill vote was rather telling. The cost to Congress for implementing a
military draft would likely have been political suicide as they feared a public backlash, similar to
what occurred with the draft during Vietnam. In some sense, that portion of Vietnam Syndrome,
despite President Bush’s earlier assertion, remained or at the very least had an outbreak at that
particular moment. Yet the cost in terms of dollars seemed to matter less as that burden since the
public does not directly feel that in the same way they would if they were drafted. With the
American State still conducting war in an almost permanent status, albeit with a reduce footprint
compared to the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars but still with a global reach, this has led to new
methods in how the American State acquires and retains military power and capacity for itself,
mainly due to the limitations that the AVF has imposed upon it. The burden for military service
cannot come from the people, so the State must find other ways of finding personnel. It achieves
this through new methods implemented in recent decades as a result of the wars.
One of the most controversial ways the State has retained personnel is by simply not
letting servicemembers go when their service agreement is completed. The stop-loss order,
which prevents a servicemember from leaving the military at the end of his or her service
requirement, became heavily used during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Officers in the military
do not have end of service dates, and while they can leave military service after an initial
obligation, they can be extended or recalled at the government’s need. Enlisted personnel,
however, have expiration of terms of service (ETS) dates which limit their service obligations to
a specific date, usually six to eight years after the initial enlistment. Beyond that date, if no
reenlistment occurs, the enlisted servicemember owes no further service and cannot be recalled.
A stop-loss order is intended to extend the length of service beyond the ETS date in order to
retain and preserve servicemembers with particular skill sets during a period of war or for the
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rest of a deployment.213 All services used the policy during the Iraq and Afghanistan War
because deployment end dates do not always match with an individual servicemember’s ETS
date. Upwards of 145,000 servicemembers were given stop-loss orders during the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars.214 The Army was the biggest contributor of stop-loss orders to retain
personnel, and the Army especially exacerbated the use of stop loss during 2007 when it was
extending Iraq deployment times from a year to 15 months to meet operational demands. The
reason it became so controversial is because of its perception as a “backdoor draft,” forcing
individuals who had completed their service obligation to continue to serve against their will.
While they initially volunteered to serve the country, some even volunteering during the war, the
extension was usually done against one’s own will since no reenlistment occurred and the
servicemember was forced into staying. The program was so controversial that the Army
suspended its use in 2010, but this also coincided with the drawdown in Iraq.215
Stop-loss is but one piece of a larger trend within the AVF, the overuse of military forces
at war time. Since the State cannot compel the public to serve because of the political cost, it
uses the military forces at its disposition in a much different fashion than in wars past. One first
way was to increase the length of enlistments, which had been a trend over the course of the
AVF, but had not really become notably prevalent until the post-2001 conflicts. In the late
1970s, the Army had flirted with two-year enlistment option, but that was quickly discarded.
Most servicemembers in the 21st Century incurred at least an eight-year service obligation if they
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enlisted, no matter the service or component they joined. There were also cases of
servicemembers entering an inactive Reserve status right before their obligation had expired,
something normal in the last two years of a service obligation, but who were called back up for
duty during the wars.216
This last part is also indicative of a heavy reliance on part-time forces. The strain put on
active-duty forces by these conflicts forced the military to also rely on Reserve and National
Guard units within troop rotations. Reserve units were usually able to supplement the needs of
active-duty units with extra personnel while National Guard units deployed together as combat
units.217 One should recall that National Guard service during the 1960s and 1970s was a means
of avoiding service in Vietnam since the Guard was meant for homeland defense, and the
international Soviet threat to the homeland remained. This was not the case in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Reserve and Guard servicemembers were just as likely to end up in each country
as active duty. This is also telling because it shows the consolidated power of the American
State over individual state National Guard units. They were no longer separated or distinct from
the Federal military; they were integrated, and they were used in combat not on American soil.
Another illustration of the overuse of the AVF is that of troop deployments. One study
found that between 2001 and 2015, which encompass the height of both the Afghanistan and Iraq
conflicts, 5.5 million deployments occurred, which were burdened on just under 2.8 million
servicemembers. Averaging that out, that is almost two deployments per servicemember who
deployed, but as always, the burden was not evenly distributed. The majority of those only
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served one to two deployments, but at least 20 percent deployed 3 or more times, to include over
80,000 Reserve and National Guard servicemembers.218 In one extreme case, an Army Ranger
was killed in Afghanistan on his 14th deployment.219 Since the end of the Iraq War and the
drawdown in Afghanistan, such a high number of deployments are unlikely to occur again unless
there is another major war, but it does show how the AVF and individual servicemembers are
burdened in times of prolonged war with multiple tours of duty.
On one final point, the AVF did not fight these wars alone; it had a lot of external support
from private contractors. This is important because private contractors serve as an extension of
the AVF. They are volunteers who choose to do a job which often entails work in a combat
zone, but the difference is that they do not sign up for the job through enlistments in the military,
but rather as a job from a private agency. That private agency then bids on contracts to do work
for the government both in and out of war theaters. These contractors serve as logistics support,
intelligence analysts, and private security elements, just to name a few. Such use has raised
questions as to if the Federal Government was farming out too many inherently government
functions to private contractors, but that has not stopped their widespread use.220 The number of
private contractors in all functions reached high new levels during Iraq and Afghanistan. At one
point in 2007 in Iraq, there were approximately 165,000 U.S. servicemembers, supplemented by
approximately 155,000 private contractors. In 2012 in Afghanistan, there were 88,000 U.S.
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servicemembers, supplemented by approximately 117,000 contractors. The American footprints
in both Iraq and Afghanistan were double what the official troop count was. Even in 2020, with
troop levels well below 10,000 in Afghanistan, there were still approximately 25,000 contractors
in that country.221 The American State used contractors effectively to the point where they now
outweigh the number of servicemembers in Afghanistan, all while the official story told of these
wars focuses on the number of troops rather than the total footprint.
Contractors are not novel to the 21st Century, and even if we consider contractors to be
pseudo-mercenaries or any other sort of older classification of those paid to conduct war, the
main point here is that the need for the massive number of contractors during this period was
born out of the AVF and the lack of a draft. The proliferation of American war in the 21st
Century has pushed the AVF to its limits, with the military preventing personnel from leaving
when their enlistments were completed, increasing the number of deployments, and heavily
relying on Reserve and National Guard forces, unlike in wars past. Yet, these wars demanded
more than what the AVF could provide. The massive footprints in Afghanistan and Iraq
compelled the State to add to its military capability, but it could not put that burden on the
public, lest it reap the political consequences. The State thus resorted to private contracting as a
means of adding manpower and capacity, but it created a whole new dimension in the AVF,
where private enterprise enters the void left by the lack, or better yet the fear, of placing that
extra burden on the public.
The AVF is the military regime of today and is unlikely to be unseated anytime soon. If
Afghanistan and Iraq created the climate where a draft could be used, but it was not used, then
the likelihood of a draft ever being used is practically nil. The burdens of war no longer fall on
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the American public, and even in high demand times, the State will look elsewhere than a
military draft to meet those demands. The era of the AVF is distinctly different from regimes
past because it lessens the burden of war from prior generations. In each of the previous regimes
discussed, the burden for the nation’s wars got progressively heavier over time, and social
expectations of service grew out of these burdens. The AVF reversed that, and as we will see in
the next section, that has created a diverging form of American identity from eras past.

Retrospective Identity
In each of the eras discussed in prior chapters, the military service regime correlated with
a particular construction of identity in which either the individual states or the American State
was a driver. The militia created state-centric forms of identity, the Civil War-era reinforced
regional identities, and the World War I era helped to create a national identity. Our last regime
before the AVF, the Peacetime Draft, created an internationalized form of American identity, and
it is that identity that has dominated much of how Americans have viewed themselves in recent
decades. The generations who have lived since World War II have not lived in a world where
the United States was not a dominant international power. The American State has had to work
to maintain that dominance, and a major thread of that supremacy is military power. The United
States is practically the only nation on Earth that has the capacity to affect world events with a
global reach. This international structure with the United States as the central player has been
built over time through diplomatic and economic channels, but its stability rests on American
military power. This international dominance can be viewed as a constant throughout the
Peacetime Draft and the AVF regimes. Americans still view themselves as a dominant nation.
As such, American international identity created with the Peacetime Draft persists into the AVF.
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Yet, crises breed eras of reassessment, and American identity is not immune to this sort
of reassessment. Up until 2001, the U.S. position in the world was practically unchallenged, and
thus American international identity remained relatively intact, in spite of the AVF and the lack
of a draft. Yet, the post-2001 era has been one of persistent American war. The State has fought
these wars with the AVF and no personal cost to the public. What has occurred as a result is a
complete change in the relationship between the State, the military, and the public. The State has
no role for the public in these wars other than uninvolved support. In wars past, the public were
part of the war effort, whether in militias, as draftees, or even large swells of volunteers brought
on by social compulsion. They were engaged as a full-fledged member of maintaining American
growth and dominance. Now, the public is simply a passive actor in an act where the American
State and the U.S. military dominant actors, and their role is nothing more than a supportive one.
That supportive role, compounded by a number of other geopolitical factors, has created
a newer era of American identity, which we will term retrospective identity. This is not the same
as previous forms of identity that we have discussed because this does not create a newer vision
of what it means to be an American. It is instead a reflective and reflexive form of identity
which focuses on the components of identity from by-gone eras through a strong form of
patriotism for what the nation has accomplished. We can see these components of retrospective
identity in patriotic demonstrations, which have become quite common in the post-2001 era.
Retrospective identity construction does not require any sort of active participation from the
public. Instead, we could consider it an identity in which the nation rests on its laurels and great
past deeds to justify itself today. Since it requires no active support from the public, individual
citizens can either accept or ignore it. Individual Americans can take pride in being American or
not, and they can use retrospective identity to self-identify however they wish. There may be
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certain elements within American identity that they may identify with more, and that may be part
of their particular form of retrospective identity. What is problematic though, as we will see, is
that retrospective identity creates passive supporters of the State’s war machine, and this in turn
perpetuates war in the current era. The State will use retrospective identity to garner public
support for wars, but in this era, the State can still conduct war regardless of public support.
The rest of this section will look at just a few different elements within American
retrospective identity to illustrate more what it is and how it manifests to make war more likely.
We will look at some of the geopolitical reasons why Americans may be looking to retrospective
identity today as a means of compensating for the U.S. position in the world. Then, we will look
at war as a means of patriotic expression, thus explaining perhaps why these wars may persist.
In the final portion, we will examine the veteran anew as a symbol of national greatness and how
that integrates into this form of identity.
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Perhaps the best place to start to see why retrospective identity is taking root in at the
current time, particularly in the post-2001 era of the AVF. The formation of retrospective
identity is not simply an outgrowth of the AVF, but is instead a combination of what the AVF
created in terms of military power along with geopolitical trends which have shifted the U.S.
position in the world. The U.S. position post-1973 has oscillated between extremes of American
doubt and overconfidence. Post-Vietnam, there was a lot of uncertainty in American military
power, as we saw with the Mayaguez incident and Operation Eagle Claw. The changes to the
AVF in the 1980s, the Persian Gulf War, and the end of the Cold War brought about renewed
hope in the country and its position in the world which lasted through the 1990s. The shift back

179

towards questioning the U.S. position occurred after the September 11, 2001, attacks, which saw
a confidence peak with the onset of new wars, but a gradual slog back towards uncertainty as the
wars dragged on. The missteps in Iraq, where no weapons of mass destruction were found
despite that being the justification for the invasion, and the extended length of Afghanistan and
other minor conflicts have locked the State into a persistent struggle, which has tied down its
focus and resource use to particular regions. There are other factors outside of these wars though
which exacerbate this uncertainty. The precipitous rise of China and other regional powers in the
world present their own set of challenges, for which the American State has few easy answers.
Also, this particular period lacks a Cold War-like adversary which might otherwise allow the
United States to paint itself as a good standing in the face of an evil. That strong international
identity and standing which emerged out of World War II, and even out of the Persian Gulf War,
is not as solid as it once was.
At the same time that this uncertainty has grown in the U.S. global position, Americans
have had declining faith institutions over the years with fewer Americans trusting government.
Institutions like Congress, the presidency, and even the police have all seen declines in
confidence in recent decades. Yet, there is only one institution has bucked this trend, the
military. The military as an institution has retained high levels of trust from the American
public, in spite of the lack of victory in Afghanistan or Iraq and elevated levels of defense
spending.222 This is distinct from the Vietnam period when the perception of a lost war
exacerbated the public’s feelings against the war and the military. It seems that 21st Century
conflicts do not suffer from such consequences from the public. One reason for this may be the
strong linkage between American identity and the military, which is likely in a much purer form
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now than in regimes past. Fighting for the country, no matter the cause, is viewed as a major
responsibility for any citizen. Well over 80 percent of the American public views serving in the
military as a patriotic act.223 Yet, simultaneously, just about 80 percent of the public says the
draft should not be reinstated, a figure that has remained constant for most of the duration of the
Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.224 This dichotomy may seem contradictory, since if military
service is patriotic, then it should be everyone’s responsibility to some extent. However, the fact
that military service has become a choice makes the decision a more noble one, done for a higher
calling, and thus the military retains a higher level of respect. At the same time, the lack of the
public’s personal connection to the military likely leads to a somewhat ignorant understanding
on what the military does and or where it is engaged. By not being forced to serve, the public
can remain apathetic to the actions of the military while also expressing tacit support.
What results from all this is a bit of a conundrum. Americans are largely disconnected
from what occurs in the world, particularly the wars in which the American State engages. The
State can engage in war with or without public support, and in the meantime, the military,
whether it wins or not, remains a highly-respected institution, if not the highest respected
institution in the nation. The public perceives the U.S. position in the world as falling, to include
loss of trust in State institutions, but the military remains a bedrock of perceived strength of the
American public. It is likely in that spot because the public does not connect with it as it did in
the past. It is a revered institution, and this isolates it from many of the consequences that it felt
as an institution during the Vietnam era.
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Retrospective identity factors into this because the public uses patriotism and yearning
for past glories as a substitute for their own form of service. Each regime in the past had some
sort of public service expected in times of war, but not this current regime. There is no State
construction of identity either. Instead, the public is expected to support servicemembers
vehemently because the social expectation is to do so. Often, the public may link this sort of
treatment as a reaction to the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans after returning home from that
conflict, but there is more to it than that. If the public were to lose the military as a respected
institution, there would be no other institution to replace it. The U.S. military represents not just
a defense of the nation, but a defense of the ideals of the American experience, whatever the
individual citizen interprets that to be. It has become the locus and guardian of American pride.
From the Revolution to the Civil War to World War II, the military has fought, sacrificed, and
died for the country. At this point in American history, where government is perceived to be in
constant gridlock and distrust of other institutions is rampant, the military remains the one
institution that can make Americans take pride in themselves with little debate. Displays of
patriotism thus, particularly those showing reverence for the military, become a form of expected
service from the public.
Yet, the problem is that there is no personal cost to this patriotism. Military service and
the public’s patriotism become siloed entities, often cut off from each other when it comes to
war. This is not to say that patriotism is not a component for military service, but more that
patriotism becomes the expectation outside of military service. There are those who serve in the
military, who perform a patriotic duty, and then there are those who do not serve in the military,
who are expected to toe a certain socially-constructed patriotic line. Patriotism thus becomes a
main outlet through which the American public deals with the shifting geopolitical environment
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in which they feel they have no control along with the move towards a less certain American
identity. Patriotism fills that void, and it allows the public to vacate responsibility for
considering the consequences of war or doing anything to shrink the military portion of the State.
The State and the military thus are able to conduct war unabated with little to no political
consequence, as has been the case in the past two decades. Next, we will examine war itself as a
possible panacea for the uncertainty in which the American public feels.

War as a Patriotic Enterprise
The compartmentalization of military service and the public’s patriotism perpetuates a
situation where war occurs, even if there is little justification for it. The State directs the war, the
military serves in the war, and the public supports it through patriotism without challenging it. It
is here where the problem exists. The public disconnect from war allows patriotism to grow with
no limit. During Vietnam, the public shamed the State for its actions. Now, there is no shame in
what the State does vis-à-vis military operations abroad, at least no shame to the point of limiting
any operations the State may wish to do since there is a lack of political consequences. War is
no longer just a means of achieving strategic political goals abroad for the nation, but is also a
means of improving the self-image of the nation. It allows the public to feel better about the
geopolitical situation in which the United States finds itself. Patriotism perpetuates war, and war
perpetuates patriotism in an almost endless cycle.
A walk through almost any portion of American society illustrates the pervasiveness of
patriotism, especially in the post-2001 era. This harkens back to Billig’s banal nationalism and
the use of nationalist flags to recall the nationalist endeavors. The American flag, for example, is
plastered on government uniforms, cars, and any number of other representations. American-
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made items are used as selling points to indicate higher quality, and even just patriotic support is
a selling point as well. Almost all sporting events begin with the national anthem and sometimes
even other patriotic and militaristic displays, like aircraft flyovers or veteran call-outs, sometimes
even with these events quietly sponsored by the military itself.225 American life is replete with
tributes to the military in some form, and these symbols are often inert in their intention, but
undermining in their effect. Patriotism alone does not create war, per se, but it does perpetuate
the use of war to make the greater society feel good about itself.
An example to demonstrate this sort of patriotism perpetuating war would be videos
which show servicemembers being welcomed home from serving abroad. Many news segments
will show unexpecting families in a situation, whether at work, school, a sporting event, or
elsewhere. Their servicemember will appear and surprise them to much fanfare for those who
observe the event.226 This has become a completely normal and habitual event, and Americans
view it as a positive because it reunites a family who has sacrificed their own personal time
together for the country. The problem is that these videos necessitate a war or at least the
perception that the country is at war in order for them to exist. Without a war to separate the
servicemember from his or her family, there would be no need for a reuniting. This element is
often left out of these stories because the feel-good element of reuniting the family takes
precedent, so much so that these sorts of videos often roll in local news segments, even some two
decades after these wars have begun. It would be one thing if these stories of reunification were
simply done at the end of conflicts, as was prevalent in images after World War II, but with
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endless war, these sorts of images are much more commonplace and accepted. This is an
example of the placation of public responsibility for war. In its place now rests a patriotic spirit,
one in which the public pays no personal cost, but one that entertains the public at the same time.
Additionally, support for the military is expected in almost all social and political
situations, and this has become especially prevalent in the major wars of the AVF regime. The
problem with this expectation of support is its pernicious ability to silence dissent against any
war. For example, at the height of the Iraq War, anti-war citizens would sometimes proclaim
support for troops, but not the war.227 This expression was rather common, and its intention was
meant to express support for servicemembers who had to serve while also expressing disdain for
the conflict. However, this sort of expression is still tacit support for the military and militarism
in general, even if one is questioning the State’s actions. The military remains the respected
institution that cannot be questioned. This is not the same sentiment as was in the Vietnam era
when both the military and the war were questioned; now the military itself is not to be
disparaged. One can no longer demean the military because that has other social consequences
with it, but at the same time, there is no political animus to change this. To do so would likely be
considered unpatriotic. As a result, expressions like this silence a major part of the dissent
concerning war. The quelled dissent blunts any argument against war, and along with this, the
lack of the public’s connection to the war provides no impetus to act against war.
These were just a few examples, but they underline that war can serve as a perpetuation
of patriotism for the individual citizen who does not serve. The nation being at war can make the
individual feel better because it stokes patriotic feelings through displays of patriotism. These
sorts of displays are much less impactful when there is not a war to fight. Wars also play into
Paul Rieckhoff, “Can You Support the Troops but Not the War? Troops Respond,” HuffPost,
July 31, 2006, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/can-you-support-the-troop_b_26192.
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retrospective identity because they harken back to times of victory in which the United States
was a positive world actor. With no perceived public cost, war becomes an enterprise unto itself,
not just to take actions abroad, but to make the public feel better about itself.

The Veteran Redux
If we recall from the Peacetime Draft era, the veteran came to be the symbol of patriotism
and service to the country, especially after World War II and the existential war that it was. This
portrayal placed the veteran on a pedestal, separate from society in terms of deserving benefits
that other citizens have not earned. The high standard of treatment of veterans diminished during
Vietnam, but it has since resurged to the point of persistently high social respect and also
persistently high government spending. The veteran of the AVF era is treated more highly and
given more benefits than veterans of eras past. This could be linked in part to the choice of
serving now as more noble and thus more deserving. It could also be linked to the diminishing
number of veterans in the overall population leaving more resources for the select few who
serve. Whatever the reason, it has consequential effects on the political execution of war. The
veteran becomes a symbol of worship, worthy of social spending that other groups do not
receive. The veteran also becomes a justification for political action, even when there is no need
for a particular action.
To illustrate these points, we should first look to how the American State rewards
veterans in the AVF regime. In the Peacetime Draft regime, the veteran had access to money for
college and government-backed home loans. Now, veterans have access to much more. The
Department of Veterans Affairs, or VA, in 2021 spend about $230 billion to administer veterans’
programs, which include running VA hospitals and educational programs. This number is much
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higher than the approximately $50 billion spent on VA programs in the early 2000s.228 Part of
this is because of the higher number of service-connected disabilities due to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. These disabilities privilege a servicemember to upwards of $3000 a
month depending on the severity of the disability.229 Another part of it is recent changes to the
GI Bill to increase benefits and accord more money for college to servicemembers.230 VA
money is separate from the DOD budget, meaning that its budget is an additional burden onto the
State to take care of veterans. Additionally, veterans who are still in the service can receive large
enlistment bonuses, all-but-guaranteed yearly pay raises, and free healthcare from the military as
well as a number of other support services that the military provides, like family assistance
groups or complimentary legal counsel. All of these programs isolate the veteran from many of
the costs that the rest of the public may deal with on a daily basis. The justification is that the
servicemembers earns these benefits, but it is also another way of stratifying a line between the
public and the military. The military does not have to deal with fluctuations in healthcare prices
or concerns about pay cuts, which are often part of the public’s existence. Servicemembers
simply do the job that the public does not want to do itself or have to think about, and thus they
are entitled to such benefits.
Veterans are also further isolated outside of these government programs as well. In terms
of monetary costs on the public, there are a lot more free or reduced cost items that are given to
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veterans as a recompense for their service. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the
rather recent Veterans’ Day tradition of giving free items to veterans. This custom began as a
small event just after the attacks of September 11 when companies like Golden Corral, for
example, want to thank veterans with a free meal.231 Today, hundreds of chains and stores on
Veterans’ Day do these types of deals, with everything from free meals, carwashes, haircuts, or
oil changes to name a few.232 It is now to the point where the expectation is that veterans receive
something free from just about every private establishment on Veterans’ Day, even if it is just a
discount.
Along these same lines is an incessant need for the public to thank veterans for their
service. This occurs at major events to individual one-on-one interactions and many places in
between. Sports events are a clear example of this, with some sort of recognition of military
service as part of any program. However, it is probably most common when individual citizens
meet servicemembers or veterans, which opens an opportunity for those citizens to express
personal thanks. However, this is, once again, a social expectation born out of this post-2001
AVF era. Whether it is meant as a good intention or not does not matter. It places the veteran on
a separate plain than the civilian. It perpetuates a stereotype that veterans are distinct and worthy
of thanks and respect. Whether one agrees with this or not, it compounds an already patriotic
atmosphere that allows the public to accept war as normal, commonplace, and something that
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they are not part of. Without war, the servicemember’s service may not rise to the level of praise
that it is at today.
All of these elements associated with the treatment of veterans are compensation methods
for the public. They play into retrospective identity because, just as the military and war help to
make the public feel better about the U.S. position in the world, treating veterans with respect
achieves a similar end. The veteran is the cornerstone of service to the nation and the State. It is
in the veteran that the image of goodness of being an American emanates from. The veteran
serves as the incarnation of a perceived long tradition of Americans standing for principles, even
when those principles may not be as clearly defined in modern American warfare.
Overall, retrospective identity plays the role of assuaging concerns over American wars.
The public is largely disconnected from the wars and the military, but the public buys into
narratives about how the military is a prominent and respectable institution, no matter what
situation. This is rooted in much of the historical connection that the public has had with the
military in prior regimes, but not so during the AVF. Since the public no longer is forced to
serve in the military and the U.S. position in the world is perceived as being in decline, the
compensation measure is patriotism, which allows the public to feel reassured in an uncertain
world. However, it also placates any public responsibility for the current wars and provides a
major political opening for the State to be permanently engaged in war. Even if the war in
Afghanistan were to end anytime soon, the sheer length of the war along with Iraq and all of the
other minor conflicts fought in the 21st Century show that the United States can now fight in a
permanent war footing. The disconnection between the public and the military will likely
exacerbate this situation, and the burden for war will rest on those who volunteer. Americans
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will continue to use patriotism as a means of compensating for their lack of military service, and
this will in turn shape identity for generations to come.

An Analysis of the Hypotheses for the All-Volunteer Force Regime
Shifting back to our hypotheses, the AVF stands as our final regime of analysis for this
project. The AVF is distinct from all prior regimes in that there was absolutely no compulsory
mechanism for requiring military service to the American public inherent within this regime. All
other periods had some mechanism that was used to compel service either at the Federal with
military drafts or at the state level with militias. As such, this regime serves as the end point of
our analysis as, at least at the time of writing, there is not likely to be a change to this regime.
The AVF will remain the structure of military recruitment for the foreseeable future. As for our
hypotheses, the AVF can address all four in depth, specifically the absence of the elements
addressed in each.
Our first hypothesis concerning regimes with diffused costs and compulsory service
required from the public reducing the length of American wars is supported by the AVF,
particularly by more recent conflicts. It provides credence to the hypothesis by showing a
regime without diffused costs or compulsory service. Afghanistan and Iraq are the two longest
major conflicts in American history, with Afghanistan lasting two decades, more than double the
length of the Iraq War. Clearly, there is a correlation that no required service has created the
environment to sustain longer conflicts in the 21st Century, which is much different than prior
eras. The one possible contradictory example to this hypothesis though is the Persian Gulf War,
which was relatively brief and used the AVF effectively. However, one cannot negate the
extraneous effect that Vietnam Syndrome had on that particular conflict. Keeping the conflict
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short with precise objectives and goals was a necessity to making the AVF a success in the early
1990s. Therefore, any extension of that conflict into a quagmire-like state would have risked the
public’s perception of the AVF, which was politically risky. By Iraq and Afghanistan, the
public’s confidence in the AVF had grown, so its effectiveness was not in question, but the
longer length of these wars seems to correlate with the lack of compulsory service.
Our second hypothesis concerns conscription components shaping American identity
through shared sacrifice. Once again, the AVF serves as an example of the inverse, of no shared
sacrifice in this particular regime, but still lending credibility to the hypothesis. This regime had
neither conscription nor shared sacrifice components. No American was required to sacrifice for
any of these conflicts if they did not volunteer. Thus, the burden of these conflicts fell
exclusively on the AVF and, by extension, the private contracting firms who worked for the
government. This lack of shared sacrificed still shaped American identity, but it did so
differently than in regimes past. The public’s personal investment in wars was more
psychological than physical, and even then, the public had a much easier time at ignoring the
war. The burden of sacrifice rested on a smaller population, so sacrifice did not represent an
element of shaping any form of identity during this regime.
Our third hypothesis, concerning American identity over time being a State-led
development, both by individual states and the Federal Government, associated with the
development of specific military regimes, is not necessarily confirmed by this particular regime,
but that is mainly because the construction of identity ended with the last regime. There was no
new construction of an identity during the AVF regime, in that there was no evolutionary step
beyond international identity. Past regimes had built new identities onto prior forms of identity.
The AVF regime did not do this, instead creating a retrospective identity rooted in patriotic
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displays. Neither the State nor the individual states were substantial creators of any sort of
identity during the AVF period. With no mandatory service regime, the State’s ability to mold
identity within its citizens was limited, and this likely is why this retrospective form of identity
exists with strong elements of patriotism at its core as a sort of panacea for the lack of Stateguided identity formation. The State, however, was not shy about using historical narratives
about American identity to facilitate public support for war. Narratives around the United States
being good, wholesome, and defenders of democracy helped to foster public support for the
wars, especially after the attacks of September 11. These narratives were called upon to achieve
a political end, but they did not create any form of identity. They simply exacerbated the identity
that already existed. Therefore, it is difficult to see this hypothesis as confirmed by the AVF, but
this is more due to the construction of American identity being completed by this time than any
other justification.
Our final hypothesis, that of the disestablishment of conscripted military service creating
a more unstable American identity, reinforced by high levels of patriotism, is clearly
demonstrated by this regime. With fewer direct connections to the military, whether in terms of
family members serving or being a servicemember oneself, the American public has effectively
disengaged from the wars in which the U.S. military fights. The professionalization of the
military has created a highly-specialized force, but it has lost a durable connection to the public
in which it serves. The public is not knowledgeable on what the military does, and with almost
five decades completed of the AVF, the public is at least two generations removed from having
being forced to consider what the military does or to personally face the wars in which the State
fights. The public loves and respects the military, the public supports the military when they
fight in war, but the connection ends there. The compensatory act for this disconnection is a
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sustained level of patriotism, driven by that lack of understanding, but not wanting to challenge
the status quo because there is no personal need to. It is not a newer formation of American
identity more so than it is a reflection on past glories in an uncertain time.

Concluding Remarks on the All-Volunteer Force
Since the end of the Peacetime Draft, the AVF has created a U.S. military that is more
specialized and more adept at late 20th and early 21st Century warfare. As shown in the Persian
Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the AVF is extremely capable and lethal at fighting adversaries and
winning wars against State actors in a quick and decisive manner. However, extended war
drains much of the AVF’s power, which the State has supplemented through private military
contractors and extensive use of the Reserve and National Guard, among other policies and
methods.
The period of the AVF, particularly during the 21st Century, has corresponded with a
growing retrospective American identity. A perceived loss in prestige and position in the world
challenges American beliefs in what the nation represents and where it stands, but to
compensate, citizens exercise a form of patriotism which expounds the veteran and war as both
noble and good. With no personal connection to the military, the public largely does not
intervene in the State’s execution of the wars. Because of this, patriotism acts as a means of
enacting some sense of service within the public since the public is no longer forced to serve
today. This sort of patriotism and form of identity exacerbates the length of modern war because
the public is expected to support the military, and the State obliges by fighting the wars and
providing resources to veterans. This in turn makes the public feel better, but does not impede
the execution of war.
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The AVF serves the end-state for our analysis in this project. The American State in the
decades to come is likely to face numerous challenges internationally, and the U.S. military will
continue to evolve and fight the nation’s wars. What will not change is the state of the AVF in
terms of how it gets its personnel. Volunteers will likely be the only way in which individuals
become servicemembers, whether that be volunteering directly for the military or through private
contracting. A military draft or a renewed form of mandatory service is just not likely to occur
in the long-term future, if ever again. The status and form of American identity is thus not likely
to change either, and the American public, devoid of any sense or connection to American
conflict, will use patriotism and retrospective identity as ways of compensating for its lack of
personal service and sacrifice.
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Chapter Seven
Military Service and Identity: A Summation

“Were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the
ocean, the American military-industrial establishment would have to
go on, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be
invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the
American economy.”
--George F. Kennan

At the beginning of this project, we sought out to discover the American relationship
between military service and identity. To accomplish this, we focused on a set of variables,
seeking to understand the historical connection and development of military service regimes and
American identity. Our goal was first to demonstrate that this connection exists and then to
show what effect it has on the political landscape and development of the United States. We
looked at major conflicts over the course of some two and a half centuries of American history,
and we use war length as a dependent variable to demonstrate a disconnection between the
American public and the U.S. military. We attempted to show how war and the State have
evolved, particularly how the State was weak in the early decades, reliant on individual states
who retained most of the military power, and how over time, the American State usurped
military power to the point that it is unquestioned today that military control is a Federal
prerogative. What exists today is an American military structure that is nested mostly at the
Federal level, with state National Guard units integrated into that structure. The growth of that
structure for most of U.S. history was correlated with a strong public connection to military
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service, whether in the militias, military drafts or volunteers. Today, only one of these elements,
the volunteers, exists, and its use during an era where war has become persistent and
commonplace has changed the landscape of war and dynamics of the public-military
relationship.
What this chapter will provide is a summation of what we have learned from the previous
chapters. We will first look at our hypotheses to see what is supported through our analysis.
After that, we will look briefly at the growth of the State’s military power on a grand scale from
the Founding up until our current era. After that, we will look at the corresponding identity
development lines as they grew over that same time period to see how they overlap today and
still color how Americans view themselves. In the final sections, we will explore a possible
solution to this gap between the military and the public, which is a renewed military draft, as
well as some areas for possible future research beyond this project.

An Analysis of the Hypotheses
The first place we should look to is a summation of the hypotheses inherent to the
project. The hypotheses for this project were as follows:
H1: Military regimes with diffused costs and compulsory service required from the public
reduces the length of American wars.
H2: Military regimes with conscription components shape American identity through
shared sacrifice.
H3: American identity over time has been a State-led development, both by individual
U.S. states and the Federal Government, associated with the development of specific
military regimes.
H4: The disestablishment of conscripted military service has created a more unstable
American identity, reinforced by high levels of patriotism.
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Table 7-1. Overall List of Data Compiled from All Regimes
Conflict

War Type

Outcome

Length
in
Days

Total
Served

Militia/
Draftees
Served

Total
U.S.
Deaths

Revolution
(1775-1783)

Existential/
Defensive

Win

3059

~217,000231,000

~145,000

4,435

War of 1812
(1812-1815)

Dispute/
Defensive

Draw

974

286,730
(official)

~251,730423,000

2,260

Expansionist/
Offensive

Win

649

78,718
(official)

~60,000
(volunteers)

13,283

Existential/
Offensive

Win

1488

2,213,363

~164,000

364,511

Civil War
(Confederacy)

Existential/
Defensive

Loss

1488

~750,0001,227,890

~300,000

~258,000

SpanishAmerican War
(1898)

Expansionist/
Offensive

Win

115

306,760

0

1,662

World War I
(1917-1918)

Dispute/
Offensive

Win

585

4,734,991

2,810,296

116,516

World War II
(1941-1945)

Existential/
Offensive

Win

1365

16,112,566

10,110,104

405,399

Korea
(1950-1953)

Dispute/
Defensive

Draw

1128

5,720,000

1,529,539

36,574

Vietnam
(1964-1973)

Dispute/
Defensive

Loss

3097

8,744,000

1,857,304

58,220

Persian Gulf
(1991)

Dispute/
Offensive

Win

210

2,225,000

0

383

Afghanistan
(2001-?)

Dispute/
Defensive

Undecided

7000+

0

2,352

Iraq
(2003-2011)

Dispute/
Defensive

0

4,418

MexicanAmerican War
(1846-1848)
Civil War
(Union) (18611865)

2,770,000+
Undecided

3195
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The data to help us with these hypotheses can be found on the next page in Table 7-1.
We will refer to this data throughout the chapter to assist with explaining the results of the
hypothesis analysis and the rest of this project. Additionally, in the last section of each chapter,
we looked at each hypothesis to see how the regime compared and whether they were supported
or not. For the sake of simplicity, the hypotheses and regimes are charted below with their
respective results in Table 7-2 along with a scale pointing to whether each hypothesis is
supported, partially supported, or not applicable.

Table 7-2. Hypothesis Results
H1

H2

H3

H4

Militia

S

PS

S

X

Coercive

S

PS

S

X

Peacetime Draft

S

S

S

PS

AVF

S

S

PS

S

Key: S = Supported, PS = Partially Supported, X = Not Applicable

A few things stand out when we look at our hypothesis results. The first is the support
across all regimes of the first hypothesis. Each one of our regimes demonstrated in some
perspective that regimes with diffused costs and compulsory service do reduce the length of
American wars. The militia, coercive, and Peacetime Draft regimes all tend to have wars that are
shorter in duration when compared to the AVF, which is the one regime with the two longest
wars in American history. The average length of major wars in the militia, coercive, and
Peacetime Draft regimes combined is approximately 1384 days.233 For the wars of the AVF,
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Individually, the militia regime wars average to approximately 1560 days, the coercive regime
to 729 days, and the Peacetime Draft regime to 1863 days.
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pegging the war in Afghanistan to just 7000 days, the average is just under 3500 days, and that
average is still growing at the time of writing. It would be a step too far to say that diffused costs
and compulsory service are the only reasons for the shortening of American war. There are a
variety of other factors that could be in play, to include war objectives, political decisions, and
other limitations, but we do easily see some correlation here. We have three regimes where war
placed some burden on the greater population, and this led to reduced war lengths, while the
inverse showed longer war lengths.
The second hypothesis is more or less supported, showing that military regimes with
conscription components tend to help create American identity. In the militia and coercive
regimes, we saw rudimentary forms of American identity at the state and regional level, which
helped to form and mold a greater American identity later one. These state and regional
identities corresponded to service in state militias and Northern/Southern Civil War drafts,
respectively. By World War I, American national identity had become rooted and grew
alongside the military draft at the time. By the end of World War II, American identity had
reached a zenith with the creation of an international identity, molded by the shared wartime
military experience within that the war had created. Finally, the AVF helps to support this
hypothesis by demonstrating the inverse, showing a regime that has no conscription and with the
result being an unmoored, unsure form of retrospective identity that focuses more on
accomplishments of the past than shaping any sort of identity.
The third hypothesis about identity being a State-led development at different levels
related to military regimes is supported as well. Both individual states and the Federal
Government fostered forms of identity through their respective military powers. Individual
states retained military power early on, fostering their own identities. By the Civil War, regional
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identities were reinforced by the respective State structures of the Union and the Confederacy.
Once again, by the time of the World Wars, the American State had become supreme in terms of
military power, and so too had it in shaping American identity at the national and international
level. By the time of the AVF, the State was not molding identity as it had in prior regimes
because it could retain military power without molding that identity. Instead, it could use
patriotism as means of garnering support for political actions and the military. In short, the
American case shows that the State is a strong actor in shaping identity.
The final hypothesis concerns the disestablishment of the conscription regime creating an
unstable form of American identity. This particular hypothesis is only demonstrated by the
Peacetime Draft and AVF regimes as the moment of transition between these two regimes is the
moment where we see the conscription regime end in the United States. Thus, only these two
regimes can shed light on this particular hypothesis. The AVF clearly demonstrates that there is
some merit to this hypothesis; since there is no mandatory service, there is no institution through
which the State can mold and shape identity within the citizenry. This does not mean that the
State cannot shape identity in other ways, through education programs or patriotic appeals, but
the personal costs of those are much different than of military service. Also, the public can
simply ignore these programs or appeals, meaning in some sense that identity becomes whatever
the public generally sees it as. The Peacetime Draft also partially supports this with the Vietnam
War causing social friction which ended the draft and leading to a period of questioning U.S.
supremacy.
Generally, these hypotheses are well-supported. While the regimes may not always line
up with the hypotheses, we can see based on the structure of this project the broader trends
within the fields of American Political Development, nationalism, and civil-military relations
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concerning the State, the construction of its military, what role the public plays in supporting
American war, and how all of these play into the construction of American identity over time.
The next few sections will summarize some of the general aspects of this study supportive of the
hypotheses.

A State-Grown Military
The U.S. military of today is mostly a Federal entity and has been for at least a century.
The American State has usurped military power in the two and half centuries of American
existence, using it to conduct war abroad to achieve political goals. Those goals have shaped the
military, but they have also diverged it from what it once was, forcing it to evolve with each
generation that controls it and each conflict that each generation fights. By looking at this
project’s analysis of the American State, its military, and the historical development of both
institutions, we can determine some common trends which have shaped the military into the
Federal institution that it is today.
First and foremost, the State and war have served to shape the U.S. military into the
structure that it has been in the past and is today. A look back at some of the foundational theory
to this study showed how the State is one of the primary, if not, the primary actor in driving
military development. In general political science terms, States hold onto territory and require
some force in order to defend that territory and the people within it. States are thus bound to
develop militaries or, at the very least, quasi-militaristic structures in order to defend their own
interests. The other component to this is war. States conduct war as a means of either growing
their control or protecting themselves from other States trying to grow their control. The types
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of wars that a State may engage force military structures to adapt and evolve beyond their
original or intended structure.
What is unique about the American case is that it demonstrates this relationship between
the State and war, but adds in a unique strain of anti-statism in the mix. The American military
structure as originally intended was meant to invest the majority of military power at levels
lower than a central government, dividing the military up among the individual states with the
people serving in the militias. These militias represented the bulk of the American fighting force
early on, and they kept the Federal Government from becoming too powerful. The Federal
Government had to ask states for militias to serve as the bulk of its military units, thus keeping a
check on Federal power. This was an idealistic anti-statist system, and at its core were the
people, who made up the militias. As intended, the State could still fight wars, but the strong
involvement of the people through state militias made the State give a compelling reason for
fighting those wars and weakened the State’s ability to enter frivolous conflicts.
Yet, this structure failed fairly quickly, requiring State intervention and adaptation. The
rest of American history beyond the militia system is effectively a protracted political battle in
which the State becomes the dominant entity in military power over time. Soon after the
Founding, battles like the Wabash and Bladensburg provided clear evidence of the shortcomings
of militias as a major military force. The Federal Government grew its military force outside of
the militia with volunteers during the Mexican-American War, and both the Union and
Confederacy used directly military drafts, bypassing the states, to supplement their respective
militaries during the Civil War. The State by this time had become a primary creator of military
force through State coercion, forced in part by the evolving warfare requiring massive armies on
the battlefield. By World War I, compulsory service became the standard, linking the greater

202

society to the wars fought in its name, and the public largely approved through social coercion.
World War II perfected the use of military drafts and was the pinnacle of societal involvement in
total war, and in its wake, it helped to create the Peacetime Draft which mandated an expectation
of military service in war and peace. This expectation lasted until Vietnam, which ruptured this
belief, transitioning the entirety of the U.S. military at all levels to an AVF, which it remains
today.
For almost all of U.S. history except for the first few years after the Founding, the
American State has grown its military power and influence, and each regime has helped to build
that power and influence. The initial movement away from the militia system set in motion the
gradual creation of what the Founders likely never intended, a national military structure with the
bulk of the force at the Federal level. This structure obviously did not occur instantaneously, and
we still have elements of military power at the individual state level with National Guard units
and other forms of state defense forces, but for more than a century now, the Federal
Government has dominated the funding, the shaping, and the use of military forces both on at
home and abroad. The structure of the military is now heavily dependent on the Federal
Government, and any attempt to return military power to the states would be practically
impossible given this dependence.
Yet, when we look at this gradual shift towards aggregating military power at the Federal
level, the American public remained a key component of the military at all levels through most
of this transition, whether serving in early militias or later as volunteers and draftees. As the
State created a system from which it took military power, it still kept the public close to the
military and close to war. This was, at least, one portion of the Founders’ intent that lasted
beyond the initial years of the militia regime. By keeping the public closely knitted to the
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military, the push for war could not be fully successful without some form of explicit public
support. Even after the militia system was officially dissolved with the Dick Act, the State and
the public held onto that belief that if the nation were to go to war, the burden would be shared
across the population in some form. This knitting of the public to the military lasted up through
the Vietnam era, when this belief broke with the perception of an unjust war. Since then, the
American public has largely been a bystander to American war.
Currently, the AVF system is a far cry from the militia-based structure that the Founders
originally implemented, but the AVF is the demonstration of the complete consolidation of
military power under the State while also negating the need for public involvement in war, apart
from just general support. The public is no longer part of the military service equation, except if
they volunteer. This changes the political dynamics of going to war because it places the burden
of war on a select few and it allows the public to sidestep any responsibility for concerns over
war. While the public can still protest war, these protests do little to actually change the
dynamics of war. The American political system as it is still perpetuates war as both political
parties advocate for war in different contexts and for different reasons, all the while the military,
intelligence agencies, and other government departments focused on security consume resources
to justify their own existence. The public does not have to politically accept this or agree with it,
but as we have seen over two decades of war, the public does little to change this dynamic.
Since 2001, the United States has been on a permanent war footing, and the structure and
general acceptance of the AVF has allowed this to happen. The State has created a military force
structure which allows it conduct permanent war abroad, and few in the political class or the
public challenge it. Once again, the AVF is the only moment in U.S. history where the
expectation of any sort of military service does not exist, and during that time, two of the longest
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wars in American history have occurred. The lack of public involvement in fighting American
war has created an era of permanent, if not, at the very least, prolonged war.

Modern American Identity
Turning towards American identity, this project sought to explore how these military
regimes helped to shape American identity. Each regime presented a form of identity that was
reinforced with the military service structures of that particular time. With the militia regime, we
saw individual state identities arise. During the coercive regime with military drafts, we saw the
rise of regional and national identity. With the Peacetime Draft, international identity became a
consolidated form of American identity. Subsequently, with the AVF, we saw retrospective
identity, which was not so much a new identity, but more a reflection on past identities given the
geopolitical situation in the United States finds itself in today. Throughout each of these
regimes, the military structure in place reinforced that particular identity, but even with this, we
still see strands of these separate identities interwoven in the greater American identity of today.
It is this interweaving which helps to foster the retrospective identity that we see in today’s
American society.
If we recall, militias were a fundamental institution to forming and creating individual
state identity. Most of the 13 colonies had their own militias with some form of identity based
on their state political culture. Additionally, we saw examples of the inverse, where instead of
states forming militias, militias helped to form states in the case of Vermont and Texas by
creating an institution before the state itself was established. State identity was thus reinforced
through militia service where individuals served with other individuals from their communities
and were regrouped into units that were organized and named by the states from which they
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came. Moreover, interactions with the bureaucracy were primarily state-based with much less
power and influence emanating from the Federal level.
Regional identities developed out of common cultural traits held by states in particular
regions. Originally, the main classification for these regional identities evolved out of the
Federal Government’s classification of free states and slave states, which for the most part tends
to overlap with Northern and Southern states. A lot of the construction of Northern and Southern
identity came from antebellum legislation at the Federal level that grouped together states based
on their use of slavery, and the Civil War reinforced these regional identities with State-like
structures in place, becoming effectively the culminating event for the construction of American
regional identity. Both the Confederacy and the Union used their State structures to draft their
respective citizens into their militaries, which in turn strengthened regional identities because it
compelled individuals to fight for their respective causes. Both drafts are examples of State
coercion forcing identity upon individuals. These regional identities lasted well beyond the Civil
War with most Northern and Southern states sharing common political and social practices and
ideologies. In the end, these regional identities served as a stepping stone between individual
state and national identity.
A national identity coalesced out of the turn of the 20th Century when the American State
had much more power to shape and mold people’s lives directly. The movement westward
across the North American continent had ended with most territory being formed into new states.
With the State’s amalgamation of military power at the Federal level, particularly after the
success of the Spanish-American War and through legislation like the Dick Act and the National
Defense Act of 1916, the only remaining requirement to consolidate a national identity was a
cause, which came during World War I. In spite of the isolationist movement prior to the war,
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the public embraced the conflict once war had been declared in 1917. The frenzy to register for
the draft and serve created a social coercion, which consolidated the American formation of
national identity around a renewed ideal of military service when the nation calls. It is by this
time that a viable form of American national consciousness and identity began to exist.
The next form, which was perhaps the pinnacle, of American identity came out of the
World War II era when the American State prepared and executed a total war. The American
fight against the Japanese and Nazi Germany created an existential crisis which the American
public and the U.S. military had to face together. Millions enlisted and over 10 million were
drafted to fight. The American industrial based was mobilized as well, and what came out of
World War II was an international identity for the American public. This identity was defined
the different elements of freedom, democracy, capitalism, and the willingness of all Americans
to fight for those values. The State reinforced this identity through the Peacetime Draft,
compelling citizens to serve if they were chosen, whether in wartime or peace. This sort of
identity still defines the Americans view of themselves today, serving as a centerpiece for
narratives on global U.S. dominance.
This leads us to the form of identity that we see today, that of retrospective identity,
formed in the decades since Vietnam and in the absence of any sort of mandatory military
service. It is best to look at this kind of identity as an amalgamation of elements of prior
identities. With the State’s role much less in fostering and shaping identity through any sort of
mandated service, military or otherwise, the State has allowed for American identity to become
what individual Americans interpret it to be, and if anything, this form of identity rests more on
the victories of the past than it does on creating something new or durable. What has resulted is
a coloration of identity that is a mix of what we have seen in prior regimes. Retrospective
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identity allows Americans to simply take elements from the collective past and use them to
justify actions of today. Much of this is done through the frame of patriotism and other acts
which make the public feel better about the uncertain status of American power today. For
instance, if the United States has fought in the past against tyranny and for freedom and
democracy, these justifications overlap much easier onto narratives for war than other reasons
may.
With American identity being an evolution over time, the one element that is clear from
our analysis of it is that the current period has not been an evolutionary step forward in identity
creation but rather a step backwards. Using American identity in whatever forms is cheap now
since there is little to no cost to the individual, and this retrenchment is correlated with the
establishment of the AVF. One by-product is a general sense or need to be at war in order to
make the public feel better about the state of American international affairs today. However, that
weight of war falls squarely on the shoulders of those who volunteer, not the hundreds of
millions of other Americans who do not serve. In wars past, the public was involved through
service, thus earning their identity. This is not the case today.

A Short Case for a Renewed Military Draft
There is one possible solution that might help solve the disconnect between the public
and the military: bring back the military draft. First, this argument for the draft should be
caveated with an acknowledgement that this is likely never to occur, at least not in 21st Century
American society as it is. A military draft would create influx of personnel into a military
structure that has adapted to the current volunteer requirements in place since 1973. This
structure incorporates technology, funding sources, and private enterprise much differently now
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than during prior regimes with mandatory service components. Additionally, despite the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan being much longer than other American conflicts, the AVF has
managed and succeeded where it needed to in order to achieve strategic objectives. To bring in
millions and millions of new draftees would likely create chaos within the ranks, at least in the
interim until the military figured out what to do with draftees. Plus, the drawdowns in
Afghanistan and Iraq have lowered the operations tempo on the AVF, which has allowed much
of the force to readjust and posture towards other threats abroad. As it is now, the AVF is poised
to meet the demands of American war as it is today.
However, this project did not seek to solve that problem. The AVF as a military
organization does its job and it does it well. The use of a draft in this argument is not intended to
win wars or meet the demands of a war machine, but rather to create a common institution where
Americans come together and share a common experience. World War II and the and the
Peacetime Draft forged a common experience where it became harder to view American political
problems individualistically, but easier to view them as a collective problem that society must
deal with together. During that period, the American social safety net grew for all Americans,
not just veterans. The collective strength of the country was high because of that shared
experience. Since the AVF was implemented, we have seen collective political action regress to
some extent, and part of it could be that there is no common place for Americans of all stripes
and creeds to come together under a common cause. The effects of a military draft are not
simply on wars, but they are also domestic as well.
Additionally, in the early 21st Century, the U.S. military remains the guardian institution
of American identity. The public looks to the military as a point of pride for the entire nation.
Other generations prior have sacrificed for the country, and that sacrifice continues today, but
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only for those who serve. Most Americans today will never experience military life, so they are
mere bystanders in the military experience, but they take pride in the actions of the military
without sacrificing. This honoring of servicemembers and their sacrifice allows the public to
simply be complacent in their responsibilities for the wars. It allows them to not face the
country’s wars while simultaneously taking pride. The political consequences of war are not felt,
shared, or thought about. A draft would rectify this almost immediately.
Finally, one cannot help but consider the counterfactual case of the state of American war
would be today if there were a draft over the past two decades. It is hard to imagine that the wars
in Iraq or Afghanistan would have lasted as long as they did. The social discord that ended
Vietnam may have reverberated during the 2000s, and that discord could have truncated both of
these conflicts. Parents would have been forced to send sons and daughters off to war that they
did not fully understand. It is hard to say whether they would have accepted that sacrifice, given
that their generation never had to serve and the experience of their parents’ and grandparents’
generations were forced upon them anew. The reaction to the wars would probably have been
stiffer and more resounding rather than the general ignorance and malaise about the conflicts that
we see today. One could also say that a draft may have changed the dynamics of the American
military structure during these conflicts. With a practically limitless amount of personnel,
servicemembers may have had to serve only one deployment and the privatization of certain
military functions may have been stunted. The wars of the 21st Century certainly would have
been different if a draft had been implemented.
Much of this is conjecture, but nonetheless, there is one certainty with a military draft:
the political cost of going to war becomes much heavier. When the whole or large part of a
society has to carry the burden of war, the State must react to meet the demands of the greater
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society because of their sacrifice. If the State goes to war and drafts its citizens to fight, that
sacrifice must create clear results, and it forces the State to achieve those results as quickly as
possible. Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that with an AVF, there is much less political cost to
going to and staying at war. Americans not involved in the war, who are not forced to confront
the wars fought in their name, can simply check out. That abdication of responsibility is an
individual decision for each person, but it is one made with a collective guilt upon the whole of
society. A draft puts a political cost on the public for war, and therein lies its true merit.

Areas for Future Research and Concluding Remarks
This project set about to connect the American identity to military service, a connection
that most would agree exists in some form. However, we sought to explore how both military
service and identity have changed over time. For almost 200 years of American history from the
Revolution to Vietnam, the State had some mechanism for compelling individual citizens into
military service, whether through militias or drafts. Since 1973, however, that system has not
existed, and what we have now at this point is almost five decades without that expectation from
the public. The State has managed and found ways of maintaining its military power through
volunteers, but also with a heavy reliance on private enterprise which has supplemented the
AVF. In spite of most Americans today never serving in the military, the demand for military
power remains. Whether it has grown or not is up to the individual to interpret, but the State has
not shied away from using that power.
This study has opened up quite a few areas that could be further researched both beyond
and with the scope of this project. The five decades of the AVF means we have a wealth of data
points that can be analyzed for how the public interacts with the military. If we recall, one of the
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largest gaps in civil-military relations is that direct public-military dynamic since most civilmilitary relations studies focus on how the civilian authorities control the military. This project
only shows some of the general trends in public-military relations vis-à-vis the military draft and
militias. Exploring this further would be worthy academic endeavor. On a separate note, one
could consider the structure of the regimes presented in this study as an opportunity to
investigate further the structure of the U.S. military over time. The broad changes from the
militia system to the AVF lend themselves to limitless avenues of analysis both within a
particular regime or across regimes. The general scope of this study could allow for more
avenues of exploration, particularly within certain elements of each regime, such as how
executive or legislative actions helped to create military structures, like the National Guard or
other military institutions.
As for identity, there are also quite a few avenues of study available. With each regime
corresponding to a particular identity, a further analysis of each particular identity within a
regime may create more nuances or opportunities for comparison across regimes. For example,
the modern-day reminiscence of the militia regime in terms of creating modern-day illegal
militias and the obsessive nature concerning the Second Amendment is likely closely linked to
formations of American identity created today about the past. These manifestations might yield
explanations for why this connection remains strong today. Along with that, delving further into
patriotism and how that manifests within the population would also expose some of the other
political elements in play here with how the public treats the military to this day and how that
affects the construction of American identity. Overall, there are plenty of further avenues of
study beyond this particular project.
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In closing, we will finish with a few thoughts on the current and future state of American
war. At the time of writing, the war in Afghanistan seems to be drawing a close. After two
decades of warfare, the longest war in American history seems to be ending, although that could
change depending on the political decisions that are made. This possible end to such a long
conflict can be seen as a positive step towards peace or simply the precipice of the next stage in
the conflict, similar to how the 2011 pullout in Iraq did not definitively end American
involvement in Iraq. Afghanistan’s claim to the title of longest American conflict is unlikely to
be challenged in the foreseeable future. The United States does not seem poised to launch
another major conflict, although, once again, that could change. Whatever occurs, whether the
American State fights another major conflict, remains relatively nimble and engages in conflicts
across the world with a smaller footprint, or disengages with the world completely, what will
endure are the precedents set by both Iraq and Afghanistan and its use of the AVF. The
American political class will not burden the American public with the personal consequences of
war. No American citizen will have to serve in a conflict for which they do not willingly
volunteer, and the AVF is not going anywhere. The consequences of all future American wars
will be borne by the select few who choose to serve, and the public will simply be expected to
support the military and the conflicts, even tacitly.
American war will not end with Afghanistan. The U.S. military will remain engaged in
smaller conflicts around the world, but the next big conflict will come. That conflict will involve
a public even further removed from American war. The question remains what role will it play
in that war, or better yet, after the example set by the public’s involvement in Afghanistan, will
that public even care?
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